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This dissertation consists of three chapters studying the effects of public goods and
public infrastructure investments on urban growth and local government finances.
The first chapter estimates, first, how local governments finance federal mandates
and, second, how much value local residents place on mandated local spending us-
ing a change in federal rules on municipal infrastructure following the 1972 Clean
Water Act (CWA). I leverage the role of river networks in distributing pollutants
across cities, combined with pre-CWA state regulatory intensity, to account for the
endogeneity of municipal infrastructure adoption decisions, and to predict ex ante
compliance with the CWA infrastructure mandate. Cities that were under the burden
of compliance experienced substantial improvements to local ambient water quality
as well as a three-fold increase in resident fees. Public spending on non-mandated
items did not change, indicating that mandates are unlikely to displace local funding
of other goods and services. The simultaneous increases to water quality and local
costs resulted in taste-based sorting. However, I find that resident value of the man-
dated infrastructure depends upon the complementarity of surface water quality to
pre-existing local features, as well as exposure to upstream polluters. These results
imply that mandates may reduce inefficiencies to local public goods provision and
provide positive benefits that are valued no less than their costs to local residents.
The second chapter, joint with Matthew E. Kahn and Shanjun Li, considers the
efficiency of local public service provision. A key challenge in quantifying the ef-
ficiency of the public sector stems from limited “apples to apples” comparisons of
service functions offered by both public and private sectors, as well as the high corre-
lation between local demand, demographic composition, and the local government’s
ability to deliver quality services. This paper posits a solution to this empirical
challenge in two ways. First, we focus on public bus transit which is a relatively
undifferentiated service across US municipalities. Second, we apply a regression
discontinuity design using local mayoral elections as a source of random variation
that predicts privatization levels in order to estimate causal effects of privatization
on service efficiency. We find that privately operated firms provide bus transit at
significantly lower costs per mile, largely due to their ability to circumvent public
sector unions. We estimate that privatizing bus transit - a service used dispropor-
tionately by lower income groups - would lower the average bus fare by $1 per trip
and create over 26,000 bus operator jobs nationally. However, these cost savings do
not necessarily outweigh benefits of providing high-paying public sector employment
opportunities.
The third chapter, joint with Panle Barwick, Shanjun Li, and Jing Wu, applies
predictions of the Alonso-Muth-Mills model of urban land use to the context of Bei-
jing’s 2008 road rationing policy to identify how such policy instruments impact the
spatial distribution of wealth within cities. We find that Beijing’s rationing policy
significantly increased the demand for housing near subway stations as well as central
business districts. Further, we find the composition of individuals living proximate
to subway stations as well as proximate to Beijing’s central business districts shifted
toward wealthier households. Our findings are consistent with theoretical predictions
of the monocentric city model with income-stratified transit modes. These results
provide suggestive evidence that city-wide road rationing policies can have the unin-
tended consequence of limiting access to public transit for lower income individuals.
Dedicated to Janie and Richard Jerch
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CHAPTER 1
THE LOCAL CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL MANDATES:
EVIDENCE FROM THE CLEAN WATER ACT
1.1 Introduction
Federal spending mandates are a controversial component of US fiscal federalism.
In recent years, local governments have allocated over 13% of their annual expen-
ditures to federally-mandated programs.1 These include compliance with surface
water pollution control under the Clean Water Act, improvements to drinking water
quality under the Safe Drinking Water Act, lead-based paint abatement, and vehicle
emissions control under the Clean Air Act (PriceWaterhouse 1994; Conlan 1994).
Collectively, the average local expenditure share allocated to mandate compliance is
equivalent to the average local expenditure share on public safety (US Census Bu-
reau 2015). This figure has tripled since the early 1970’s (Conlan 1994). How have
these federal mandates impacted local governments? Opponents—both at state and
local levels—argue that mandates infringe upon local sovereignty, inhibit the ability
of cities to tailor their spending to preferences of local taxpayers, and place sub-
stantial cost burdens on local governments unable to flexibly raise revenues to meet
mandated expenditure requirements.2 Despite the largely negative popular opinion,
1Based on author’s calculations using aggregate local cost needs reported in Conlan (1994) Table
2-2 and mean municipal annual expenditures sourced from US Census Bureau (2015). Conlan (1994)
p.13 also cites national survey studies that find mandate compliance costs comprise between 11 and
12% of locally raised revenues.
2As recently as July 2018, members of Congress drafted a bill to limit federal mandates, citing
its adverse impacts on local businesses and government budgets (Kasperowicz 2018). In 2017, the
1
empirical evidence on local budgetary responses to federal mandates is quite limited.
Yet, understanding how local governments respond to federal mandates reveals im-
portant information on factors that govern their budgetary process, and ultimately,
the effectiveness of federal policies that are implemented at the local level. In this
article, I provide new empirical evidence on how cities fund compliance with federal
mandates as well as the effectiveness of mandates at meeting their national goal us-
ing federal dictates on infrastructure spending following the 1972 Clean Water Act
(CWA).
Is federally mandated spending necessarily mis-aligned with local taxpayer pref-
erences? If local governments provide public goods at an efficient level, federal or-
ders on local spending should, indeed, reduce the social surplus of existing residents
(Samuelson 1954). However, there are several reasons why local public goods may
be undersupplied relative to a locally efficient level. Large fixed costs, economies
of scale, and credit constraints may prevent municipalities from investing in valued
infrastructure projects (Fisher 2015). Additionally, failures of coordination, in which
local provision decisions partially depend upon the decisions of other local govern-
ments, may lead to underprovision of public goods, particularly if those public goods
generate spatial spillovers (Cooper and John 1988; Fisher 2015). This is a noteworthy
concern with surface water quality, which was the focus of the 1972 CWA.
Mandated programs potentially address these inefficiencies. Several of the largest
mandated programs, including the CWA and the Safe Drinking Water Act, are ac-
state of New York passed mandate-relief legislation in an effort to alleviate fiscal burdens on New
York school districts (Seward 2017).
2
companied by federal grants and subsidies (Conlan 1994). If local residents are
infra-marginal consumers of the mandated public good, federal mandates may pro-
vide local benefits to the extent that they relax fiscal pressure on, or credit constraints
to, public goods provision. Additionally, the national scale and uniformity of these
programs may induce strategic complementarities across local governments. For ex-
ample, the marginal benefits to a city of abating surface water pollution may increase
if all other cities sharing the same river also abate. To the extent that inefficiencies
induce local governments to undersupply public goods with high fixed costs or diffuse
benefits, federal mandates may generate substantial local benefits in the long run,
even if they are politically unfavorable in the short run.
In this article, I further analyze the effects of mandate compliance on local gov-
ernment by asking: is local spending on mandated public goods valued above its
costs to local residents? I measure the net value of mandated spending by assessing
changes to house prices, population, and skill composition of local residents following
compliance with federal requirements on infrastructure. These hedonic and sorting
responses provide an indication as to whether individuals value mandated public
goods provision more than the local cost.
Despite the growing prominence of federal mandates as a share of municipal
budgets, very little is known about their consequences for the fiscal or economic
well-being of local governments. A major impediment to conducting this type of
research has, historically, been the lack of national-scale data on the local provi-
sion of a federally mandated public good. To remedy this problem, I obtained new
3
data from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on the census of municipal
wastewater treatment plants—a public good which was federally mandated under the
1972 CWA. Importantly, I obtained these data from an early survey that predates
enforcement of the CWA regulations, thus allowing me to estimate mandate compli-
ance effects by comparing municipal outcomes before versus after federal enforcement
of the mandate. The 1972 CWA aimed to improve the environmental health of US
rivers and lakes by requiring that polluters of surface waters, including any munic-
ipal government operating a public sewerage system, treat their wastewater with a
minimum level of pollution abatement technology. Cities with ex ante noncompliant
wastewater treatment technology were under regulatory pressure to invest in more
effective abatement technology following the 1972 legislation.
A second major challenge to understanding the local impacts of mandate com-
pliance is that of causal identification. Specifically, local governments differ widely
with respect to the preferences of their taxpayers and their ability to provide cer-
tain public goods, including wastewater treatment infrastructure. Such underlying
differences across cities in their pre-policy provision of wastewater treatment infras-
tructure are likely deterministic of differences across these cities in their local fiscal
conditions and ability to attract taxpayers.
To solve this endogeneity problem, I construct an instrument that predicts
wastewater treatment adoption using city-level variation in riparian exposure to
downstream populations and state-level variation in pre-policy water pollution regu-
lation. The intuition behind my identification strategy is that cities with historically
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large population centers downstream were more likely to be pressured by their down-
stream neighbors to adopt stringent wastewater treatment, long before the CWA
became legislation, in order to reduce conveyance of harmful pollutants to down-
stream drinking water sources. Furthermore, this inter-jurisdictional pressure was
more likely to be enforced for cities within states with more regulation of surface wa-
ter pollution. Such early-adopter cities were unaffected by the CWA infrastructure
standard when the law passed in 1972 because they had already adopted secondary
treatment technology. By leveraging variation in infrastructure adoption driven by
forces external to the city, this instrument provides variation in ex ante CWA com-
pliance that is plausibly exogenous to local spending decisions or growth.
In contrast to the main popular criticism against federal mandates, I do not
find evidence that cities were forced to displace funding of other goods and ser-
vices in order to fund compliance with the CWA mandate. While the infrastructure
requirements caused local governments to more than double their expenditures on
wastewater from 6% prior to the Act to over 14% of their total budgets, cities pri-
marily funded these compulsory expenditures through federal grants and by tripling
fees on residents. I find that the mandated expenditures on wastewater treatment
led to economically and statistically significant improvements in water quality: cities
under the burden of compliance with the CWA experienced a 18% improvement to
surface water quality, on average, as measured by dissolved oxygen concentration.
My results are consistent with recent work by Keiser and Shapiro (2018) who find
significant positive effects of CWA federal grants on dissolved oxygen levels. How-
ever, this study advances prior work concerned with the CWA by providing a new
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estimate on the effectiveness of the CWA technology standard—the primary regula-
tory instrument of the 1972 legislation—at meeting the Act’s main goal of improving
surface water quality. The findings of this paper demonstrate that the CWA mini-
mum technology standard for wastewater treatment was effective at improving the
environmental health of rivers and lakes across the US. More broadly, these find-
ings suggest that the local implementation of a federal pollution control policy was
effective at improving US surface waters.
When considering the average city, I find that local improvements to surface wa-
ter quality had positive impacts on population growth and housing prices, suggesting
that the mandated infrastructure was at least valued at its marginal cost to local
residents. However, the aggregate effects mask important sources of heterogeneity
in city responses. First, per capita compliance costs were 20% higher among smaller
cities unable to exploit scale economies in infrastructure realized by larger cities.
Second, I show that the value of mandate compliance to local residents was greatest
among cities with warmer summer climates, closer proximity to large waterbodies,
and greater exposure to upstream abatement. I interpret these findings as demon-
strating that federal mandates can correct for inefficiencies to local public goods
provision in the presence of market failures. I further interpret these findings as sug-
gestive that both efficiency and equity could have improved under the CWA federal
aid program if grant allocation followed city-specific abilities to benefit from scale
economies as well as improved surface water quality.
Prior work concerned with the local impacts of federal spending mandates is
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quite limited. Miceli and Segerson (1999) develop a theoretic framework to compare
the relative efficiency of fully, partially, or unfunded federal mandates. Cre´mer and
Palfrey (2000) also derive a theoretical framework to understand welfare gains from
various federalist systems of public goods provision, but does not consider welfare
gains in the case when local decisions on public goods provision are strategically
linked across jurisdictions - a scenario that is highly relevant to local water pollution
abatement. Empirical work on federal mandates mainly rely on isolated case studies
(Weiland 1998 and Hanford and Sokolow 1987) or focus on education outcomes
following No Child Left Behind (Imazeki and Reschovsky 2004; Reback et al. 2014;
Deming et al. 2016) without consideration for local government budgetary responses
to mandate compliance.3 Work by Katherine Baicker (Baicker 2001 and Baicker
and Gordon 2006) provides the closest parallel to my study. She explores state-
level budgetary responses to federally mandated changes to healthcare spending and
finds significant evidence of crowd out in welfare payments. One plausible reason
my findings of no crowd-out contrast from hers is that wastewater treatment has
few substitutes. A city cannot readily reduce surface water pollution through means
other than by adopting treatment technology. Medicaid spending, in contrast, may
be a substitute service for welfare payments, since both mainly serve health and
quality of life among lower-income populations.
My paper makes three important contributions to the public finance and envi-
3National survey studies by Conlan (1994), NLC (2017), EPA (1988) and Lake et al. (1979)
provide evidence that mandates displace local funding of other public goods, however these studies
are descriptive and based on self-reported responses to surveys explicitly concerned with federal
mandates, which may invite biased responses from local officials.
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ronmental economics literature: First, I provide the first test of local fiscal responses
to federal mandates. Specifically, I show that the unfunded local costs of CWA man-
date compliance were financed through increasing revenues, rather than re-allocating
spending away from other public goods and services. This finding contrasts with
most existing work on local budgetary responses following shocks to taxpayer wealth
(Skidmore and Scorsone 2011; Lutz et al. 2011; Lutz 2008; Alm et al. 2011; Feler and
Senses 2017; Melnik 2017; Cromwell et al. 2015) because, unlike these papers, my
results demonstrate that cities do not respond to a budget shock through austerity
measures. However, this asymmetry is consistent with the “flypaper effect” summa-
rized by Hines and Thaler (1995), which suggests governments respond to taxpayer
wealth shocks differently than to proportional increases in expenditure obligations.
This finding has important policy implications because it demonstrates that federal
mandates are unlikely to displace funding of other local goods and services. In other
words, the current focus within congressional mandate reform on local fiscal burdens
may be overly narrow.
Second, I provide evidence that partially funded federal mandates can reduce
inefficiencies to the provision of public goods that are valued by local residents. While
popular opinion generally agrees that federal mandates serve to further interests
specific to a national agenda, I argue that mandate compliance can provide important
benefits locally if mandates correct for certain market failures that otherwise restrict
the local provision of public goods.
Lastly, my paper contributes to a rich literature concerned with estimating the
8
value of policy-induced changes to environmental amenities (Keiser and Shapiro 2018;
Banzhaf and Walsh 2008; Kahn 2000; Chay and Greenstone 2005; Greenstone and
Gallagher 2008; Gamper-Rabindran et al. 2011; Sieg et al. 2004). To the best of my
knowledge, this paper is the first to study the direct regulatory impacts of the CWA
technology standard. More broadly, my paper demonstrates that environmental reg-
ulation enforced through a federal mandate can impact local public finances and, in
particular, can increase the cost of living for local residents. This finding is important
because several national environmental policies, including the Clean Air Act, the Safe
Drinking Water Act, and the Superfund Amendments—like the CWA—require local
government expenditures for their implementation (Conlan 1994). Consideration of
the local public finance element of these regulations is of first order concern because,
if environmental improvements from federal regulation spur increases to local taxes
or fees, hedonic estimates may systematically underestimate true willingness to pay
for environmental amenities.
The remainder of my paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides a brief
overview of the theoretical framework motivating my empirical estimation, Section
1.3 provides institutional background on the CWA regulations and determinants of
wastewater treatment technology adoption, Section 1.4 describes the data, Section
1.5 presents the two empirical approaches I use to identify the effects of the CWA
infrastructure mandate, and Section 1.6 discusses my results and provides several
robustness checks. In Section 1.7, I explore heterogeneity in municipal responses to
the CWA. Finally, Section 1.8 concludes.
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1.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section, I discuss the basic theoretic framework motivating my empirical
research design. The experience of Walton, NY provides context for the theoretic
motivation.
Walton is a village of 3,700 people situated along the west branch of the Delaware
River. Following the CWA, Walton was mandated to build a $9 million wastewa-
ter treatment plant (Newman 1976). Their annual operating budget in that same
year was $556,000 ($3.07 million in 2012 dollars). While Walton received large fed-
eral subsidies to comply with the CWA infrastructure requirement, the challenge of
meeting the local cost share as well as securing federal aid had several implications
for the city’s finances. For the first time in its 300 year history, Walton issued debt,
charged sewerage user fees on its residents, and applied for intergovernmental grants.
Did residents of Walton value this new wastewater treatment more than its costs?
Figure 1.3 illustrates that the CWA federal mandate on wastewater treatment
infrastructure can have two opposing effects that depend upon the initial efficiency
of local public goods provision. If pre-CWA Walton is best represented by the left
panel, city A, water pollution abatement in equilibrium was under-provided due to
some market failure such as credit constraints or coordination failures stemming from
upstream pollution spillovers. Note, that while existence of pollution externalities
can induce under-provision of pollution abatement relative to an aggregate, social
efficiency perspective, credit constraints and coordination failures can induce under-
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provision from a local efficiency perspective. These market failures generate a wedge,
indicated by X, between the locally efficient level of P ∗ and the equilibrium level,
PLow. For city A, the mandate serves to, both, reduce credit constraints by providing
federal matching grants and reduce coordination failures because it requires that all
cities on the same river equally abate their pollution. The former reduces marginal
costs while the later increases the local marginal benefit of abatement. Consequently,
the mandate increases local surplus of living in city A.
On the other hand, if pre-CWA Walton is best represented by city B, residents
experience the mandate as strictly reducing local surplus because the city was already
providing pollution abatement at its locally efficient level. The mandate forces this
city to abate at a level beyond which additional benefits outweigh additional costs.
Following Oates (1969), I consider a utility maximizing consumer who weighs the
benefits stemming from the menu of local public services against the cost of their
tax liability and chooses as a residence the location that provides them with the
greatest surplus of benefits over costs. The individual’s tax liability is their effective
“price” of consuming the local output of public services. After Walton increases its
tax liability in order to expand its output of public services (i.e., pollution abatement
through wastewater treatment), property values need not decline and may actually
increase if residents value the additional public good provision more than its cost.
Mandated expansion of the public good will increase property values in city A of
Figure 1.3 because the mandate will serve to increase local social surplus. In addition
to property values, changes to population provide evidence of a positive revealed
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preference for changes in public goods, as individuals “vote with their feet” (Tiebout
1956; Banzhaf and Walsh 2008).
At least 10,000 other villages, towns, and cities like Walton were also in violation
of national restrictions on dumping untreated sewage and waste into surface waters
following the CWA (EPA 1973). Whether city A or city B is more representative
of the average US city prior to the CWA is an empirical question. Consequently,
I estimate the effect of the CWA mandate on local taxes and fees, population, and
housing prices to test whether, on average, the mandate altered local tax liabilities
and whether it increased or a decreased efficiency of public goods provision.
My empirical approach exploits the 1972 CWA policy change in order to isolate
the mandate’s effects on these outcomes net of any remaining confounding factors.
Let i index cities, and t index years, I estimate:
yit = β(Pi × POSTt) + XiΓt + εit , (1.1)
where yit is one of several outcomes of interest, including local fees, population, and
housing prices; Pi is an indicator equal to 1 if a city is under the burden of CWA
mandate compliance ex ante; and POSTt is an indicator equal to 1 for years after
the CWA came into effect. β provides the differential change in y for a noncompli-
ant relative to a compliant city as a result of the CWA mandate. If the mandate
increased local social surplus and increased local efficiency of wastewater treatment
provision then β will be positive. In the following sections, I discuss determinants of
wastewater treatment technology adoption and potential sources of endogeneity in
ex ante noncompliance.
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1.3 Regulation of Surface Water Pollution
1.3.1 Benefits & Costs of Wastewater Treatment
Wastewater treatment facilities protect environmental and public health by treating
sewage, urban debris, and pathogens from piped waters before they return to rivers
and lakes. By removing oxygen-consuming organic matter that damages aquatic
ecosystems, wastewater treatment helps the environment as well as the aesthetic
and recreational use value of surface waters.4 Specifically, wastewater treatment can
improve surface water clarity be reducing instances of algal bloom eutrophication and
aids in improving aquatic biodiversity (Brown 2018). Prior work on water quality
valuation demonstrates that consumers value improvements to recreational fishing,
swimming, boating, and surface water clarity (Olmstead and Kuwayama 2015; Bock-
stael et al. 1987, Lipton 2004; Boyle et al. 1999). Further, waterfront (Leggett and
Bockstael 2000) as well as non-waterfront property values (Walsh et al. 2011, Poor
et al. 2007) increase following local surface water pollution control, suggesting that
the benefits to local water quality extend beyond properties immediately adjacent
to the affected water body. Consequently, improvements to surface water follow-
ing wastewater treatment has the potential to increase surrounding property values
or population levels if individuals value the water quality amenity more than its
4Wastewater treatment also increases the supply of potable water and can help to prevent disease
by removing harmful bacteria and chemicals. In industrialized economies, however, health benefits
from surface water pollution control are likely to be dwarfed by recreational and ecosystem benefits
because basic drinking water treatment methods are ubiquitous and have a long history, predating
most federal environmental regulations (Olmstead 2010).
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marginal cost.
However, constructing and maintaining wastewater treatment facilities is costly
and requires significant public financial investment. US municipalities allocate 10%
of their total annual expenditures toward sewerage and wastewater treatment (US
Census Bureau 2015). Costs vary considerably with the type and rigor of wastewater
treatment technology. Primary treatment is a basic treatment process that utilizes
physical methods (gravity, settling tanks, or centrifuges) to separate waste from
water. Secondary treatment is a more advanced technology that uses biological
processes to decompose the organic matter in waste that can both spread disease
and absorb oxygen in water. Secondary treatment removes more than twice as much
oxygen demand from wastewater as primary treatment and is thus more effective at
protecting aquatic life and reducing bacterial counts in surface water (Stoddard et al.
2003). However, secondary treatment is considerably more expensive to install and
operate, ranging between 2 and 10 times the cost of primary treatment (EPA 1976).
Figure 1.4 plots the engineering costs required for secondary treatment technology
based on a plant’s service population. For a city of 30,000 people, upgrade costs
were roughly $6 million in 2012 dollars, equal to the annual public safety operating
budget of a similar-sized city.5
5Per Guo et al. (2014), the average wastewater flow per capita is 100 gallons per day. Public
safety cost estimate calculated by averaging Census of Governments data on annual police and fire
expenditures for cities with populations between 20,000 and 40,000.
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1.3.2 The 1972 Clean Water Act
The large investment costs and potentially diffuse benefits of secondary wastewater
treatment contributed to the need for federal regulation of surface water pollution.
Prior to the CWA, over two-thirds of municipal wastewater systems used the prim-
itive, less expensive treatment technology of primary treatment (see Figure 1.1).
The CWA addressed this low take-up of rigorous wastewater treatment by estab-
lishing secondary treatment as the minimum technology standard for all wastewater
re-entering surface waters. For this reason, the Act constitutes a “technology-forcing
statute” because of its focus on pollution abatement treatment (Copeland 1999).6
By directly removing bacteria and thus lowering oxygen demand in wastewater ef-
fluent, secondary treatment provided the means to achieve the CWA’s ultimate goal
of making all US surface waters “fishable and swimmable.”
Congress enforced the secondary technology standard through a new monitoring
system. Local governments, firms, or individuals dumping untreated wastewater into
surface waters through any discrete conveyance could be fined up to $25,000 per day,
sanctioned, sued, or imprisoned by the federal government (Copeland 1999).7 The
CWA also recognized the authority of citizens to bring civil suits against their local
governments for violating CWA standards (Andreen 2013).8
6The original 1972 Act included requirements under Section 303(d) for states to monitor surface
water pollution levels and abate when pollution levels exceed state limits. The EPA did not begin
enforcing the “control” approach of the CWA until 1992 (Copeland 2012).
7For examples of recent CWA enforcement, see Fields and Emshwiller (2011) or Westerling
(2011).
8Earnhart (2004) analyzes the impact of different regulatory instruments (permits, inspections,
and enforcement actions) on water pollution abatement among municipal plants in Kansas in the
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To assist in paying for these large infrastructure costs, the federal government
distributed construction grants to state and municipal governments. Approximately
two-thirds of existing wastewater treatment plants received at least some funding
(Keiser and Shapiro 2018). At their peak, these grants were intended to support up
to 75% of total capital costs. However, by 1981, Congress changed the matching rate
to 55%, and by 1987, the grant program was phased out.
While a substantial portion of these construction costs for CWA compliance were
supported by federal grants, there are several reasons to expect that the unfunded
costs placed a significant burden on local budgets. First, municipalities were obli-
gated to fund at least 25% of their capital needs for secondary treatment, equivalent
to approximately 4% of the average noncompliant city’s budget prior to the CWA.
Second, operating costs, which on average are 60% of total annual wastewater treat-
ment costs (US Census Bureau 2015), were not eligible for grant assistance and
operations costs are likely to increase with secondary treatment.9 Lastly, while no
study has comprehensively tested how compliance with the CWA technology stan-
dard impacted local finances, early case studies found that some communities were
unable to provide the required finances for infrastructure adoption without burden-
ing taxpayers or displacing other services (EPA 1973; GAO 1980; PriceWaterhouse
1994; Hanford and Sokolow 1987; Lake et al. 1979).
mid 1990s.
9Secondary treatment requires more energy input relative to primary treatment to operate aera-
tion pumps and added personnel to monitor electrical and mechanical processes. Also, monitoring of
the secondary treatment biological digestion process often requires skilled labor from environmental
and civil engineers, unlike primary treatment operations (Brown 2018).
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Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show aggregate, national-level effects of the CWA technology
standard. Figure 1.1 shows that between 1972 and 1977, the number of treatment
plants with noncompliant “primary” technology fell by 50%, and steadily declined
thereafter. The contemporaneous changes to municipal budgets are apparent in
Figure 1.2: while the share of total spending in wastewater trended with overall
spending in years 1967 and 1972, there is a divergence after the CWA in which the
share of wastewater spending increased by 3 percentage points on average, despite a
downward trend in total spending per capita.
The 1972 CWA marked a major shift in the nation’s approach to surface water
regulation. Prior to the CWA, state governments had de facto autonomy over their
surface water regulations. In contrast, the 1972 CWA gave the federal government
substantial power to respond directly to violations of the Act through administrative
actions, civil actions, and criminal sanctions (Andreen 2013).10 The prior federal ap-
proach to surface water regulation was more passive, relying on voluntary subsidies
to local governments in order to promote national programs (Dilger 2013). Addi-
tionally, disputes between the executive and legislative branch nearly handicapped
the enforcement of the Act.
The unique providence of the CWA legislation is important for this paper’s em-
pirical design. I leverage the unanticipated nature of the CWA to compare changes
10Of the six major federal Acts between 1948 and 1970 related to surface waters that preceded
the 1972 CWA, all maintained that regulatory authority was mainly in the hands of the states
(Fairfax and Hamilton 2000). Two Acts in 1966 and 1970 had attempted to impose wastewa-
ter treatment standards, but these actions were legally challenged by the States, and were never
enforced (Stoddard et al. 2003).
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in outcomes after the Act across ex ante compliant and noncompliant cities. Identifi-
cation of causal estimates under this approach would be invalidated if cities had been
able to anticipate the CWA regulations or if broader changes to wastewater treat-
ment were taking hold prior to the CWA. However, for cities to have anticipated
the CWA regulations, they would need to have foreseen a substantial deviation from
historical precedent on state rights to self-regulate and strong collective action on
the part of the legislative and judicial branches to counteract a presidential veto.
1.3.3 History of Wastewater Treatment
Prior to the 1972 CWA, litigious downstream neighbors suffering from pollution
externalities were one potential mechanism inducing cities to adopt secondary treat-
ment technologies. In the early development of modern water infrastructure, meth-
ods of wastewater treatment were mainly for aesthetic as opposed to direct health
benefits. Urban water systems were designed such that drinking water intakes were
upstream of wastewater outfall locations and protected from wastewater contami-
nants (Okun 1996). Primary treatment could provide a localized improvement in
surface water quality by reducing accumulation of solid materials, debris, and per-
vasive odors, but wastewater treatment was not considered necessary for cleaning a
city’s drinking water supply (Tarr 2016).11 Any health benefits from sewage treat-
11In reference to primary treatment development, Stoddard et al. (2003) states: “In many cases,
this construction was promoted by city officials and entrepreneurs, who were rapidly learning that
unsightly urban debris and a delightful growing phenomenon, tourists with leisure dollars to spend,
did not mix.”
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ment were perceived by early city planners to accrue mainly to downstream neighbors
(Metcalf and Eddy 1922).
Urban population growth during the twentieth century combined with improved
understanding of riparian biochemical cycles in the scientific community brought
about water pollution disputes between upper and lower riparian cities. Develop-
ment of the metric “biochemical oxygen demand” provided a method to directly link
the existence of organic wastes in wastewater to bacterial and oxygen levels in nat-
ural waters (Fairfax and Hamilton 2000; Melosi 2000), enabling downstream cities
to pinpoint sources of pollution in their own drinking and surface waters. Conse-
quently, pressure from downstream cities could induce upstream polluters to adopt
secondary treatment technology (Melosi 2000). Various historic anecdotes illustrate
this pattern. For example, the city of Chicago—which shares the Mississippi basin
with St. Louis—invested in secondary treatment technology beginning in 1916, only
after the state of Missouri enacted a lawsuit against Chicago in 1901 for polluting
the drinking water of St. Louis (Cain 2005; Stoddard et al. 2003; Missouri 1901).
Similarly, Melosi (2000) discusses how city adoption of wastewater treatment meth-
ods were “born amid the unhealthy background of injunctions and court orders”
between cities.12 Several state and federal court cases at the turn of the century
set the precedent for individual protections against water pollution. These cases
provided the legal framework for individuals and local governments to prevent both
12Melosi (2000) also states: “Conflict between upstream and downstream cities over the dumping
of sewage and industrial waste had been fought in the courts and addressed through interstate
sanitation compacts.”
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public and private entities from polluting surface waters.13
In summary, a city’s riparian exposure to downstream populations may have
a positive impact on the likelihood of ex ante compliance with the CWA technol-
ogy standard. Prior to the 1972 CWA, cities demanding aesthetic improvements
to nearby surface waters generally adopted the low-cost primary technology. More
costly secondary treatment adoption, on the other hand, could follow litigation dis-
putes from downstream neighbors suffering from pollution externalities. Such early-
adopter cities were unaffected by the CWA infrastructure standard when the law
passed in 1972 because they already were compliant. My identification strategy
exploits these determinants of infrastructure adoption to predict ex ante CWA com-
pliance. By leveraging forces external to the city dictated by river networks, this
instrument provides variation in ex ante compliance status that is plausibly exoge-
nous to local spending decisions or growth.
13Example cases include: Storley v. Armour & Co., 107 F.2d 499 (1939), Sammons v. City of
Gloversville, 67 N.E. 622 (NY 1903); Butler v. White Plains, 69 N.Y.S. 193 (1901); Gould v. City
of Rochester, 105 N.Y. 46 (1887). McQuillin (1912) provides a thorough law review of municipal
responsibilities for water pollution control. These cases set the precedent that “a city has no right
to gather its sewage and cast it into a stream so as to injure the lower proprietor” and further,
the “power of a municipal corporation to construct sewers or to use a natural stream as a sewer
does not authorize it to so construct the sewers or to use the stream as to create a nuisance to the
damage of a lower riparian owner. (p. 3051)”
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1.4 Data
Ninety percent of publicly owned wastewater treatment plants in the US are fi-
nanced, operated, and managed by local governments.14 Consequently, I consider
the local government, including cities, villages, boroughs, towns, and townships as
my primary unit of observation.15 Throughout this paper, I refer to “local govern-
ments,” “municipalities,” and “cities” interchangeably. Local governments in the US
are small. Eighty percent of all municipalities have populations less than 20,000 and
a mean population of about 5,000 people (see Appendix Figure A.1). The analysis
in this paper, therefore, is distinct from much prior literature concerned with urban
sorting responses in its focus on the representative US municipality as opposed to
metropolitan urban centers.
I construct a new dataset of municipal CWA compliance using records obtained
from the Clean Watershed Needs Survey (CWNS) Team of the EPA. The CWNS
is a census of approximately 22,500 publicly-owned wastewater treatment facilities.
These data provide detailed facility-level information including unique facility iden-
tifier codes, treatment technology characteristics, operating status, and identifying
information on the facility’s managing authority including name, county, state, and
14Roughly 11% of the 22,500 publicly-owned plants in the US are managed by counties, states,
or other non-municipal authorities such as universities, national parks, or correction facilities (EPA
Clean Watershed Needs Survey, 1973-2004).
15Local governments are defined by the US Census Bureau as political entities authorized by
state constitution to provide government for a specific population in a defined area. The geographic
boundaries of local governments are endogenously determined and can vary over time. I standardize
the political jurisdiction of local governments over time through FIPS place codes rather than
geographic boundaries because jurisdictional borders may respond to fiscal shocks.
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government type. The CWNS surveys began in 1972 and have since been adminis-
tered approximately biannually.16
The treatment technology variables of the 1972 survey provide the crucial infor-
mation I use to observe compliance status of a city’s wastewater treatment plant
before the CWA regulations came into effect. While the EPA has not maintained
data dictionary records associated with the 1972 computer-readable survey file, I
was able to identify the survey’s compliance status information using a copy of the
original 1972 survey questionnaire, found in the appendix of EPA (1973). I define
a plant as ex ante noncompliant if its eﬄuent discharge is recorded as not meeting
secondary treatment levels at the time of the survey. A plant is ex ante compliant
if its eﬄuent discharge is recorded as meeting secondary or more stringent treat-
ment levels. This is the first study to codify these early CWNS surveys in order to
categorize and document impacts of municipal CWA compliance.
While I use only the 1972 survey to designate municipal treatment compliance
status, I utilize the full survey panel to construct a sample suitable for analyzing the
CWA minimum technology standard. Appendix A.2 provides additional detail on
my sample restrictions.
Figure 1.1 shows the national growth in plants with secondary treatment technol-
ogy following the CWA. As of 1972, over three-quarters of publicly owned wastewater
treatment plants lacked the secondary treatment technology mandated by the CWA.
16Data reported in each CWNS report are representative of the prior calendar year. For example,
the first available CWNS survey titled the “1973 Clean Watershed Needs Survey” describes plant
technology as of 1972.
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Between 1975 and 1977, the number of plants with only primary treatment fell by
over 55%, from roughly 10,000 plants to under 4,500, and declined steadily there-
after. Compliance with the CWA’s technology standard had a substantial time lag.
Part of this lag is mechanical: primary to secondary treatment upgrades require
several years for engineers to execute planning and construction, as well as for the
municipality to secure financing and apply for federal aid. Another part of this lag
is political: the CWA passed amid substantial backlash from the executive branch.
After a Congressional override on Nixon’s initial veto of the Act, Nixon impounded
half of the funding Congress had appropriated for plant construction costs. It was
not until after 1975, when the Supreme Court ruled against presidential power to
impound funds (Train 1975), that appropriations for the CWA ramped up and sev-
eral cities received construction grants (Copeland 2015). These lags justify assigning
1972 as a pre-policy year even though this was the year that the Act became law.
To gauge the impact of the CWA technology standard on municipal finances, I use
the US Census Bureau’s “Historical Finances of Individual Governments” database.
These data provide detailed information on annual revenues, expenditures, and debt
for the census of local governments every five years, starting from 1967. I merge
the municipal finance data with the CWNS plant technology data based on the
name, state, county, and government type (i.e., “city”, “village”, “township”, or
“borough”) of the plant’s managing authority. To ensure the accuracy of this merge,
I exclude plants managed by counties, districts, universities, or corrections facilities.
Additionally, I exclude cities with non-unique name–government type combinations
within their county. Under this criteria, I am able to match 3,593 municipalities to
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the Census finance data from approximately 4,000 municipalities in the CWNS data.
Because the Census finance data are self-reported, they may be prone to measure-
ment error, particularly if local government expense and revenue categories do not
precisely match up with the Census of Governments categories. For this reason, I
consider impacts on categories directly related to the CWA mandate (i.e. wastew-
ater user fees), as well as aggregates of those categories (ie, total user fees). I also
exclude municipalities reporting zero total expenditures or property taxes, which
eliminates approximately 6% of the municipalities. Lastly, I restrict the sample to
cities that appear in each decade of the “Historical Finances of Individual Govern-
ments” database, which eliminates approximately 5% of municipalities. These data
restrictions yield a sample of 2,975 cities.
Data on growth outcomes, including population, education levels, and median
housing prices, are sourced from the Decennial Census. IPUMS NHGIS provides
these data at the relevant FIPS place and county subdivision levels from 1970.
IPUMS also provides shapefiles, which I use to calculate the centroid of each FIPS
place and county subdivision in GIS. Information on local labor markets and indus-
trial composition are sourced from County Business Patterns, available from 1956,
and annually from 1974. I gauge pre-CWA support for environmental issues among
state senators using the League of Conservation Voters score card from 1971 and 1972,
and I source distance-to-major- waterbodies using data from Rappaport and Sachs
(2003). Lastly, I source water quality data back to 1962 from the EPA STORET
Legacy database, as well as the National Water Information System Water Quality
Portal. These data provide water quality readings from over 740,000 monitoring loca-
24
tions across the US. I calculate ambient water quality as the annual average dissolved
oxygen level within 25 miles of a city centroid, where monitor readings are inversely
weighted by their distance from the city centroid.17 I focus on dissolved oxygen as
my preferred measure of water quality because it is directly impacted by secondary
treatment, and because it provides a holistic measure of aquatic ecosystem health.
Appendix A.3 provides further discussion on dissolved oxygen and its relevance as a
measure of water quality.
Table 1.1 compares descriptive statistics across ex ante compliant and noncom-
pliant cities (i.e., compliant or not with the CWA technology standard of secondary
treatment prior to 1972). Voluntary secondary treatment is correlated with both abil-
ity to pay for, and propensity to benefit from, water pollution abatement. Secondary
treatment adoption is positively correlated with wealth (e.g., share of population
with a college degree, median housing prices, and revenues per capita), preference
for environmental protection (e.g., conservation score), higher levels of manufactur-
ing industry, receipt of intergovernmental funding, and proximity to waterbodies.
Expenditures appear overall balanced, with the noticeable exception of wastewater
expenditures: cites that already adopted secondary treatment spent nearly double
per capita on wastewater treatment prior to the CWA. Figure 1.5 shows the spatial
distribution of ex ante compliance aggregated to county-level averages for exposition
purposes. Ex ante compliant cities are more likely to be near large lakes, population
centers, or manufacturing-intensive areas, such as Tennessee, Michigan, Pennsylva-
nia, and New York. These substantial differences underscore the importance of using
17I focus on a distance of 25 miles following Keiser and Shapiro (2018).
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an empirical approach that eliminates potential confounding factors correlated with
outcome differences across compliant and noncompliant cities.
1.5 Empirical Strategy
The goal of my analysis is to estimate the impact of the CWA infrastructure mandate
on local government budgets and growth. The relationship of interest is:
yirt = β(Pi × POSTt) + Xiθt + (γr × t) + τt + νi + εirt (1.2)
where yirt is one of several outcomes related to municipal expenditures (e.g., wastew-
ater expenditures) or growth (e.g., population) for city i in geographic region r in
year t.18 Pi is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a city is ex ante noncompliant,
meaning it had only primary treatment technology at the start of the CWA in 1972,
and 0 if a city is ex ante compliant, meaning it had at least secondary treatment as
of 1972. POSTt is an indicator equal to 1 for all post-CWA years (e.g., years 1977
and later because my panel structure is quinquennial).
As ex ante compliant and noncompliant cities exhibit substantial differences in
observable characteristics (see Table 1.1), I include a vector of pre–CWA city char-
acteristics, Xi, whose effects are allowed to vary by year (Lechner et al. 2011). The
pre–CWA city characteristics in Xi include income per capita, share of employment
18I follow the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) definition to categorize states into one of eight
US regions: New England, Mideast, Great Lakes, Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky Mountain,
and Far West.
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in all manufacturing as well as water-polluting manufacturing, river population size
to control for historic differences in riparian connections to urban markets (Bleakley
and Lin 2012, Rappaport and Sachs 2003), distance to coast, and receipt of inter-
governmental grants to account for differences across cities in their fiscal managerial
capabilities to obtain federal or state funding. The year fixed effects τt control for
macroeconomic time-varying determinants of yirt common to all cities, such as federal
budget cycles, while νi captures all unobserved, time-invariant differences across cities
that affect yirt such as distance from a water body or soil and landscape attributes
that affect infrastructure construction costs. (γr × t) is a vector of region-specific
linear time trends, which ensures estimated differences in yirt across cities are not
driven by divergent patterns of growth across regions. Lastly, εirt is an error term.
I cluster standard errors at the city level to account for city-specific correlations in
unobserved components of spending and growth over time. The coefficient of interest
is β, which measures the differential change, conditional on controls, in outcome y
between noncompliant and compliant cities before versus after the CWA.
For the differences-in-differences estimate of the CWA mandate effect to be unbi-
ased, (Pi×POSTt) must be uncorrelated with the error term εirt. That is, potential
outcomes y would have trended similarly for ex ante compliant and noncompliant
cities in absence of the CWA technology standard. There are several reasons why
this assumption is problematic in this context. First, the architecture of the CWA
legislation included not only enforcement of a technology standard, but also substan-
tial federal financial assistance in the form of capital construction grants. Congress
distributed over $153 million in outlays from 1973 through 1986 for the construc-
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tion and modification of municipal wastewater treatment plants (Copeland 2015).19
These construction grants provided funding not only for ex ante noncompliant cities
to upgrade from primary to secondary, but also for ex ante compliant cities to in-
vest beyond the minimum requirements in advanced treatment technologies. Table
1.1 suggests that compliant cities are historically more capable of obtaining inter-
governmental funding, therefore the availability of CWA federal grants is likely to
have impacted ex ante compliant cities differently than ex ante noncompliant cities.
This means that simply controlling for baseline differences in grant receipt will not
remove bias induced by the contemporaneous federal grants shock. In particular,
difference-in-differences estimates of β are likely to be attenuated toward zero for
fiscal and water quality outcomes because control cities may respond to the federal
grants program by further investing in pollution abatement technology.
Second, the early 1970’s were a time of several major environmental regulations,
including the Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974 and the Clean Air Act in 1970, the
latter of which affected the economic development of regulated counties through its
impacts on industry, labor markets, and local amenities (Greenstone 2002; Kahn
2001; Lin 2016). If violations across these Acts were correlated within cities, devia-
tions from trend that appear after the CWA may be spurious. Lastly, differences in
baseline wealth, surface water quality, and environmental preferences shown in Ta-
ble 1.1 suggest that taxpayers may have sorted differentially into ex ante compliant
cities relative to noncompliant cities even absent the CWA technology standard. If
19See Keiser and Shapiro (2018) for an empirical analysis on the cost-effectiveness of the CWA
grants program.
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ex ante compliant cities were more competitive in attracting taxpayers, differences-
in-differences estimates of β will be biased away from zero toward a negative growth
effect.
To address these various sources of bias, I employ an instrumental variable ap-
proach that uses variation in downstream population across cities combined with
variation in pre-CWA water pollution abatement across states to predict CWA com-
pliance status. The key to my identification strategy is that I exploit variation that
is external to the city; I predict CWA compliance from factors that are unlikely to
be correlated with local taxpayer preferences for public goods or local abilities to
obtain federal grants.
1.5.1 Instrumental Variable Approach
The positive relationship between downstream population size as well as state envi-
ronmental regulation and pre-CWA secondary treatment adoption (as described in
Section 1.3.3) forms the basis of my identification strategy. Specifically, cities situated
upstream of population centers were more likely to adopt secondary treatment tech-
nology prior to the CWA regulations relative to low-downstream-population cities.
Further, cities located in states with stronger regulation of surface waters prior to
the CWA were more likely to adopt. The CWA secondary technology standard was,
therefore, more likely to bind for cities with smaller populations downstream and
weaker state regulation of water pollution.
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I construct the downstream population component of the instrument using dig-
ital spatial maps sourced from the National Hydrography Dataset Plus of the US
Geological Survey (USGS). These maps contain hydrologic information for over 2.6
million stream segments averaging 1 kilometer in length. Every river segment pos-
sesses three identifying attributes that allow me to trace out all possible linkages in
the US river system: a segment identification code, the code of the immediate up-
stream river segment, and the code of the immediate downstream river segment. In
addition, all segments include an identifier for the terminal point of its river network
(i.e., the river “mouth”). The combination of network linkages across segments and
terminal point identifiers allows me to identify upstream versus downstream rela-
tionships across cities located on the same major river (e.g., the Mississippi) as well
as across cities on differing tributaries sharing the same major river basin (e.g., the
Illinois and Ohio rivers, which both feed into the Mississippi).
I assign each city centroid to its closest stream segment using GIS software. My
criteria for matching cities to a stream segment is to select the six closest stream
segments to a city centroid and assign the city to the stream segment with the lowest
branching level. This approach accounts for the tendency of cities to divert wastew-
ater eﬄuent into the main river segment closest to their city as opposed to a small
tributary. I then calculate each city’s cumulative downstream population through a
recursive “search tree” algorithm as follows: I first find the terminal point, or the
mouth, of each river network and assign this segment a downstream population of
xi = 0 and a current population of xj equal to the population of a city at that mouth,
if one exists. Moving upstream along stream segments, indexed by j for current and
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i for the relative downstream segment, I sum the population xi of any cities located
along those segments until a branching occurs. The branch point is again treated as
a temporary “river mouth” with a downstream population of ∑i0 xi, and the process
repeats itself until the source (j = N) of the river is reached, with a total down-
stream population of xj +
∑N
0 xi. The final result is a downstream population value
for every river segment. The “search tree” algorithm provides important precision in
my measure of downstream population by explicitly accounting for tributary branch-
ing within river networks. A naive reliance on distance to river mouth across cities
without accounting for branching would induce substantial measurement error into
the downstream population calculation.
Figure 1.6 shows downstream populations, aggregated as county means for expo-
sitional purposes. Cities with a higher downstream population are generally located
near the headwaters of populous river networks, such as the upper Missouri, the
upper Mississippi, and the upper Ohio rivers. Importantly, downstream population
is not only a function of river length. For example, cities along the Columbia river in
Washington state have high downstream populations despite a shorter river length.
Cities along the similarly-sized Colorado River in Arizona, in contrast, have rela-
tively low downstream populations owing to the relatively low population density in
the American southwest.
The second component of the instrument exploits pre-existing differences in wa-
ter pollution regulation across states to predict municipal ex ante compliance. My
instrument includes the share of wastewater treatment plants within a state that
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had secondary treatment technology prior to the CWA. Figure 1.7 shows variation
across states in pre-CWA municipal secondary treatment adoption. States with his-
torically more environmental legislation, such as Pennsylvania and New York, had
higher levels of secondary treatment prior to the CWA.20,21
My identification strategy thus exploits two sources of variation to predict ex ante
compliance: pre-CWA downstream population size and pre-CWA state composition
of compliant wastewater treatment plant technology. In my empirical approach,
these fixed characteristics predict differences in outcomes across cities as a function
of their differential effects prior to versus after the CWA. The first and second stage
estimation equations are shown below in Eqs. 1.3 and 1.4. Let i index cities and t
index years. Pi is an indicator equal to 1 if a city is ex ante noncompliant and yist is
one of several outcomes of interest (e.g., wastewater expenditures, population, etc.).
yist = βIV
∧
(Pi × POSTt) + Xiθt + (γr × t) + τt + νi + ist (1.3)
(1.4)
Pi × POSTt = α1(Di × Ss × POSTt) + α2(Ss × POSTt)
+ α3(Di × POSTt) + Xiλt + (γr × t) + τt + νi + µist
In Eq. 1.4, the first three terms are the excluded instruments, where Di is a city’s
downstream population as of 1970 and Ss is pre-CWA state technology composition,
measured as the share of all wastewater treatment plants in state s with secondary
20As of 1970, twenty-nine state constitutions included standards on water quality (Andreen 2013),
though enforcement of these regulations was generally infrequent (Rechtschaffen 2003). Pennsylva-
nia began regulating water quality in 1937 with the Clean Streams Law, and several requirements
of the CWA were enacted in Pennsylvania prior to 1968 (Walters 2017). New York state laws on
watershed regulations date back to the early 1900s (Hudson River Watershed Alliance 2015.)
21The pre-CWA state composition of treatment plants can be equivalently interpreted as the
predicted CWA technology incidence in the state. In their identification strategy, Duflo and Pande
(2007) employ a similar approach by predicting district-level dam adoption in India using a state’s
baseline share of all national dams.
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treatment as of 1972. As before, Xi is a vector of pre-CWA determinants of y whose
effects are allowed to vary with time, including intergovernmental grants, industry
mix, distance to coast, and river population size to account for time varying effects
of historic exposure to urban markets via river-based trade routes (Bleakley and Lin
2012, Rappaport and Sachs 2003). This river population control is important because
this ensures that ex ante compliance is predicted from a city’s relative positioning on
a river system, and not by the overall population size of their river. Standard errors
are clustered at the city level.
The remaining variation that powers my instrument is the population size down-
stream, state secondary treatment share and its interaction with population down-
stream. Figure 1.8 shows the variation I exploit. For a given downstream population,
there is a range of state technology composition. Similarly, states with similar tech-
nology composition harbor cities with varying degrees of downstream population
sizes. The interaction of these two terms is important because the marginal impact
of downstream population varies with pre-existing, state-level regulations of water
pollution. Specifically, cities located in states with more regulation of water pollution
were more likely to adopt wastewater treatment as a result of downstream population
pressure relative to cities located in states with less regulation of water pollution.
The state compliant plant share term (Ss × POSTt) enters into the instrument to
take advantage of variation in pre-existing state environmental regulations.
In Table 1.2, I formally examine the first stage relationship between a city’s down-
stream population, state plant composition, and CWA compliance status. These
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results confirm the importance of water pollution externalities: a city with higher
likelihood of inflicting pollution on its neighbors was more likely to have adopted sec-
ondary treatment prior to 1972. Columns (1) and (2) use cross-sectional variation.
A one standard deviation increase in downstream population reduces the likelihood
that a city had only primary treatment as of 1972 by approximately 7.5 percentage
points from a mean noncompliance rate of 75%. These results are robust to including
controls for distance to river mouth and distance to river edge, which supports that
downstream population, as opposed to the size or proximity to a river, provides the
relevant variation in compliance.
Columns (3) and (4) show estimates of the first stage Eq. 1.4, where downstream
population is interacted with state pre-CWA share of secondary treatment plants.
Cities in states with a higher share of secondary treatment plants are less likely to
be ex ante noncompliant (more likely to be ex ante compliant). Conditional on state
share, cities with a larger downstream population are additionally less likely to be
noncompliant. These results demonstrate that the marginal impact of downstream
population for ex ante compliance was stronger in states with more water pollution
abatement. Accounting for baseline differences across cities in income, intergovern-
mental funding, or geographic region does little to impact the likelihood of secondary
treatment adoption. Column (4) employs the full set of controls and is my preferred
specification of Eq. 1.4. At the mean state share level, a standard deviation increase
in downstream population reduces the likelihood of ex ante noncompliance by 2.7
percentage points, from a mean of 75%. The Kleibergen-Paap first stage F-statistic
(which is robust to non-i.i.d. errors) is above the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value
34
of 9.08 (for 10% maximum relative bias). I also fail to reject that the instruments
are uncorrelated with the error εist with a p-value of 0.44. Table 1.2 shows that my
instruments are sufficiently strong.
1.5.2 Validity of Instrumental Variable Approach
A causal interpretation of the instrumented differences-in-differences parameter βIV
requires two assumptions (Hudson et al. 2015). First, the evolution of outcomes
across cities with different pre-existing state compliance shares should have trended
similarly; and —conditional on state compliance—the evolution of outcomes across
cities with high- versus low- downstream populations should have trended similarly
absent the CWA technology mandate. Second, the exclusion restriction requires that
shocks which co-vary with the CWA do not differentially impact cities with high- ver-
sus low-downstream population sizes, or cities in high- versus low- compliance states.
In other words, the exclusion restriction requires that downstream population size
and state compliance share explain post-CWA differences in outcomes only through
their influence on pre-CWA wastewater treatment plant technology adoption.
I assess the plausibility of these assumptions by testing for the presence of pre-
trends of city characteristics across municipalities exposed to above median versus
below median exposure to the instrument. Table 1.3 column (2) shows that cities
predicted to be in the treatment group have similar pre-CWA growth trends com-
pared to cities predicted to be in the control group on the basis of the instrument.
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In contrast, column (1) shows apparent differences in growth trends across observed
treated versus control cities prior to the CWA for population, wastewater expendi-
tures, user fees, and receipt of federal grants. These baseline characteristics are more
comparable across cities on the basis of the instrument. The fact that the instru-
mental variable approach invites comparable pre-trends in federal grant receipt is
particularly important; this reduces concern that the CWA grant program will have
differentially impacted cities predicted to be control relative to those predicted to be
treated. Taken together, Table 1.3 suggests that potential outcomes in absence of the
CWA are more likely to trend in parallel under the instrumental variable approach
compared to a basic difference-in-differences approach.
I further test the plausibility of these assumptions with respect to my instruments
by comparing pre-CWA trends in wastewater spending across cities with high relative
to low downstream populations as well as high relative to low state compliance share
cities. Panel A in Figure 1.9 plots the linear combination of estimates δt×50 + δt in
black and δt in gray from the following equation:
yit =
∑
t
δt×50(I50 × Ss ×Dt) +
∑
t
δt(Ss ×Dt) + (NR ×Dt) + νi + εit (1.5)
where I50 is an indicator for a city having downstream population size in the bot-
tom 50th percentile and NR is river population. An estimate of δt×50 > 0 indicates
higher expenditures in year t relative to 1972 for cities in the bottom 50th per-
centile of the downstream population distribution relative to cities in the top 50th
percentile. Prior to the CWA, cities with high and low downstream populations
had similar wastewater expenditures per capita, suggesting that cities with differ-
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ing downstream population sizes had similar potential outcomes in absence of the
CWA. However, their expenditures per capita diverge beginning after 1972: cities
with lower downstream populations incur larger wastewater expenditures per capita
following the CWA relative to cities with downstream populations in the top 50th
percentile.22 Panel B similarly shows how cities with 1972 state compliance share in
the bottom 50th percentile of the distribution incur larger wastewater expenditures
per capita after the CWA relative to cities in states with higher compliance shares.
The absence of significant pre-trends in Figure 1.9 supports the identifying assump-
tion that differences across low and high downstream population cities, and low and
high state compliance share cities impact expenditures only through their impacts
on CWA compliance status.
The local average treatment effect (LATE) identified by my instrument is the
effect of the CWA infrastructure mandate among cities with low riparian exposure to
downstream populations and low levels of pre-CWA state regulation. The CWA was
binding for these cities because they faced little pressure from downstream to treat
their wastewater. The comparison group of cities are those that adopted compliant
infrastructure prior to the CWA as a consequence of downstream pressure. Recall
that ex ante compliant cities could apply for and use federal infrastructure grants
under the CWA to further upgrade their secondary treatment plants. The correlated
shock of the CWA grants program that may have impacted both the treatment and
22Appendix Figure A.2 shows the same figure after including year fixed effects in Eq. 1.5. Conse-
quently, δt×50 + δt and δt capture the difference across low relative to high downstream population
cities conditional on being located in a high compliance state. The same pattern holds; however,
the coefficients capture the effect of low versus high downstream population relative to all cities in
low compliant states.
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control cities under the difference-in-differences approach is less likely to manifest
with the IV approach. My instrument exploits variation across cities in the degree
of external pressure they faced to abate surface water pollution. Consequently, the
cities induced by the instrument to be ex ante compliant are less likely, relative to
the self-selected ex ante compliant cities, to undertake federal infrastructure grants
and inframarginally consume additional wastewater treatment. My IV estimates do
not capture the effect of the CWA infrastructure mandate due to alternative reasons
that would cause the policy to bind, such as insufficient finances or local taxpayer
indifference to environmental protection. Consequently, the LATE identified by my
instrument may differ from the impact experienced by the average city bound by the
infrastructure mandate.
1.6 Results
My empirical tasks are threefold: first, I identify the magnitude of direct compliance
costs and benefits by examining changes in wastewater expenditures and water qual-
ity. Second, I test how cities financed those direct costs by estimating differences in
expenditures of non-wastewater public goods and municipal revenue sources. Finally,
I estimate the indirect, non-pecuniary impacts of compliance by testing how water
quality, population, housing prices, and demographic composition of city residents
change differently among noncompliant cities relative to compliant cities. I present
results from both the differences-in-differences approach and the instrumental vari-
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able approach. The differences-in-differences approach provides useful information
on the policy-relevant average impacts of CWA noncompliance and is a likely lower
bound on the fiscal impacts of compliance. In contrast the instrumental variable
estimates are more likely to capture a “mandated expenditure” effect because com-
pliance status is identified from fixed characteristics that are external to the city’s
own decision-making process.
1.6.1 Local Government Budgets & Water Quality
I start by examining the effect of noncompliance on ambient water quality. I test the
assumption of common potential outcomes by estimating a dynamic effect specifica-
tion that allows for visual examination of pre-trends in the data. For the differences-
in-differences estimator, the dynamic effects estimating equation is a flexible version
of Eq. 1.2, where the impact of noncompliance is allowed to vary in each year:
yirt =
′02∑
t=′67(3′72)
δt(Pi ×Dt) + Xiθt + (γr × t) + τt + νi + εirt. (1.6)
The coefficient δt measures the difference, conditional on controls, in outcome y
between noncompliant and compliant cities in year t relative to 1972.
Figure 1.10 Panel A presents evidence of the initial amenity effect experienced
by noncompliant cities. The figure plots estimates of δt from Eq. 1.6, where the
dependent variable is the five-year annual average dissolved oxygen in milligrams
per liter for city i in years t to t − 5. The bars show 95% confidence intervals, and
the dashed line denotes the start of the CWA. An estimate of δt > 0 indicates higher
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water quality in noncompliant cities relative to compliant cities in year t relative
to 1972. While limited availability of data prior to the CWA at the level of local
governments restricts me from observing pre-trends beyond one period, the lack of
significant differences in spending leading up to the CWA is suggestive that com-
pliant and non-compliant cities had similar potential trajectories. There is a lagged
increase in water quality following about 15 years after the increases to wastewater
expenditures. On average, water quality increased by 0.5 milligrams per liter from
pre-CWA levels, or less than 1%. This is significantly lower than the 7% improve-
ment in water quality implied by Keiser and Shapiro’s (2018) estimate of reductions
in dissolved oxygen deficit as a result of the CWA construction grants. However, the
effect is imprecisely estimated.
Figure 1.10 Panel B shows the dynamic effects after using downstream population
and state plant composition as instruments for ex ante compliance status. Changes
to water quality are substantially larger in magnitude and show a persistent upward
trend through the end of the study period relative to the differences-in-differences
estimates. Because the IV approach removes potential bias from control cities re-
sponding to the CWA treatment, the estimated change in water quality better char-
acterizes the causal impact of unanticipated wastewater treatment adoption. Water
quality improved nearly 2mg/l on average after the CWA, or an 18% increase from
pre-CWA levels. My results are consistent with those implied by Keiser and Shapiro
(2018). The authors find that the average infrastructure grant improved dissolved
oxygen deficit by 7% in the year following grant receipt, and improvements grew
in magnitude over time. They also find positive dose-response effects to additional
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grants. Given that many cities received at least three infrastructure grants, and that
my study period averages effects over nearly 30 years, an 18% improvement to water
quality following CWA compliance is consistent with their findings.23
Panel A of Table 1.4 provides differences-in-differences estimates of Eq. 1.2;
and Part B, instrumental variable estimates of Eq 1.3.24 Wastewater expenditures
increased substantially more from pre-CWA levels relative to all other expenditure
categories. The differences-in-differences results in Panel A show minor increases in
public safety and general and administrative spending, suggesting potential crowd-in
effects of the CWA mandate. Increases in wastewater expenditures induced increases
in intergovernmental grant receipt, as well as user fees. Overall tax revenues did not
significantly change, as decreases in property taxes offset increases in sales & license
tax revenues.
The IV estimates in Panel B show similar results, however with substantially
larger magnitudes. Attenuation of the differences-in-differences estimates is consis-
tent with uptake of CWA federal grants and increased expenditures on wastewater
treatment among the control group. Ex ante compliant cities may be differentially
impacted by the grants program because of their pre-existing advantage in obtaining
23Appendix A.4 provides further discussion on the comparability of my water quality estimates
to those of Keiser and Shapiro (2018).
24Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2 show the sensitivity of wastewater expenditures and growth out-
comes to various specifications. Inclusion of city-level fixed effects in Appendix Tables A.1 increases
the CWA effect on wastewater spending substantially, suggesting that unobserved fixed differences
across cities are highly correlated with expenditure decisions. The additional controls mainly serve
to increase precision of the point estimate, but do not substantially change the magnitude. The
point estimates in Appendix Table A.2 show greater sensitivity to controls, which is likely due to
the more limited panel. Controls serve to attenuate the growth effects.
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federal funding. Thus, the IV estimates provide a more accurate estimate of the
fiscal costs required to comply with CWA infrastructure mandate because the LATE
group of cities are more comparable with respect to pre-existing wealth and intergov-
ernmental funding (see Table 1.3). Wastewater expenditures increased by $151 per
capita, or over 200 percentage points after the CWA. Both wastewater capital and
operating costs increased. The estimated increase to total wastewater expenditures
closely aligns with engineering cost estimates from the EPA CWNS. These surveys
show that additional expenditures required for secondary treatment adoption for a
city of 30,000—the mean population size in my sample—is approximately $6 million
per year.
Importantly, Panel B shows no evidence of crowd out in the funding of other
goods. In other words, cities did not respond to the federal mandate through auster-
ity measures. Rather, total city expenditures increased by approximately 47%, driven
partially by increased public safety expenditures contemporaneously with wastewater
expenditures.
To meet these increased expenditures, cities increased user fees and receipt of
intergovernmental grants. While wastewater user fees do not precisely match with
changes in wastewater expenditures, the disparity could be due in part to measure-
ment error from the Census of Governments. Data from the Census of Governments
are self-reported by local government administrators, and local expense and revenue
categories do not always match up with the Census of Governments structure. For
this reason, estimates for on specific line items, like wastewater user fees, are likely
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to be attenuated from measurement error.
Since user fees are indexed directly to the consumption of the public good, user
fees are non-distortionary. However, the $61 per capita (or, over $180 per household)
annual increase could place a nontrivial burden on local taxpayers, particularly those
with lower incomes that cannot easily substitute away from consuming water.25 The
fact that intergovernmental grant receipts per capita increased more than wastewater
expenditures per capita is suggestive of strategic complementarities across applica-
tions for grant funding. That is, it is possible that cities responded to the CWA
federal grants program by not only applying for treatment plant construction grants
but for other federal grant programs as well. Case studies of 16 communities, col-
lectively, in Hanford and Sokolow (1987) and Weiland (1998), found that municipal
CWA compliance served to improve their financial positions and organizational skills
for acquiring intergovernmental grants.
In summary, Table 1.4 demonstrates that wastewater expenditures per capita
tripled after the CWA, with little change in expenditures on other goods and ser-
vices. Lack of displaced funding contrasts with prior work that largely finds local
governments reduce spending on goods and services in response to fiscal shocks.
However, the asymmetric response to expenditure liabilities relative to tax revenue
loss may be additional evidence of the “flypaper effect” (Hines and Thaler 1995),
whereby governments act as though money is not fungible and respond to taxpayer
wealth shocks differently than proportional shocks to local fiscal obligations.
25Per Foster and Beattie (1979), the price elasticity of demand for water among US consumers
is inelastic, at -0.1 (see Table 2).
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Do these budgetary and amenity changes, in turn, impact municipal growth?
To answer this question, I employ dependent variables drawn from the Census and
measure city growth through pre- versus post- CWA changes in population, housing
prices, and composition of residents with high educational attainment.
1.6.2 Local Government Growth
I explore how changes to local government budgets impacted municipal demograph-
ics and property values in Table 1.5. Unlike the municipal finance data which I
observe once every five years from 1967, Census outcomes are observed only once
per decade. Consequently, results in Table 1.5 are estimated from a more limited
panel where observations from 1972 provide pre–CWA outcomes, and observations
from 1982 and 1992 provide post–CWA outcomes. Difference-in-differences estimates
in Panel A show that the noncompliant cities experienced declines relative to com-
pliant cities in all three measures of growth. Compared to ex ante compliant cities,
ex ante noncompliant cities grew 3% slower with respect to population, 0.6% slower
in median housing prices, and 5% slower with respect to share of the working-age
population with a college degree. The population and housing price results suggest
that residents of noncompliant cities did not value benefits from additional wastew-
ater infrastructure more than their costs. Households adjusted locations in response
to the federal mandate and capitalization effects are negative.
The negative growth response is intuitive if cities consume public goods only up to
44
the point where aggregate social benefits outweigh the marginal cost of providing the
goods (Samuelson 1954). Compliant cities likely adopted prior to the CWA because
they garnered higher benefits from wastewater treatment compared to noncompliant
cities, due to either easier access to surface waters or greater treatment needs from
manufacturing industry. This selection is problematic for causal identification of
federally mandated expenditures, particularly if differences across cites in their ability
to benefit from, or ability to pay for, wastewater treatment infrastructure generates
more positive growth outcomes for ex ante compliant cities. For example, Carlino and
Saiz (2008) and Guerrieri et al. (2013) show that cities with greater levels of natural
amenities and initial wealth, respectively, exhibited significantly faster population
and housing price growth during the late 20th century. Presence of such selection
would bias the differences-in-differences CWA effect away from zero.
The instrumental variable results in Table 1.5, Panel B, indeed, show effects of
the CWA mandate that suggest a more positive effect of the CWA mandate for
city growth. Cities predicted to be noncompliant as a function of their downstream
population and pre-CWA state adoption share experience 12.6% greater changes to
population and 1.1% higher housing price growth relative to control cities, although
the housing price result is not statistically distinguishable from zero. While the
population effect is large, the implied 12.6% increase in treated city populations
following an 18% improvement to water quality is consistent with prior literature
that tests for migration effects from environmental regulation. Banzhaf and Walsh
(2008) find a 7% increase in population over a decade among communities that
lost exposure to TRI chemical emissions, while Kahn (2000) estimates a population
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increase of 8% over 15 years among California counties that experienced an average
improvement to ozone exposure of 21%.
Median housing values grew by 1.1% more on average among noncompliant cities,
although the estimate is imprecisely estimated. This represents the combined capi-
talization effect of both increased user fees, and improvements to local ambient water
quality, as well as any subsequent general equilibrium changes resulting from either
effect. Appendix Table A.3 provides details on a back-of-the-envelop calculation for
resident fee capitalization. Under the more conservative rate of return assumption,
these estimates indicate that residents value water quality improvements at twice
their marginal cost. The effect of the CWA mandate on user fees is of first order im-
portance. Although the general equilibrium effects complicate interpreting the hedo-
nic estimates as a direct willingness-to-pay for water quality improvements, ignoring
the impact of the CWA on local public finance would substantially underestimate
the implied value of water quality improvements.
The last column of Panel B shows that the share of residents with a college degree
increased by over 3 percentage points as a result of the CWA infrastructure mandate.
This result is consistent with prior work by Sieg et al. (2004) and Banzhaf and Walsh
(2008) that find evidence of gentrification effects following exogenous improvements
to environmental amenities. Consistent with their findings, the positive parameter
estimate on housing prices suggests that increased cost of living may explain rel-
ative out-migration of individuals with lower educational attainment. The growth
results collectively suggest that taxpayers of mandated cities valued the treatment
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infrastructure above its local cost, which taxpayers realize as increased user fees.
1.6.3 Robustness Checks
My identification strategy relies on comparisons across cities with differing down-
stream population levels within states of similar pre-CWA water pollution abate-
ment activities. The size of a city’s downstream population serves as a proxy for
the degree of litigation pressure it could have received from exposing downstream
cities to its surface water pollution. To assess whether power from downstream is
the driving mechanism, I re-estimate the two-stage least squares results using the
count of large downstream cities as an instrument for ex ante compliance. I define a
city as “large” if its 1970 population was at least 30,000, the approximate mean city
size in my sample. Table 1.6 shows that downstream litigation pressure explains the
relevance of the downstream population instrument. Having one additional city of at
least 30,000 people downstream increased the likelihood that a city was ex ante com-
pliant by 2%. In contrast, having one additional small city downstream has nearly
no impact on the probability of compliant technology adoption. Appendix Table A.4
and A.5 shows that estimated effects on budgetary and growth outcomes using the
count of large cities downstream as an instrument closely mimics my main results.
The validity of the instrumented differences-in-differences design requires that
outcomes across cities with high versus low exposures to the instrument would trend
in parallel absent the CWA technology standard. One concern suggested by Fig-
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ures 1.6 and 1.7 is that, both, downstream population size and state compliance is
regionally determined. Northern cities, for example, have higher downstream popu-
lations on average relative to southern cities because several major US rivers begin
in the north and terminate along coastlines in the south. Additionally, coastal cities
generally have lower downstream populations relative to interior cities. The regional
correlations generated by my instrument may be problematic because coastal cities
are unlikely to be comparable controls to interior cities,26 and likewise northern
cities are unlikely to be comparable controls to southern cities. Appendix Tables
A.6 through A.9 show that my instrumental variable results are robust to excluding
coastal cities, and are robust to excluding hydrologic regions with the largest down-
stream populations (the upper Mississippi and the Ohio river watersheds). This
suggests that my findings are not driven strictly by divergent growth trends across
coastal relative to interior cities, or by northern relative to southern cities.
I lastly show that results are robust to using the full, unbalanced panel of munici-
pal wastewater treatment plants (including plants that were built after the CWA) in
Appendix Tables A.10 and A.11. This final robustness check provides qualitatively
similar results to that of my main balanced sample. However, significant increases in
other goods expenditures and population levels due to CWA noncompliance are sug-
gestive that the unbalanced panel of cities likely includes those that adopt wastewater
treatment due to unobserved local demand shocks, and not purely due to the binding
26A small number of coastal cities face different treatment technology standards from interior
cities. Known as 301h Wavier Recipient facilities, some treatment plants that discharge into coastal
waters are exempt from secondary treatment requirements. As of 1994, only nineteen facilities in
the lower 48 states had this exemption (EPA 1994). Most are located in Maine. I remove such
facilities as a robustness check in Appendix Table A.6 and find consistent results.
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constraints of the mandate. This result supports my selection criterion used for my
main results, whereby only cities that have had an operating wastewater treatment
plant since 1972 are included in the sample.
1.6.4 Limitations & Interpretation
I consider some of the potential limitations associated with these data and my ex-
perimental design. These potential limitations will generally tend to bias my results
toward a null effect. First, I am comparing treated cities to control cities, whereby
the treated cities may receive an exogenous improvement to surface water quality
after complying with mandated investment in wastewater treatment infrastructure.
However, municipal boundaries may not provide the correct spatial extent of pol-
lution abatement effects from wastewater treatment. If the infrastructure’s actual
impact is more narrow than municipal borders, any perceived benefits of wastewater
pollution measured at the this level will be diluted. Conversely, if the actual impacts
of surface water pollution extend beyond municipal borders, to downstream cities,
for example, the mandated infrastructure will have some impact on control cities,
again diluting the identified differential across these communities.
Second, multiple municipalities may share a single wastewater treatment plant,
particularly if those municipalities are located close together. I can identify the
municipality that manages a publicly owned plant from the CWNS data, but I cannot
distinguish whether other municipalities are serviced by that plant. This will not
49
compromise the diagnosis of treatment versus control cities in my design, as I consider
only municipalities that are, themselves, the managing authority of a plant. However,
to the extent that there is cost sharing of mandate compliance across unobserved
communities, the estimated differential on expenditure changes will be diluted. In
Appendix Figure A.3, I compare the plant service population of each plant reported
in CWNS to the Census population estimate for the plant’s managing municipality
and find a correlation very close to unity. This suggests that mis-measurement of
the per capita compliance costs borne by municipal residents is likely to be minimal.
Finally, the interpretation of my hedonic estimates on property values are best in-
terpreted as a capitalization effect of mandated wastewater treatment infrastructure
rather than the exact willingness-to-pay. This is because, first, the impacts on water
quality following the CWA are likely non-marginal and, second, my identification
strategy exploits a long panel. Over this time period, preferences among treated city
residents likely changed as the residential composition of treated cities shifted toward
higher educational attainment (see Table 1.5). When hedonic analysis is used to es-
timate “large” changes in public goods, Kuminoff and Pope (2014), Banzhaf (2018),
and Sieg et al. (2004) suggest that the resulting partial equilibrium estimates - as
in my empirical design - will likely understate residents’ willingness to pay and are
better interpreted as a lower bound on the Hicksian equivalent surplus.
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1.7 Who Benefits from the CWA mandate?
The aggregate effects of CWA infrastructure mandate estimated in section 1.6 poten-
tially mask important sources of heterogeneity. Figure 1.4 suggests that per capita
costs of secondary treatment adoption diminish with population size, at least with
respect to capital costs. In the following section, I test how the effects of CWA
compliance differ according to city population and explore plausible mechanisms in-
cluding differences in housing supply, exposure to upstream polluters, and receipt of
federal grants. I also test for differences across cities in the implied value of mandate
compliance and find that water quality improvements are more likely to be valued
by residents in areas where water recreation is more feasible and among cities whose
water quality is more reliant on the actions of upstream polluters.
1.7.1 Heterogeneous Responses by City Size
Table 1.7 shows IV estimates of:
(1.7)
yist = δPOST
∧
(Pi × POSTt) + δPOST×ω
∧
(Pi × POSTt × ωi)
+ (N iψt) + Xiθτ + (γr × t) + τt + νi + εist
where ω is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a city has above median population size.
I add a control for baseline differences in population size interacted with year fixed
effects, N iψt, to account for differential growth trends across large relative to small
cities over the study period. All other variables are as before in Eq. 1.3. For the
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local budgetary outcomes, I expect δPOST×ω < 0 if the effects of CWA compliance
are less costly for larger cities.
Table 1.7 confirms that compliance costs are lower in larger cities. Larger city
wastewater expenditures are, on average, $33 less per person per year relative to
smaller cities, or about 80% the costs of smaller cities. These per capita expendi-
tures savings for large cities translate into user fee savings, as well. Notably, inter-
governmental grant receipts per capita are approximately 17% larger in larger cities.
Larger cities also appear better able to finance the mandated costs with long-term
debt, which may speak to their relative advantage in credit markets. Results of Ta-
ble 1.7 are consistent with the existence of scale economies in mandated wastewater
treatment infrastructure.
In Appendix A.5, I test how these cost differences translate into differences in
growth outcomes and explore mechanisms for divergent responses of small relative
to larger cities.
1.7.2 Federal Grants and City Size Heterogeneity
The CWA infrastructure mandate spurred asymmetric responses across large relative
to small noncompliant cities. While both large and small cities increased municipal
expenditures substantially following the 1972 CWA, smaller cities experienced signif-
icantly larger cost increases, ranging from 14-20% above the per capita costs of larger
cities. A natural question is whether changes to the structure of the CWA mandate
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could have mitigated some of the fee increases; and, more importantly, whether such
changes could have generated gains to economic efficiency.
The CWA construction grants program distributed approximately $153 billion in
federal aid to local governments for the purpose of municipal wastewater treatment
and sewerage improvements between 1973 and 1986 (Copeland 2015). Table 1.7
shows that relative to larger cities, smaller cities received disproportionately less
federal aid following the 1972 CWA. The change in wastewater expenditures for
small cities was approximately $33 higher per capita, however, smaller cities received
approximately $61 less per capita in federal aid compared to large cities.27
Whether redistribution of federal funds from large cities to small cities would
have improved overall social welfare depends upon the relative effectiveness of grants
in large versus small cities. Only if federal dollars induced larger benefits on the
margin to smaller cities relative to larger cities would redistribution of funds have
improved economic efficiency.
In Table 1.8, I test whether grant funding was more effective at mitigating neg-
ative growth outcomes in small versus large cities. Grant receipt is likely to be
endogenous to growth outcomes, however the comparison across large and small
cities is suggestive of grant mis-allocation. This table shows results from estimat-
ing Eq. 1.7 for two separate samples: above median and below median population
cities. Here, ω is a city’s annual receipt of federal grants. The coefficient δPOST×ω
27While the “Inter Govt” category includes federal grants, not just those for wastewater infras-
tructure, I show in Appendix Table A.22 that the same allocative pattern holds when considering
the grant category most likely to include CWA federal construction grants.
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is the difference in one of several outcomes - user fees, population, property values,
or high skill population share - among treated cities that received additional grant
funding. Although the point estimates are not directly comparable across samples,
these results are suggestive that federal grants are effective at reducing user fees and
mitigating housing price decline among smaller cities. In contrast, user fees and
growth outcomes appear to be insensitive to grant receipt among large cities. The
marginal effect of federal grant dollars in large cities are precisely estimated zeros.
Grants have little additional impact on mitigating the CWA budget shock among
large cities.
Results of Table 1.8 indicate that redistribution of federal grants that imposes
equity of compliance costs could have resulted in a more efficient use of those grant
funds. The insensitive response of larger cities to federal grants suggests that such
a redistribution could be revenue-neutral. Future research should address the endo-
geneity of grant receipt to better understand its impacts at alleviating local costs of
mandated infrastructure adoption.
1.7.3 Heterogeneous Responses by a priori Potential Bene-
fits
In recent work by Albouy et al. (2018), the authors show that estimates of resident
value for public goods can critically depend on their complementarities with other
public goods. They demonstrate that public park access, for example, is valuable to
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residents only if accompanied by improvements to public safety. The central finding
of their paper is that ignoring the existence of such complementarities across public
goods can significantly attenuate valuation estimates of those public goods. In the
context of this paper, valuation of mandated wastewater treatment infrastructure
may be biased toward zero if cleaner ambient surface water is valuable to residents
only in conjunction with other public goods, such as warm swimming weather or
proximity to a large river or lakes.
I estimate a version of Eq. 1.7 to test how my valuation outcomes of popu-
lation, housing prices, and high skill composition respond differently among cities
with warmer summer temperatures, proximity to large water bodies, and for cities
more likely to experience water quality improvements from upstream abatement.
Figure 1.11 shows the heterogeneity prevalent in each of these regressions.28 The
value residents place on mandated changes to wastewater infrastructure depends
upon the municipality’s a priori potential to benefit from a federal mandate. Cities
with warmer July temperatures, that are closer to large water bodies, and that are
located closer to the mouth of a river have larger increases in population and hous-
ing prices. The July temperature and Distance to Water results are consistent with
prior literature that generally finds the salience of water quality improvements is
an important determinant of its valuation. The “Distance to River Mouth” point
estimates indicated by diamonds provide suggestive evidence that the largest ben-
efits accrued to cities more likely to have experienced water quality improvements
from upstream abatement because they are situated near the bottom of a river. This
28Tabular results from these regression estimates are shown in Appendix Table A.17.
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result should not be interpreted as the spillover benefit because distance to river
mouth is not a precise measure of exposure to upstream pollutants. However, it
points to a potentially important function of federal mandates in enabling strategic
complementarities from environmental regulation. Specifically, the greatest benefits
accrue to cities that are not only impacted by their own investment in pollution
abatement, but investments of upstream neighboring cities as well. This suggests
federal mandates have the capacity to improve efficiency locally when the benefits of
public goods provision are intertwined with the decisions of other neighboring cities.
1.8 Conclusion
The American Society of Civil Engineers estimates that infrastructure in the United
States requires an investment of at least $3.2 trillion to prevent deterioration of
the country’s aging roadways, electrical grids, transit, and waterworks (Economic
Development Research Group, Inc. 2016). To meet some of these needs, the Trump
administration proposed in January of 2018 to use local user fees and state and
local financing to fund a $1.5 trillion infrastructure renewal plan. While there is
bipartisan consensus that infrastructure renewal is necessary, we know very little
about how localized financing for federally-mandated projects affects local economies.
The striking gap in our knowledge of these effects matters because understanding who
ultimately bears the burden of federal spending mandates and whether mandates are
valued locally can alter conclusions of the cost effectiveness of federal policies.
56
This paper is the first empirical effort to assess the impact of federal mandates
on local government budgets and to determine whether mandated provision of goods
and services are valued by local residents. Further, this is the first paper to test how
the regulatory burden of the CWA technology standard on wastewater treatment
impacted municipal governments. My results indicate that local governments relied
mainly on user fees to finance the unsubsidized portions of CWA compliance, with a
collective increase totaling $300 per year per household or a three-fold increase from
pre-CWA levels. Importantly, I do not find evidence that local governments displaced
funding from unmandated public goods and services in order to fund mandated
infrastructure, even several decades following the CWA legislation. Several of the
largest federal mandates - including regulations on solid waste management and
drinking water quality - are funded with a fee for service, suggesting that mandate
compliance is unlikely to generate distortions in the menu of goods and services
offered by local governments. Yet, reliance on user fees for essential, demand-inelastic
goods like piped water presents important distributional concerns. In Baltimore, for
example, federal demands on renewal of the city’s water infrastructure have increased
resident water bills so much that the city has repossessed several homes for unpaid
water bills (Baltimore Sun Editorial Board 2019).
The local impacts of the CWA infrastructure mandate were associated with sta-
tistically significant positive increases to total population. Further, compliance with
the uniform mandate induced highly heterogeneous responses. First, I find robust
and economically significant evidence of taste-based sorting, with regulated cities
experiencing increases in educational attainment. Second, cities more likely to ex-
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perience pollution abatement from upstream neighbors, closer to large water bodies,
and in more temperate climates incurred larger gains in both housing prices and
population relative to other cities less likely to benefit from proximate water quality
improvements. My results suggest that the externality corrections induced by the
CWA mandate are at least valued above their cost by taxpayers at the local level. Fu-
ture work should assess whether the CWA mandate is overall welfare enhancing after
accounting for spillover effects and the benefits from upstream pollution abatement
on downstream cities.
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Figure 1.1: Inventory of Publicly-Owned Wastewater Treatment Plant Tech-
nology
Source: EPA Clean Watershed Needs Surveys (1973-2004). Figure plots the total number of
publicly-owned wastewater treatment plants by technology type. Secondary treatment technol-
ogy was mandated under the 1972 CWA for all surface water-bound eﬄuent. Treatment plants
with only primary treatment were required to either cease operations or upgrade to secondary
treatment. See text for further details on treatment technology characteristics.
Figure 1.2: Municipal Expenditure Trends
Source: Census of Governments. Figure plots raw means for annual direct expenditures (total
expenditures net of intergovernmental payments) in thousands of 2012 USD in gray; and annual
share of expenditures in wastewater in black. Dashed line indicates the start of the Clean Water
Act in 1972. 59
Figure 1.3: Federal Mandates and Local Efficiency
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Note: Figure shows the effect of the CWA mandate given locally inefficient versus efficient pro-
vision of pollution abatement. City A under-provides pollution abatement in equilibrium due
to market failures X which either increase the marginal cost from MC to MC + X, or reduce
aggregate social marginal benefits from
∑
MBi to
∑
MBi−X. For city A, the mandate reduces
either source of inefficiency and moves the equilibrium provision of pollution abatement from
GLow to G∗ and local surplus increases by h. City B efficiently supplies pollution abatement in
equilibrium. The mandate reduces local surplus by k.
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Figure 1.4: Capital Cost of Secondary Treatment by Plant Service Popula-
tion
Source: EPA (1973). Figure plots the binned scatterplot and quadratic fit of cost needs for
compliance with the secondary treatment standard relative to a plant’s service population. Plot
divided into 100 equal-sized bins. Residualized by year fixed effects. Sample is based on 48,115 ob-
servations, which includes 5,884 treatment facilities from 1975-2003 reporting non-zero secondary
treatment cost needs and non-zero service population. Sample excludes the top and bottom 5%
of treatment capacity, and plants that appear less than 7 years over the 28-year panel. Plant
service population is calculated as plant capacity in gallons per day divided by 100 (Guo et al.
2014). Cost values are in thousands of 2012 dollars.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of Pre-CWA Secondary Treatment Adoption
Source: EPA (1973), Census. Figure shows the county share of municipal wastewater treatment
plants with secondary treatment as of 1972.
Figure 1.6: Mean Municipal Downstream Population Size by County, 1970
Source: USGS, Census, author’s own calculation. Figure shows county-level averages of city
downstream population as of 1970. 62
Figure 1.7: State Composition of Wastewater Treatment Technology, 1972.
Source: EPA 1973 Clean Watershed Needs Survey. Figure shows the distribution of wastewater
treatment plant technology composition by state. Each shade of gray corresponds to a quartile.
Figure 1.8: State Compliant Plant Share (1972) vs Downstream Population
Source: EPA 1973 clean watershed needs survey, USGS, author’s calculations. Figure shows the
distribution of downstream population (25th-75th percentile) by state share of compliant plants
as of 1972. 63
Figure 1.9: Wastewater Expenditures per capita and Instrumental Variable
Variation
Source: USGS, CWNS, Census of Governments, author’s calculations. Panel A plots δt×50 + δt and δt from equation: yit =∑
t δt×50(I50 × Ss × Dt) +
∑
t δt(Ss × Dt) + (Diσt) + νi + εit where the dependent variable is wastewater expenditures per
capita for city i in year t; I50 is an indicator for a city having downstream population in the bottom 50th percentile, Ss is
state share of compliant plants as of 1972, Dt is an indicator for year t, and Di is downstream population. Bands show 95%
confidence intervals. All coefficients are evaluated at the mean state share of secondary treatment plants as of 1972. The
reference year is t=1972. Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level. Panel B plots σt×50 + σt and σt from equation:
yit =
∑
t σt×50(I50 × Dt) +
∑
t σt(Dt) + νi + εit where the dependent variable is wastewater expenditures per capita for city
i in year t; I50 is an indicator equal to 1 if a city’s state has share of compliant treatment plants as of 1972 in the bottom
50th percentile, and Dt is an indicator for year t. Bands show 95% confidence intervals. The reference year is t=1972. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Figure 1.10: CWA Noncompliance and Dynamics of Water Quality
Note: Figure plots δt from estimating yist =
∑
t δt(Pi×Dt)+Xiθτ +(R× t)+γt+νi+εist. yist is
dissolved oxygen. Panel A is estimated from differences-in-differences; Panel B is estimated from
two-stage-least squares. Bands show 95% confidence intervals. All coefficients are normalized
relative to t=1972. Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level.
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Figure 1.11: Benefits of Mandate Compliance and Complementary Amenities
Note: Figure plots estimates of δPOST + δPOST×ω from Eq. 1.7, where ω is one of three variables:
(i) average maximum July temperature from 1970-2000; (ii) kilometers to nearest large water
body, where “large” is a water feature with a stream order of 6 or larger as defined on a scale of
1-13 by USGS; and (iii) distance to river mouth in percentiles. ω is evaluated at high and low
values of each variable. Standard errors clustered by city.
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Table 1.1: Pre-Clean Water Act Descriptive Statistics
Primary Secondary P-value for
Treatment Treatment difference in means
City Characteristics
Population 36,752 30,055 0.439
Median House Price ($ ) 95,434 103,559 0.000
Share of population with a college degree 0.110 0.114 0.166
Dissolved oxygen (mg/l) 8.11 8.14 0.591
LCV conservation score 43 50 0.000
County-level labor market
County income per capita ($ ) 23,071 24,168 0.000
County employment share in manufacturing 0.362 0.386 0.000
County employment share in 0.146 0.152 0.293
water polluting manufacturing
Expenditures per capita
Total expenditures 1,027 1,195 0.000
Wastewater 66 115 0.000
Total other 649 667 0.354
Public works 132 134 0.429
Public safety 384 382 0.886
General & admin. 61 75 0.000
Health & welfare 28 30 0.552
Recreation 43 44 0.639
Revenues per capita
Total revenues pc ($) 1,014 1,141 0.000
Intergovernment revenues 168 217 0.000
Revenues from own sources 846 923 0.007
Total taxes 387 508 0.000
Property taxes 299 431 0.000
Sales & License taxes 87 77 0.020
Total user fees 111 100 0.095
Wastewater user fees 31 29 0.336
Long-term debt outstanding 1,394 1,368 0.799
Short-term debt outstanding 87 116 0.011
Geography
River Population as of 1970 (th.) 8,577 5,558 0.000
Distance to waterbody (km) 0.057 0.021 0.002
Distance to river mouth (km) 1,276 828 0.000
Distance to navigable river (km) 207 193 0.084
Distance to Great Lake (km) 735 663 0.004
Distance to Ocean (km) 525 388 0.000
Number of Cities 2,290 685
Panel Frequency 5.2 5.4
Observations 11,320 3,546
Note: All variables measured as means in 1967 and 1972. P-value denotes significance of difference
in means. Dollars in USD 2012 values. See Section 1.4 for details on data sources.
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Table 1.2: Determinants of Ex Ante CWA Compliance Status
Cross Section (1972) Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Downstream Population -0.049∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.014)
Dowstream Population x StateShare’72 x Post -0.704∗∗ -0.593∗
(0.322) (0.330)
Dowstream Population x Post -0.003 -0.011
(0.019) (0.019)
StateShare’72 x Post -2.066∗∗∗ -2.345∗∗∗
(0.347) (0.372)
River FE Y Y
Geography Controls Y
City Controls Y
Year & City FE Y Y
RiverPopulation x YearFE Y Y
CityControls x YearFE Y
Income Trend Y
Region Trend Y
Baseline mean 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Pct δ in y for 1 SD
increase DSpop -6.58% -7.56% -3.20% -2.70%
F-statistic 15.64 5.84 19.22 20.11
Observations 2151 2151 14866 14866
Note: The dependent variable in (1) and (2) is an indicator for primary treatment as of 1972.
In (3) and (4), this is interacted with a post CWA indicator. Standard errors clustered by city.
Geography controls include distance to river edge and distance to river mouth. City Controls
include pre-CWA averages from 1967-1972 of: share of county-level employment in manufacturing
and water-polluting industries; annual federal, state, and local intergovernmental grants and
distance from coastline. Specifications (3) and (4) interact these baseline controls with year fixed
effects. Downstream population is normalized by its standard deviation. Region consists of 8
indicators based on BEA US regions: New England, Mideast, Great Lakes, Plains, Southeast,
Southwest, Rocky Mountain, and Far West. Income is average county-level income per capita in
1970. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean value of 1972 state share of secondary treatment
plants (3.4%). ∗ (p<0.10), ∗∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗∗ (p<0.01).
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Table 1.3: Pretrends of City Characteristics by Treatment and Instrument
Secondary Treatment Above Median Mean of
as of 1972 Exposure to Instrument Secondary Treatment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dissolved Oxygen (mg/l) -0.069 -0.094 -0.055 -0.071 8.11
(0.074) (0.074) (0.065) (0.093)
Ln(Population)‡ 0.046*** 0.035** -0.011 -0.028 24,549
(0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019)
Total Expenditures pc ($) 71.458 48.132 9.800 -90.762 1032.09
(46.889) (46.677) (41.159) (57.829)
Sewerage Expenditures pc ($) 68.133*** 60.453*** 33.992** 18.221 66.67
(15.216) (15.328) (13.415) (19.109)
Other Expenditures pc ($) -19.102 -18.141 -49.897* -89.160** 650.54
(30.941) (30.975) (27.105) (38.321)
Total Revenues pc ($) -27.091 -30.600 -67.511 -95.004 1019.02
(58.585) (59.460) (51.351) (73.667)
Total User Fees pc ($) -10.137 -7.767 -5.075 5.793 111.91
(9.832) (10.073) (8.625) (12.488)
Wastewater User Fees pc ($) 6.024** 6.496** -0.414 -4.158 31.41
(2.521) (2.560) (2.216) (3.179)
Long Term Debt pc ($) 110.565 141.048 -29.219 71.008 1394.71
(156.300) (160.351) (137.105) (198.821)
Short Term Debt pc ($) 29.074 20.770 23.630 -28.144 87.83
(20.672) (20.838) (18.132) (25.829)
Total federal grants pc ($) 14.003 17.254 6.682 4.176 29.23
(10.559) (10.756) (9.265) (13.346)
Federal Infrastructure grants pc ($) 20.983*** 24.446*** 0.342 4.583 14.63
(6.394) (6.337) (5.631) (7.900)
Controls Y Y
Observations 2590 2590 2590 2590
Note: Table provides city-level summary statistics obtained by estimating firt = βControlir +
γr + τt + ic where firt is a pre-CWA characteristic for city i in region r. Column (1) reports
estimates of β when “Control” equals 1 if a city had secondary treatment as of 1972 (i.e., compliant
treatment technology). Column (2) reports estimates of β when “Control” equals 1 if a city has
a higher than median probability of having a compliant treatment plant prior to the CWA’s
adoption on the basis of the instrument, Downstream Population × StateShare’72. Includes pre-
CWA years, 1967 and 1972. Federal Construction Grants pc include federal grants for wastewater
treatment as well as disaster relief, homeland security, and miscellaneous goods. Controls include
all variables listed in Table 1.2. ‡ Population regression includes census years 1950, 1960, and
1970. Controls include only city and year fixed effects, region linear time trends, and time-varying
effects of distance to ocean and river network population. ∗ (p<0.10), ∗∗ (p<0.05), ∗∗∗ (p<0.01).
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Table 1.4: Effect of CWA compliance on Local Government Budgets
PANEL A: DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
Expenditures Per Capita Total Wastewater Other
Total Capital Operating Total Public Safety Public Works Gen Admin Welfare Rec
Primary’72xPost 59.787 58.715∗∗∗ 54.737∗∗∗ 3.469 -27.342 5.232 -44.154 11.195∗ 0.982 -0.597
(42.141) (9.415) (9.025) (2.193) (35.306) (3.182) (33.322) (5.731) (4.354) (2.282)
Marginal effect (%) 5.79% 88.07% 141.62% 12.53% -4.20% 3.95% -11.49% 18.24% 3.34% -1.39%
Baseline mean 1032.09 66.67 38.65 27.69 650.54 132.39 384.35 61.36 29.43 43.02
Revenues Per Capita Total Revenues User Fees Taxes Debt
Total Inter Govt Own Total Wastewater Total Property Sales & License Long Term Short Term
Primary’72xPost 41.352 59.698∗∗∗ -18.362 17.454∗ 4.885∗∗ 5.626 -4.638 10.195∗∗ 34.324 12.547
(32.089) (11.040) (29.178) (10.345) (2.461) (10.311) (9.254) (4.425) (112.620) (13.652)
Marginal effect (%) 4.06% 34.99% -2.16% 15.60% 15.55% 1.44% -1.54% 11.46% 2.46% 14.29%
Baseline mean 1019.02 170.60 848.45 111.91 31.41 389.85 300.87 88.99 1394.71 87.83
PANEL B: INSTRUMENTED DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
Expenditures Per Capita Total Wastewater Other
Total Capital Operating Total Public Safety Public Works Gen Admin Welfare Rec
Primary’72 x Post 480.927∗ 151.768∗∗∗ 101.021∗∗ 46.471∗∗∗ 241.263 64.237∗∗∗ 136.003 2.286 20.586 18.151
(255.934) (50.576) (46.097) (15.528) (213.601) (21.855) (203.596) (21.338) (24.974) (15.033)
Marginal effect 47% 228% 261% 168% 37% 49% 35% 4% 70% 42%
Baseline mean 1032.09 66.67 38.65 27.69 650.54 132.39 384.35 61.36 29.43 43.02
Revenues Per Capita Total Revenues User Fees Taxes Debt
Total Inter Govt Own Total Wastewater Total Property Sales & License Long Term Short Term
Primary’72 x Post 691.545∗∗∗ 403.769∗∗∗ 287.513∗ -1.178 61.335∗∗∗ 26.508 7.610 18.850 -309.102 76.313
(182.481) (79.160) (153.476) (63.395) (19.742) (51.740) (42.648) (27.005) (834.045) (71.667)
Marginal effect 68% 237% 34% -1% 195% 7% 3% 21% -22% 87%
Baseline mean 1019.02 170.60 848.45 111.91 31.41 389.85 300.87 88.99 1394.71 87.83
First Stage F-statistic 20.11 20.11 20.11 20.11 20.11 20.11 20.11 20.11 20.11 20.11
Clusters 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2976 2975 2975
Observations 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866
Note: Dependent variables are in 2012 dollars per capita. Table reports estimates of β from Eq. 1.2: yit = β(Pi×POSTt)+Xiθt+(R×t)+γt+νi+εit.
The instrument for (Pi × POSTt) in Panel B is Eq. 1.4. Standard errors clustered by city. X includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Effect of CWA compliance on Water Quality & Municipal Growth
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary’72xPost 0.039 -0.030∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.005∗∗
(0.047) (0.011) (0.008) (0.002)
Marginal effect (%) 0.49% -2.97% -0.64% -4.18%
Panel B: Instrumented Difference-in-Differences
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary’72xPost 1.543∗∗∗ 0.121∗ 0.013 0.027∗∗
(0.327) (0.071) (0.054) (0.012)
Marginal effect (%) 19% 12.59% 1.12% 25%
First Stage F-statistic 19.58 20.43 20.43 16.16
Baseline mean 8.11 mg/l 36,710 $95,461 11%
Clusters 2933 2965 2965 2329
Observations 14177 8264 8264 6366
Note: Population, housing price, and high skill regressions include decade interval years only (1972, 1982, 1992).
Dollars in USD 2012 values. “High Skill Share” is the share of city population with 4 or more years of college (1972)
or a bachelor’s degree or higher (1982-1992); and includes only balanced panel of cities with annual observations for
educational attainment (e.g., cities with a population over 2,500 as of 1970). Table reports estimates of β from Eq.
1.2: yit = β(Pi × POSTt) + Xiθt + Rτ + γt + νi + εit. The instrument for (Pi × POSTt) in Panel B is Equation
1.4. Standard errors clustered by city. Includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). Marginal effect for
ln(population) and ln(median house price) calculated as (exp(β − var(β)/2)− 1)× 100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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Table 1.6: Downstream Population Mechanisms
All Cities Downstream “Big” Cities Downstream
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Count of Cities Downstream -0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
Count of Cities Downstream x StateShare’72 x Post -0.029∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Count of Cities Downstream x Post 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Count of Big Cities Downstream -0.017∗∗∗
(0.006)
Count of Big Cities Downstream x StateShare’72 x Post -0.430∗∗∗ -0.445∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.162)
Count of Big Cities Downstream x Post 0.004 0.005
(0.008) (0.008)
StateShare’72 x Post -1.516∗∗∗ -1.870∗∗∗ -1.466∗∗∗ -1.760∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.412) (0.401) (0.415)
Geography Controls Y Y
Baseline Controls Y Y
Year & CityFE Y Y Y Y
RiverPopulation x YearFE Y Y Y Y
Baseline mean 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Pct δ in y for 1 SD
increase Downstream Count -0.14% -0.13% -0.10% -2.26% -1.95% -2.02%
F Statistic 10.627 17.876 17.453 9.408 19.331 19.486
Observations 2151 14866 14866 2151 14866 14866
Note: Dependent variable in columns (1) is an indicator for primary treatment as of 1972. In the remaining columns, this is interacted
with a post CWA indicator. “CityCountDownstream” is the count of cities downstream. “BigCityCountDownstream” is the number
of cities with 1970 populations over 30,000 downstream.Standard errors clustered by city. Baseline controls include all controls listed
in Table1.2 column 4. Marginal effects evaluated at the mean value of 1972 state share of secondary treatment plants (3.4%). ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Effect of CWA compliance on Local Government Budgets by City
Size
Panel A: Expenditures per capita
Total Wastewater Other
Total Capital Operating Total Public Safety Public Works Gen Admin Welfare Rec
Primary’72xPost 413.561∗ 177.624∗∗∗ 124.537∗∗∗ 49.013∗∗∗ 237.406 53.771∗∗ 149.349 12.871 5.216 16.200
(230.584) (50.148) (45.907) (14.531) (185.368) (22.256) (174.569) (20.462) (22.286) (14.656)
Primary’72xPostxAboveMedian 66.808 -33.468∗∗ -16.796 -17.117∗∗∗ -70.991 15.531∗∗∗ -90.021 -14.517∗ 16.033∗∗∗ 1.983
(71.275) (13.922) (12.250) (4.323) (63.089) (5.765) (59.246) (8.121) (6.211) (3.492)
Baseline mean 1032.09 66.67 38.65 27.69 650.54 132.39 384.35 61.36 29.43 43.02
Panel B: Revenues per capita
Total Revenues User Fees Taxes Debt
Total Inter Govt Own Total Wastewater Total Property Sales & Licenses Long Term Short Term
Primary’72xPost 591.233∗∗∗ 359.173∗∗∗ 231.715 6.131 57.561∗∗∗ 32.172 16.208 15.883 -477.680 72.000
(174.907) (76.445) (147.383) (61.219) (19.382) (50.445) (41.354) (25.345) (754.298) (78.240)
Primary’72xPostxAboveMedian 103.603∗∗ 61.055∗∗∗ 42.636 -27.117∗ -8.020∗ -4.212 -8.914 4.728 454.371∗∗∗ -44.050∗∗
(47.914) (18.502) (39.972) (16.353) (4.759) (12.496) (11.500) (8.551) (173.885) (18.277)
Baseline mean 1019.02 170.60 848.45 111.91 31.41 389.85 300.87 88.99 1394.71 87.83
First Stage F-statistic 11.02 11.02 11.02 11.02 11.02 11.02 11.02 11.02 11.02 11.02
Observations 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866
Note: Dependent variables are in 2012 dollars per capita. Table reports estimates of δPOST and δPOST×ω from Eq. 1.7: yit = δPOST (Pi × POSTt) + δPOST×ω(Pi ×
POSTt × ωi) +Xiθτ + (N i × γt) +Diσt + (R × t) + γt + νi + varepsilonit, where Equation 1.4 instruments for (Pi × POSTt). Standard errors clustered by city. X
includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: CWA Compliance and Heterogeneous Effects by Grant Receipt
and City Size
Wastewater Userfee Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Panel A: Below Median Population Cities
Primary’72xPost 78.271∗∗∗ 0.055 -0.215∗∗ -0.002
(28.407) (0.126) (0.099) (0.016)
Primary’72xPostxGrant -6.823 0.012 0.065∗∗ 0.009
(10.804) (0.035) (0.021) (0.006)
First stage F-statistic 5.55 3.31 3.25 4.07
Baseline mean $13.63 2,648 $83188.99 9%
Observations 5980 2270 2270 1010
Panel B: Above Median Population Cities
Primary’72xPost 18.555 -0.036 -0.115∗ 0.011
(18.766) (0.069) (0.064) (0.011)
Primary’72xPostxGrant 0.007 -0.001 -0.001∗∗ 0.000
(0.038) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
First stage F-statistic 4.06 4.15 4.15 4.15
Baseline mean $44.52 59,594 $103,570.1 12%
Observations 5944 2482 2482 2482
Note: Table reports estimates o δPOST and δPOST×ω from Eq. 1.7: yit = δPOST (Pi × POSTt) + δPOST×ω(Pi ×
POSTt×ωi) +Xiθτ + (N i× γt) +Diσt + (R× t) + γt + νi + εit, where ω is annual federal grant receipt, normalized
by its standard deviation, and includes federal grants for wastewater treatment, as well as disaster relief, homeland
security, and miscellaneous goods. Eq. 1.4 instruments for (Pi × POSTt). Primary’72xPostxGrant are evaluated at
the average annual grant receipt, in standard deviation units. Sample includes years 1967-1987. Population, house
price, and high skill share regressions include only years 1972 and 1982, which correspond to decennial census years
1970 and 1980. Standard errors clustered by city. Includes all controls and fixed effects listed in Table 1.2 column 4.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFICIENCY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT: THE ROLE OF
PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC SECTOR UNIONS
2.1 Introduction
In 2012, 19.3 million people (13% of the total workforce) worked in state and local
government. This sector encompasses labor-intensive tasks such as K-12 education,
garbage collection, fire protection and providing public transit services. Dating back
at least to Baumol (1967) economists have argued that productivity growth is slow in
labor-intensive industries. In the absence of public sector productivity gains, rising
costs for public services mean that local taxpayers face a higher tax burden.
A challenge in studying the efficiency of the public sector arises because key
indicators such as street safety or local school quality are both a function of the
local population’s composition and the local government’s ability to deliver quality
services. Evaluating public sector efficiency is further complicated by the absence
of a universal metric that can provide meaningful comparisons of local governments,
either across localities or over time for the same locality. Experimental or quasi-
experimental studies permit evaluation of government service efficiency, however only
a few examples exist in the literature.1
1Chong et al. (2014) perform a cross-country evaluation of government service efficiency using
a natural experiment on postal services. Cellini et al. (2010) study the efficiency of local tax policy
across school districts in California using a regression discontinuity design.
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In this paper, we argue that the operating cost of moving a public transit bus one
mile represents a standardized metric for ranking local government service efficiency.
A distinctive feature of bus travel is its simple production function featuring three
key inputs: a driver, a bus, and fuel. The bus and the fuel needed to move the bus
are traded on a national market. Labor represents over 80% of the cost. Bus transit
provides an informative lens through which to investigate public sector productivity
for three additional reasons. First, because multiple agencies may operate within the
same city, bus transit provides a unique opportunity to compare public and private
service provision within the same locality. Second, bus transit is a ubiquitous public
service found in both urban and rural locations alike and across all U.S. regions.2
Third, fixed-route bus transit forms the core of public transportation in the U.S. Out
of 10.6 billion passenger-trips made on mass transit as of 2013, bus transit was the
most frequently-used mode of transit accounting for 50%, while heavy rail accounted
for 36%. Low-income households are less likely to own vehicles and many do not
live near viable heavy or light rail transit. These individuals often use the bus to
commute within America’s cities. Thus, higher bus transit operating costs could lead
to inadequate provision of an important public service for low-income households.
A transit agency can have a high operating cost per mile for two main reasons. It
can pay bus drivers and mechanics more than their local opportunity cost or it can
hire too many drivers and mechanics relative to the efficient level of employment.
For instance, the median hourly wage paid by the Chicago Transit Agency in 2014
2While just 13 metropolitan areas offer heavy rail systems (i.e., commuter trains or subways),
342 metropolitan areas across the U.S. have at least one bus transit system (APTA 2015; FTA
2016).
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to bus drivers was $32 and the 25th percentile was $24 per hour. Private sector
hourly wages in Chicago for comparable work were $12 and $8, respectively.3 While
a for-profit firm in a competitive industry would have sharp incentives to engage
in cost minimization, non-profit public transit agencies have weaker incentives to
do so as they face pressure from unions and local political leaders.4 Prior research
has shown that unions have negligible impacts on economic outcomes of employers
in the private sector (DiNardo and Lee 2004). In contrast, our study demonstrates
that public sector unions are a key determinant of public transit operating cost
differentials across space and time.5
Privatization represents one strategy for checking local union power and improv-
ing transit agency productivity. A transit agency that privatizes a fraction of its
bus miles is outsourcing a contract to private sector firms. This action (and even
the threat of this action) could discipline public sector unions and is likely to en-
hance public sector efficiency. Using variation in privatization levels from nationally
representative data on public transit, we provide new estimates of the effect of pri-
3Based on 2013 IPUMS CPS data for full time, private-sector workers, ages 25-64, living in the
Chicago metropolitan area, with at least a high school diploma, but no bachelor’s degree, with the
occupation “Motor Vehicle Operators”.
4Winston (2010) provides a review of several institutionalized protections that inhibit labor pro-
duction efficiencies in the transit sector. These include powerful transit worker unions, excessive
administrative staffing in order to fulfill federal bureaucratic obligations, and large transit subsidies
which discourage efficiency improvements. Lave (1991) further documents excessive administrative
staffing mandated by subsidizing-government institutions. Winston (2000) reviews how policymak-
ers in charge of public entities tend to be responsive to political influences rather than market
influences at the expense of efficiency.
5Brueckner and Neumark (2014) document that public employees extract rents from local tax-
payers in areas with attractive natural amenities. Public sector wages rise in absolute terms relative
to private-sector wages in the presence of such amenities. This relationship is stronger for unionized
public-sector workers. Diamond (2017) finds similar results in areas with inelastic housing supply.
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vatization on the cost of government service provision. We address the fact that
privatization is an endogenous choice by employing a regression discontinuity (RD)
design based on political elections following the strategy introduced by Lee (2008).6
Since we compare government service provision at the local level, our approach fol-
lows Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) where we use closely-won mayoral elections as a
source of quasi-random treatment assignment in the level of privatization.
Our results from the RD design show that bus transit agencies experience substan-
tial cost savings from privatization: transit agencies can reduce per-mile operating
costs by nearly 70% from fully privatizing the service provision, holding other factors
constant. In addition to testing for the average effect of privatization, we also doc-
ument that privatization has larger cost-saving effects for a city’s dominant transit
agency and in areas with strong union power. We test whether these cost savings
are a result of service reductions, both in terms of the level of service or the quality
of service, and find no evidence of either channel after privatizing. The supply of
service and the quality of service are not indistinguishable across publicly relative
to privately operated transit agencies. These results highlight that the public sector
cost premium cannot be easily explained by efficiency wages because publicly and
privately operated agencies in the same city can have significantly different operating
costs for the same unit of service. Our findings are consistent with private enterprises
operating at a lower cost and higher efficiency relative to their public counterparts.
Private entities hire fewer workers and engage in less “featherbedding” relative to
6Lee (2008) establishes that as long as there is some inherent uncertainty in the final vote
count of a political election with candidates from multiple parties, treatment status (i.e., political
partisanship) is as good as random in a small neighborhood of the winning margin threshold.
78
public transit agencies.
We conduct several robustness checks to examine threats to the RD design in-
cluding reverse causality and omitted variable bias. The results suggest that priva-
tization is the main channel through which transit agencies with Republican mayors
reduce operating costs. Further, Republican and Democrat mayors in closely-won
elections do not engage in significantly different cost-cutting behaviors, other than
their propensity to privatize transit services. Alternate identification strategies, in-
cluding an instrumental variable approach, and a difference-in-difference estimator
exploiting within-city cost variation support the RD result that privatization directly
reduces operating costs by over 70%.
After estimating the effect of privatization on the cost of bus service provision,
we quantify the deadweight loss generated by public provision of high-cost services.
Larger cities with strong union power experience substantial losses in consumer sur-
plus from costly public transit. Our estimates suggest that fully privatizing all bus
transit would generate cost savings of approximately $5.7 billion, or 30% of total U.S.
bus transit operating expenses. The corresponding increased use of public transit
from this cost reduction would lead to a gain in social welfare of $524 million, at
minimum, and at least 26,000 additional transit jobs.
Our study finds that the political affiliation of city mayors strongly predicts the
local level of public service privatization. Specifically, the propensity to privatize
public services at the local level increases when a Republican mayor wins office.
In contrast, Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) conclude that mayoral partisanship does
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not affect the extent or allocation of government spending at the local level. Our
conclusions differ from that ofFerreira and Gyourko (2009) for two important reasons:
first, our analysis considers the “intensive margin” of public spending (i.e., costs
per unit of service) as opposed to their “extensive margin” (the i.e., the size of
government spending). Unit cost reductions for public services do not necessarily
imply cost reductions at the aggregate level. For example, is it quite plausible that
a newly-elected city mayor outsources certain public services in order to lower costs,
and then allocates the realized cost savings to other public services, or to improving
technologies of the privatized service, such that the net change in aggregate spending
is minimal. Second, while Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) consider mayoral elections
from 1950 to 2005, our study examines a more recent time period, 1998 through
2011, a period of growing political polarization.7
Recent work by Bel and Rosell (2016) compares operating costs across privately
and publicly-operated transit agencies in Barcelona, Spain. Unlike their work, this
paper identifies cost differentials without imposing that the privatization decision
of agencies is orthogonal to their cost-generating behaviors. Our significant cross-
sectional, and time-wise variation allows us to control for selection endogeneity. We
find selection induces a substantial negative bias on the cost-saving effect of privati-
zation. Further, our study provides nationally representative estimates for all U.S.
cities with public bus transit.
7Several studies have documented increases in political polarization in the U.S. over the past two
decades, including: Abramowitz (2010); Ash et al. (2015); McCarty et al. (2016); and Gentzkow
et al. (2016).
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
relationship between labor unions and transit operating costs across the U.S. Section
2.3 presents our theoretical model of transit service provision and our empirical
identification strategy, respectively. Section 2.4 describes the data, and Section 2.5
establishes the relevance of our RD design. Section 2.6 discusses our empirical results.
We provide estimates of social welfare losses in Section 2.7, and Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Spatial & Temporal Variation in Operating Costs of Bus
Transit
We use vehicle miles traveled (VMT) as the relevant unit with which to standardize
the variables of interest, operating cost and privatization levels. The cost per mile
is calculated as total annual operating costs divided by total annual VMT.8 Other
possible operating statistics available through NTD include annual vehicle revenue
miles, annual number of passenger trips, and annual passenger miles traveled (PMT).
We focus on VMT for several reasons. First, unlike passenger trips or PMT, VMT
is strictly a mechanical measure of bus transit and does not conflate unobservable
demand-side factors such as service quality or route desirability with the cost of pro-
viding bus transit. Second, vehicle revenue miles exclude miles in operator training,
maintenance testing, or deadhead, thus do not fully capture the operational costs.
Finally, normalizing by VMT ensures that transit agencies serving differently sized
8See Appendix B.1 for details on the line items of operating costs.
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populations are comparable. If we were to standardize costs by PMT, for exam-
ple, transit agencies in larger cities would appear to have lower operating costs by
construction of serving a larger number of patrons for every bus mile.
The cost of operating a public bus varies greatly across U.S. cities. Table 2.1
compares the operating cost per mile of public bus transit across the twenty largest
urbanized areas in the U.S. in 2012. The unit operating cost ranges from $5.91 per
mile in San Antonio to $18.67 in New York City. A large part of the variation is
driven by differences in wages paid to drivers and mechanics.
Figure 2.1 compares the average operating costs per mile over time for transit
agencies in weak bargaining states versus strong bargaining states.9 Costs per mile
are consistently higher in strong bargaining states. Figure 2.2 illustrates that the
distribution of labor costs per mile in weak bargaining states is consistently lower
than that of strong bargaining states. While the dispersion of the labor cost per
mile in weak bargaining states has decreased over time, the dispersion in strong
bargaining states has increased over time.
In contrast, privatization shares are consistently lower in strong bargaining states.
9State bargaining rights data are sourced from Freeman and Valletta (1988). The level of a
state’s collective bargaining provision is coded as values ranging from 0 (no state laws relevant to
bargaining rights) to 6 (state law dictates employer is obligated to negotiate and come to written
agreement with unionized public employee). We classify states with strong bargaining rights laws
are those where legislative mandate either implicitly or explicitly dictates public employers and
union employees must come to an agreement on contract negotiations (values 5 and 6). States with
weak bargaining rights laws either prohibit collective bargaining all together, or do not mandate
that the public employer bargain with unions (values 4 or less). Courts have typically interpreted
an absence of provision for collective bargaining (value of 0) as prohibiting collective bargaining
(Freeman and Valletta 1988), thus we include states classified as level 0 as weak bargaining rights
states.
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We define a transit agency’s privatization share as the ratio of privatized VMT to
total VMT. Table 1 illustrates how the average privatization share for the twenty
largest urbanized areas is negatively correlated with the cost per mile. San Diego,
for example, was 63% privatized as of 2012, and had a cost per mile of $7.09. San
Jose, on the other hand, which has a similar cost-of-living index, had a cost per mile
nearly 56% higher than that of San Diego at $12.63, and this agency’s bus transit is
operated almost completely in-house (the privatization share is 1.3%).
Figure 2.3 displays the growth in privatization shares, comparing strong and weak
bargaining states. Strong bargaining rights states have consistently lower privatiza-
tion share. Taken together, Figures 2.1 through 2.3 illustrate a paradox whereby
transit agencies with higher costs are less likely to privatize. Union power appears
to simultaneously increase transit agency costs and limit the degree to which the
transit agency can outsource their operations.
For some major cities including Boston, Chicago, Denver, and Houston, we were
able to access their administrative salary databases. These data provide the count
of drivers and their salary or hourly wage. In Table 2.2 we report the empirical
distributions of current hourly wages for these major transit agencies, as well as
descriptive summary statistics on employee utilization, union presence and mean
home prices in each city. Boston and Chicago have stronger union presence relative
to Houston or Denver because the share of unionized workers in these urbanized areas
are higher and because Massachusetts and Illinois are non-right-to-work states. Cities
with a stronger union presence have more employees per VMT and higher wages paid
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to transit agency employees. The employees earning the 25th percentile wage in
Boston and Chicago earn more than the 75th percentile wage in Houston or Denver.
It is unlikely that housing costs entirely explain this divergence in pay, as Chicago
has lower average home prices than Denver.
2.3 A Model of Transit Service Provision and Privatization
In this section, we present a model of input choice in the production of public transit
services and discuss mechanisms that can generate cost differences across cities for
similar public services. Each transit agency is required to forecast aggregate demand
for its services and then to prepare to supply these miles by purchasing buses, and
fuel, and hiring drivers and mechanics. We model the manager’s decision as choosing
operating inputs to minimize the total operating cost conditional on capital and fleet
inputs.10 Managerial decisions on capital and fleet procurement are less frequent
relative to operating input decisions of labor, maintenance, and fuel. While Li et al.
(2015) study the durable bus investment decision and its implications on energy
efficiency for transit agencies, we focus on the labor input decisions and productivity
under the influence of labor union rules.
10Transit agencies do receive federal subsidies for capital costs but their operating costs are
generally not subsidized (Li et al. 2015).
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2.3.1 Optimization & Input Decisions
A transit agency provides service (i.e., vehicle miles) using three essential inputs:
the physical input (bus), fuel, and labor. We follow Berechman (2013) and posit a
constant returns to scale production technology. The production function is:
Q = min{gk(K, ηk), gl(L, ηl), gf (F, ηf )} (2.1)
where Q denotes the amount of bus service demanded, K the number of buses, L
labor input and F fuel input. ηk, ηf and ηl are productivity shocks, including both
those observed and unobserved to researchers that affect how efficiently these inputs
produce the service. The function gk(.) translates buses into effective capital (i.e.,
buses in full operation). The function gl(.) translates labor inputs (i.e., number of
full-time equivalent employees) into effective (i.e., non-idle) labor. The function gf (.)
translates the fuel input into energy used to propel the bus and is affected by bus
fuel economy, engine type, and unobserved shocks such as driving conditions.
A transit manager first chooses the physical input K, procured through capital
investment, to meet the expected local demand for bus services. Next, they decide
the fuel and labor inputs to operate the buses while observing shocks, η. We focus
on the operation stage where the transit agency manager chooses inputs to minimize
the operating costs while meeting the demand of their service area.
The static optimization problem can be defined as:
minL,F W ∗ L+ P ∗ F
s.t. min{gk(K, ηk), gl(L, ηl), gf (F, ηf )} = Q, (2.2)
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where W is wage and P is fuel price. We assume the following functional forms for
gl(L, ηl) and gf (F, ηf ):
gl(L, ηl) = L ∗ exp(ηL)
gf (F, ηf ) = F ∗ exp(ηf ) (2.3)
The optimal fuel and labor inputs can be written as:
L∗ = Q/exp(ηL),
F ∗ = Q/exp(ηf ), (2.4)
The total cost function can be expressed as:
TC∗ = Q[W/exp(ηL) + P/exp(ηf )] (2.5)
Conditional on the capital investment decision (i.e., the bus type), fuel productivity
shocks, ηf , are mainly dependent upon congestion and other local driving conditions.
These forces are arguably out of the transit agency manager’s control and are treated
as exogenous to their cost minimization decision.11 Labor productivity shocks ηL,
on the other hand, are dependent upon local labor and political conditions which
the transit agency manager may be able to counteract through the use of private
contractors. Labor input decisions are the major component of a transit agency
manager’s cost minimizing problem.
Wages for bus transit workers depend upon local market wages, as well as public
sector union strength. There are two main avenues through which unions increase
the costs of transit service provisions. First, the majority of transit union labor con-
tracts place substantial limits on use of part-time workers. Contracts either stipulate
minimum eight-hour shifts, or require that a minimum ratio of all runs be “straight
11The transit agency manager may decide to alter bus routes in order to reduce fuel costs, but
must maintain service at the desired quantity, Q.
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runs” as opposed to “split runs.”12 These rules work in direct opposition to the
heavily peaked demand of transit service. During midday lulls, workers may be paid
even when they are not driving. On the other hand, if a driver works more than an
eight-hour shift - extending between morning and evening peak demand - the addi-
tional hours are compensated as over-time pay.13 If managers are able to negotiate
for part-time employees, they must pay concessions in the form of wages or benefits
that often outweigh gains from lower labor utilization (Giuliano and Lave 1989). By
limiting the use of part-time labor, public sector union strength enters into the ηL
term in Eq. 2.2, and inhibits the translation of employees into fully-utilized, effective
labor. The second avenue through which unions increase the cost of service provision
is through pensions and fringe benefits. The costs of union workers’ pensions can
amount to 50% of their direct wage bill (Black 1991; DiSalvo 2010). Higher unit
costs serve to increase W in Eq. 2.5.
A unionized transit agency is likely to pay a higher wage per hour and to
have more drivers and mechanics on payroll than would be predicted by the cost-
minimizing decision under competitive labor markets. The net effect is a higher
average cost per mile of bus service.14 Figure 2.1 illustrates the positive correlation
between average unit cost of bus service and state union strength.
12“Split runs” partition driver duties into multiple pieces for a given route, as opposed to a
“straight run” where a driver works a continuous eight-hour day. (Deprez 2013).
13In 2010, over time costs paid to New York City’s MTA employees amounted to 13% of payroll,
or the equivalent of employing 7,000 additional full-time workers (Deprez 2013).
14Shleifer (1998) review of related empirical work finds similar differences across government vs.
privately-run firms: government-run firms hire more workers, have higher operating costs, and lower
productivity and profitability than their privately-run counterparts.
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Now that we have modeled the cost of producing bus miles under alternative local
rules, we introduce the privatization decision, which is one strategy transit agency
managers can use to counteract union influence and cut costs.
2.3.2 The Privatization Decision
The ultimate goal of privatization by transit agencies is to reduce costs, especially
in the face of a tight budget. Many cities use privatization as a way to reduce costs
for various types of services.15 Local and state level economic conditions affect the
revenue base that provides the majority of the operating funding for bus services.
Therefore, sluggish economic growth could provide the impetus for transit agencies
to explore the cost-cutting options such as privatization, especially in areas more
vulnerable to macroeconomic fluctuations such as those in a weak local housing
market. A strong public union presence can increase the unit cost of public service
provision, but can also make it harder to privatize.16 Opponents of privatization
often argue that the public sector provides steady, well-paying jobs for middle class
minorities and that the service from private contractors can be less safe, less reliable
15Levin and Tadelis (2010) examine the privatization decision of city services by examining the
probability of privatizing as a function of service- and city- specific characteristics. They conclude
that services for which it is harder to measure and monitor performance are less likely to be
privatized. In their empirical work, they find that cities which are larger, newer, or in the western
part of the U.S. are more likely to contract out public services to private providers. They also find
a negative correlation between city expenditure per capita and privatization of public service.
16In a study on the impacts of state legal environment on county-level privatization of public
services, Lopez-de Silanes and Vishnyn (1997) find prohibition on public employee political activity
and low unionization encourage privatization of public services.
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and, ultimately, more expensive.17
The decision to privatize transit operations originates either with agency manage-
ment or with a governing body of the agency, such as a county board of supervisors.
The agency seeks bids from multiple private competitors. Contract lengths generally
span one to three years, after which the transit agency management again seeks bids
from competitors (Iseki et al. 2005). Most often, the transit agency pays the private
firm a negotiated fixed rate per unit of service delivered.
The privatization of transit service routes can include a wide range of contractual
arrangements between the transit agency and private contractors. Contract specifica-
tions can range from managerial or maintenance assistance alone, to full “turn-key”
relationships, where the contractor performs all essential roles including financial
management, procurement, marketing and scheduling on behalf of the public transit
agency. In most instances, private firms are contracted to manage personnel who
operate and maintain the buses for a subset of service routes offered by the public
transit agency. In some instances, private firms are contracted to operate all routes
offered by the public agency. The private firm is in charge of hiring, compensating,
and scheduling employees, as well as negotiating labor contracts with union repre-
sentatives. Transit agencies retain control over key policy decisions, including service
levels, fares, annual operating plans, and contractual compliance. The transit agency
is also in charge of budgeting and financing operations, and maintains ownership of
all equipment, vehicles, and facilities.
17See, for example, “Public-Sector Jobs Vanish, Hitting Blacks Hard” by Larry Hanley, President,
Amalgamated Transit Union International, Washington.
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Most private contractors of bus transit are national or multinational firms.18
While market forces incentivize private firms to keep costs at competitive levels,
private firms further benefit from economies of scale in ways that public providers
cannot. Accumulated experience garnered from managing several transit agencies
at once and negotiating with labor unions enable private firms to employ labor and
other operating inputs in a more cost-efficient way than their public counterparts.
For example, the demand for bus service is highly peaked in the morning and evening
commute hours. Private contractors can hire part-time workers to meet the demand
during peak hours while public transit agencies have more limited ability to negotiate
for part-time labor use in the face of public sector unions.
2.3.3 Empirical Specification
Based on the model of service provision in Section 2.3.1, we specify the productivity
shocks to labor ηl in Eq. 2.4 as a function of privatization and other factors:
ηl = −βd− xθ − ε (2.6)
where d is a variable characterizing the level of privatization from 0 (no privatization)
to 1 (full privatization of all bus service). x are other observed covariates that affect
productivity and ε are productivity shocks unobserved to researchers.
18The three largest private contracting companies, Veolia, First Transit, and MV Transit col-
lectively accounted for 65% of all US public bus transit contracts in 2013 (NTD.gov). Veolia is a
French company that operates worldwide. MV Transit is a US-based company with international
operations. First Transit is a US-based company that operates in the US and Canada.
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With the optimal labor inputs and productivity shocks from Eqs. 2.4 and 2.6,
we can write the unit labor cost, l, as the following:
l = L∗ ∗W/Q = W/exp(ηl) = W/exp(−βd− xθ − ε) (2.7)
Performing a log transformation on the input cost equation yields:
ln(l) = ln(W ) + βd+ xθ + ε (2.8)
Denote a transit agency by i and year by t, we rewrite Eq. 2.8 as:
ln(lit) = β0 ln(Wit) + β1dit + xitθ + τt + ηs + εit (2.9)
Eq. 2.9 provides the basis for our empirical analysis. In addition to wages, privatiza-
tion share, and UZA and agency controls, our empirical specification includes a set
of year fixed effects τt to control for common macroeconomic trends across transit
agencies and state fixed effects ηs to control for time-invariant shocks within a state.
2.3.4 Identification
The decision for a transit agency to privatize some (or all) of their operations is
likely to be influenced by local characteristics as well as expectations about future
operations and service demand, each of which may not be fully captured by xit
and may affect agency unit costs, lit. The inability to control for such factors will
render εit to be correlated with the treatment, dit, which will bias estimates of β1.
To address this identification challenge, we employ an RD design by using data
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on mayoral election results and political partisanship.19 Local partisanship impacts
public spending and the propensity to privatize public services (Gerber and Hopkins
2011; Richmond 2001). All else equal, a Republican mayor is more likely to engage
in privatizing compared to a Democratic mayor.20 We exploit the discontinuity in
treatment levels generated by narrowly won mayoral elections as a source of pseudo-
random assignment of privatization.
In our RD framework, whether the winning margin of the Democratic candidate
(i.e. the running variable) falls on one side of a fixed cutoff or the other partly
determines treatment intensity. We define the Democrat winning margin as the
share of votes received by the Democratic candidate less the largest share of votes
received by any other candidate in the election (the “runner-up”). A Democrat
winning margin of 0% is the fixed cutoff determining the political party of the winner.
Defined in this way, the Democratic candidate wins the election if and only if the
Democrat winning margin is positive.21 The discontinuity we use is fuzzy because
the probability of privatization jumps by less than one at the Democratic winning
margin threshold of 0%; mayoral partisanship is only part of the factors that affect
the probability that a city will privatize it’s public transit. As we will demonstrate,
19In Appendix B.3, we also provide results based on two alternative strategies as robustness
checks: the first method uses labor contract cycles as an instrument for privatization, and the second
compares transit costs between buses and subways (which, by their nature cannot be privatized)
for cities that have both modes of transportation. Although these strategies are based on different
identification assumptions, the empirical findings from these robustness checks are all consistent
with those from the RD design.
20Between 1998 and 2014, the Amalgamated Transit Union, the largest transit worker’s union
in the nation, allocated an average of 93% of its political campaign contributions to Democratic
candidates (see OpenSecrets.org Center for Responsive Politics).
21The Democrat winning margin ranges from -1 to 1 and it takes value -1 if none of the candidates
are Democrats and 1 if all the candidates are Democrats.
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transit agencies in cities where the Republican candidate won are significantly more
likely to privatize a portion of their operations, even after controlling for several
potentially confounding factors including market wage rates, unionization levels, and
population density.
Our empirical model of the privatization decision is specified as follows:
dit = D(S)it + P (Mit;κ) + zitδ + νit (2.10)
where D(Sit is a function describing the mayoral political party after election year t
for the city in which transit agency i operates. We allow the mayoral party effect to
vary across states with strong relative to weak collective bargaining rights, such that
D(S)it = λ1Dit+λ2DitS. The dummy variableDit is equal to 1 if the winning mayoral
candidate in election year t is a Democrat and zero otherwise. The dummy variable S
is equal to 1 for states with legislation strongly in favor of collective bargaining rights.
P (Mit;κ) is a flexible polynomial function of the Democrat winning margin (Mit).
zit is a vector of UZA- and agency-level control variables including fixed effects.
Eq. 2.10 provides the first-stage regression in the analysis of the cost Eq. 2.9. Our
preferred specification for the control function P is a second order polynomial in
M , however our results vary little after using cubic or quartic polynomials. For
all specifications, we allow the polynomial coefficients to differ above and below the
cutoff. Consequently, our main specification for the first-stage regression is as follows:
dit = λD(S)it + α1Mit + α2M2it + α3DitMit + α4DitM2it + zitδ + νit (2.11)
We model the privatization decision under the assumption of uniform impacts of
Democratic mayor across states (D(Sit = λ1Dit) as well as heterogeneous impacts
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by collective bargaining strength (D(S)it = λ1Dit +λ2DitS). We estimate the priva-
tization treatment effectβ1 in Eq. 2.9 via two stage least squares (Hahn et al. 2001;
Lee and Lemieux 2010).22
Comparing outcomes across cities within a sufficiently narrow window around the
winning margin cutoff permits one to draw causal inference regarding the effects of
privatization on public transit operating costs. Our fuzzy RD (FRD) design provides
a weighted average of the effects of privatization for transit agencies in cities with
mayoral elections near the winning margin threshold, where weights reflect the ex
ante likelihood that the agency’s mayoral winning margin is close to the threshold.23
2.4 Data Sources
Our primary data source is the government-sponsored National Transit Database
(NTD). Any transit agency that receives grants or financing from the Federal Transit
Administration must report data to the NTD. Our analysis focuses on transit agencies
providing fixed-route, public bus transit. We obtained information on annual VMT,
passenger miles traveled (PMT), operating costs, fuel use, fleet characteristics, and
22Our fuzzy RD method has two IV’s instead of the canonical example with one IV in Hahn et al.
(2001). The second IV is an interaction term between the Democrat mayor dummy and the strong
collective bargaining rights dummy. The interaction term allows the discontinuity in privatization
to differ based on the strength of a state’s collective bargaining rights.
23Our RD design reflects imperfect take-up with a continuous treatment variable. Lee and
Lemieux (2010) refer to this type of RD design as a fuzzy RD with a “continuous endogenous
regressor.” Despite the semantic differentiation, the treatment effect in both cases is analogous to
the treatment effect in an instrumental variables setting, and in both cases can be estimated using
two-stage least squares. Thus, throughout this paper we refer to our RD design as a “fuzzy RD.”
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number of accidents and fatalities per year for 328 transit agencies from 1998 to
2011, for a total of 3,706 transit agency-year observations. Our sample of transit
agencies includes all 50 of the largest public agencies that operate buses, as ranked by
passenger trips as of 2011.24 These data cover 236 distinct urbanized areas (UZA’s)
across the U.S.
Agencies are required to partition their reported operating cost and service infor-
mation between services that were directly operated and those that were outsourced
to a private contractor. We construct the privatization share by dividing the re-
ported privatized VMT by total annual VMT. As of 2011, approximately 43% of
transit agencies outsourced their operations to some degree between 1998 and 2011.
Of those transit agencies, roughly half privatized 100% of their VMT for at least one
year between 1998 and 2011. Fleet characteristics sourced from NTD include the
size and average age of the bus fleet, the share of the fleet that is hybrid or operating
on compressed natural gas (CNG), and the organizational type. We codify transit
agencies as: an independent agency, a city agency, or “other” which includes agencies
operated by the state DOT or planning agency subsidiaries.
NTD reports operating costs which includes labor costs (salaries, wages, benefits,
and pensions), costs of fuel, materials and supplies, utility costs, taxes, and liability
costs. They do not report these individual components separately. However, they
do report annual fuel usage. Using fuel prices from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, we construct the annual fuel costs for each transit agency. Based
242013 Public Transportation Fact Book. American Public Transportation Association. 64th
edition.
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on reported operating costs and fuel costs estimates, we calculate the labor costs as
total operating costs net of fuel costs. The labor cost is the major component of
transit agency operating costs, averaging over 80% of total annual operating costs.
Appendix 1 provides a discussion of the calculation of these fuel and labor cost
measures.
The UZA-level data used in our empirical analysis consists of wages, unionization
shares, average housing prices, a road congestion index, and population density.
Because employee wages are not observed through the NTD data, we use earnings
data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to approximate wages paid to transit
agency operations workers. Our measure of W is the average weekly wage earned
by a full-time worker without any college education in an urbanized area. We use
the urbanized-area average wage for two reasons.25 First, we do not observe wages
or benefits that transit agencies pay their employees. Second, the actual wages paid
to transit employees are an endogenous choice made by the agency. The CPS wage
data provide a measure of the competitive market wage for a low skill employee
in an urbanized area and thus are unlikely to be correlated with transit agency-
specific cost shocks. Labor market controls, including share of unionized workers,
state collective bargaining rights and right-to-work status, account for the difference
between the compensation of transit workers (reflected in the labor cost data) and
the wage variable used in our regression (the average wage of all low-skill workers in a
UZA). Unionization share is the ratio of union-represented full time-equivalent (FTE)
workers to all FTE workers, also sourced from CPS. State-level data on collective
25We removed observations of earners below the 5th and above the 95th percentile.
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bargaining rights as well as right-to-work status are obtained from Freeman and
Valletta (1988).26
Population density is sourced from NTD, and covers years 2000 and 2010. Annual
average housing price data are sourced from ACCRA Cost of Living Index. The
road congestion index measures density of traffic across an urban area. The index is
sourced from the Texas A&M Transportation Institute.
Mayoral election data prior to 2008 are sourced from Ferreira and Gyourko (2009).
From the universe of Ferreira and Gyourko’s original data, we use only elections after
1998 in urbanized areas that have public bus transit systems reporting to NTD. We
extended election results for cities in Ferreira and Gyourko’s dataset from 2008-2011
through contacting city clerks and performing online searches. These data include
the names, political affiliation, number of votes received by the winner and runner-
up, total election votes, date, and location for elections. Election data from both
Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and the authors’ extension are limited to cities with
populations over 25,000 with direct mayoral elections.27
26We use the 1996 values updated by Kim Rueben in our analysis. While the timing of the col-
lective bargaining and right-to-work data does not overlap with our analysis, year-to-year variation
of collective bargaining right strength varies minimally within state. See footnote 10 for further
explanation on the construction of this variable.
27NTD data are aggregated to the UZA level while mayoral election data are at the city level.
In instances where a UZA had multiple cities with distinct mayoral elections in a given year, we
assigned the UZA a winning margin equal to the average winning margin across elections with
the same winning political party. Cases where the winning political party differed across cities
within the same UZA-year were excluded. We excluded elections where the winning mayor ran
as an Independent. In instances where the candidate ran unopposed, the winning margin is 1 for
Democrat winners (-1 for Republican winners). Our results are robust to excluding elections run
unopposed.
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The RD analysis uses only the dominant transit agencies in a UZA. We define
saydominant transit agencies as the largest transit agency in a UZA, based on average
annual VMT. Using only the dominant transit agencies effectively creates a one-to-
one match within our sample between a city and a transit agency.28 The majority
of mayoral election cycles occur every three or four years, consequently our RD
estimation is identified off of 548 unique elections. The final RD sample includes
1,444 observations covering 128 urbanized areas in 36 states from 1998 through 2011.
Table 2.3 characterizes the difference between transit agencies that are fully public
and those that are not using sample means for UZA and transit agency characteris-
tics. For both the RD sample and the full sample, labor costs and union participation
rates are lower, on average, among agencies that engage in privatization. In general,
the RD sample has similar mean characteristics as the full sample.
2.5 The RD Framework
Whether and to what extent privatization reduces the cost of public service provision
are contentious issues. Using panel data on hundreds of transit agencies’ annual
28We focus on the dominant transit agencies for the RD approach for the following reasons.
First, the privatization decision of these agencies has more significant implications on the local
budget than non-dominant agencies. Appendix Figure B.2 plots the privatization share in non-
dominant agencies against the winning margin and there does not appear to be a discontinuity in
the privatization share among close elections. Second, the non-dominant transit agencies tend to
be those that serve suburban areas and their service area may overlap with multiple municipalities.
Thus, the connection between a city mayor’s political decisions and the city’s public services is
less clearly defined for such non-centralized transit services. For these two reasons, we focus on
dominant transit agencies in our RD analysis.
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operating costs, we seek to understand why agencies differ with respect to their
cost of service provision and what roles privatization and public unions play in the
cost of service provision. Since privatization is a choice, we must explicitly model the
determinants of this endogenous variable. The following sections establish our RD as
a valid experimental design that provides quasi-random assignment of privatization.
We then show the relevance of our first stage relationship between mayor partisanship
and privatization levels.
2.5.1 Testing the Validity of the RD Design
There are two important assumptions underlying the RD strategy and we discuss
each of them in turn. The first assumption is that transit agencies in cities with
mayoral elections in a narrow window around the zero winning margin threshold are
similar on observable and unobservable dimensions.29
We provide evidence that treatment assignment is locally randomized by demon-
strating that observable baseline covariates are balanced, and evolve smoothly over
the winning margin threshold. To test covariate balance we conduct both graphi-
cal RD analysis and formal estimation. Figure 2.4 provides graphical evidence that
selected covariates evolve smoothly through the winning margin cutoff. A compre-
hensive test of covariate balance is shown in Appendix Table B.1, where we compare
sample means for each transit agency- and UZA-level baseline covariate across 30-
29See Lee and Lemieux (2010) for a comprehensive discussion of RD designs and their applications.
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percentage-point bins. We test for covariate balance by regressing each variable
in Appendix Table B.1 on the Democrat indicator variable, the Democrat winning
margin, and their interactions.30 The last column of Appendix Table B.1 shows
the p-value associated with each discontinuity estimate (λ) from these regressions.
We fail to reject continuity across the winning margin threshold for each covariate,
except two (Share City agency; and the Share of CNG buses).
In cases where there are many covariates, it is possible that some discontinu-
ities will be statistically significant by random chance (Lee and Lemieux 2010). To
increase the power of the covariate balance analysis, we follow a “covariate index”
procedure suggested by Card et al. (2015): we predict transit agency labor costs
from a simple linear regression model relating the log of labor costs per VMT to
each of the 11 predetermined covariates listed in Appendix Table B.1 as follows:
yit = xκ + εit. The vector of coefficients, κ, is estimated from a random subsample
of 150 observations. Next, we generate out-of-sample predictions of log(labor costs)
per VMT: yˆit = xκ. The resulting covariate index function can be interpreted as the
best linear prediction of mean log labor costs given the vector of predetermined vari-
ables. In Appendix Figure B.3, we plot the mean values of these covariate-predicted
labor costs around the Democrat winning margin threshold. Predicted labor costs
evolve smoothly through the cutoff. Further, regression results show no evidence of
a discontinuity in the predicted labor cost across the winning margin threshold.31
30Specifically, we run regressions of the form: yit = σD(S)it + λ1Mit + λ2M2it + λ3DitMit +
λ4DitM
2
it + νit or (|M |≤ 0.6) where y is a covariate, M is the winning margin, and D = 1 if the
winning mayor is a Democrat.
31We estimated the following regression: Iit = ζDit + η1Mit + η2M2it + η3DitMit + η4DitM2it + ρit
where Iit is the covariate index. The p-value associated with ζ, the discontinuity at the winning
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The second assumption for a valid RD design is that transit agencies cannot
precisely manipulate mayoral election voting outcomes, and subsequently select into
the treatment. Voter turnout for our sample of election outcomes range from 3,000
to 257,000, in cities with populations ranging from 59,000 to 1.8 million. Given the
large voter turnout, it is unlikely voters were able to precisely manipulate voting
outcomes.32 However, we provide descriptive evidence as well as a formal test that
there is no discontinuity in the distribution of the running variable at the cutoff.
Any evidence of a jump in the density of the running variable at the cutoff would
suggest some degree of sorting into the treatment and would invalidate the quasi-
experimental RD design.
In Figure 2.5, we plot the number of elections in each percentage point bin of
the Democrat winning margin, as well as estimates of the Democrat winning margin
density function. We estimate the density function following McCrary (2008).33
There is no indication of discontinuity in the density of the running variable at the
cutoff. A McCrary test confirms that there is no statistically significant jump in the
running variable density function at zero.34 This is consistent with absence of any
margin threshold is 0.750 without Table 2.3 controls, and 0.240 with controls.
32Near the winning margin threshold, voter turnout is comparable for UZA’s on either side of
the threshold. Average voter turnout is 48,500 for elections where the winner won by less than 20%
of the vote share. Voter turnout is negatively correlated with winning margin. DiNardo and Lee
(2004) observe this same trend in their analysis of union elections. The smallest voter turnout in
their sample is 20, substantially smaller than the voter turnout observed in our mayoral elections.
33The McCrary test is based on an estimator for the discontinuity at the cutoff in the density
function of the running variable. The test involves, first obtaining a finely-gridded histogram of the
running variable; and second, smoothing the histogram using local linear regression on either side
of the cutoff. The parameter of interest is the log difference in histogram height to the right and
left of the threshold. See McCrary (2008).
34The point estimate of discontinuity in the density function is -0.40 with a standard error of
0.25, consequently we can reject the null hypothesis that the running variable density function is
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voter manipulation that may undermine the RD design. Consequently, for transit
agencies in UZA’s with close margins of victory, the political affiliation of Republican
or Democrat is assigned essentially at random.
2.5.2 Partisanship and Privatization
We present evidence on the effects of Democratic mayoral victories on a transit
agency’s level of privatized bus miles. Each dot in Figure 2.6 corresponds to the
average transit agency privatization share following election t, given the margin of
victory obtained by Democrats in election t. The solid and dashed lines in the
figure represent the predicted values of privatization share from linear, quadratic,
and cubic polynomial control functions without covariates. There are noticeable
discontinuities at the cutoff, with conspicuous drops in privatization levels within
each bin for positive Democrat winning margins near the 0% threshold. The partisan
discontinuity is even more pronounced in Appendix Figure B.4, which “zooms” into
a winning margin window around the threshold of -60% to 60%. Privatization levels,
while significantly lower, are not zero for Democratic victories; however it is clear
that there is a discrete increase in the probability of privatizing public bus transit
operations in urbanized areas where a Republican won a mayoral election.35
The likelihood of privatization differs across states with either strong or weak
discontinuous at the threshold.
35Figures with varying bin sizes appear in the online appendix. The discontinuity in privatization
share is robust under varying bin sizes.
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collective bargaining rights. Panel B of Figure 2.6 shows that most of the jump
generated in Panel A is driven by Republican victories in states with strong collec-
tive bargaining rights. Agencies in weak bargaining rights states show very little
difference in privatization levels regardless of whether the Republican or Democratic
mayoral candidate won an election (Panel C). Weak bargaining rights states may
have less to gain from privatizing: these states tend to have lower wages, less union
power, smaller city sizes, and lower urban density. In contrast, the potential cost
savings is greater in strong bargaining rights states. Our analysis accounts for this
heterogeneous treatment effect across strong versus weak bargaining rights states.
To improve estimation efficiency, we utilize the full sample of 1,444 transit agency-
years in our main RD results. Approximately 10% of transit agencies in the RD
sample fully engage in privatization (i.e., their privatization share is one), which is
why some observations in Figure 2.6 appear as extreme outliers. While use of the
full sample size improves estimation precision, our estimates are generally robust to
restricting observations to elections with margins of victory closer to the winning
threshold.
Regression estimates of the discontinuities in privatization share are shown in
Table 2.4. Each cell in the first row reports an estimate of the effect of electing
a Democratic mayor on privatization based on various specifications of Eq. 2.11.
All specifications include quadratic control functions and their interactions with the
mayor party dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the UZA level. A Democratic
mayoral victory reduces the likelihood of privatizing bus miles. In column (3), we
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allow the discontinuity estimate to differ for states with strong vs. weak collective
bargaining rights laws by including an interaction of the Democrat mayor indicator
with strong bargaining rights indicator (“Democrat x Strong Barg”). This variable
is equal to one for a transit agency operating in a strong bargaining rights state in a
year where a Democrat mayor was elected, zero otherwise. The negative coefficient
on “Democrat x Strong Barg” implies that Democrat mayors in cities with strong
bargaining rights are even less likely to engage in privatization than their mayoral
counterparts in areas with weak bargaining rights. The estimates in column (3)
are jointly significant with 95% confidence level. Column (4) uses local polynomial
regression estimation with a robust confidence interval developed by Calonico et al.
(2014) and ?, henceforth “CCT”.36 We report local polynomial regression estimates
under a triangular kernel density and bandwidths following the optimal bandwidth
selection procedure of CCT (2014).
The results reported in Table 2.4 suggest that a Democratic mayor reduces pri-
vatization levels by between 6 and 10 percentage points. Results are robust to the
specification of the control function or the inclusion of covariates. All estimates are
significant at the 10% level.
36The performance of available local polynomial confidence intervals are sensitive to the chosen
bandwidth, and can produce biased intervals with low empirical coverage in finite samples. The con-
fidence interval proposed by CCT corrects for this bias by rescaling the conventional bias-corrected
t-statistic with a standard error formula that accounts for the additional variation introduced by
the estimate bias. The resulting confidence interval allows for mean squared optimal bandwidth
selectors, and improved coverage rates. See Calonico et al. (2014) for a detailed discussion on the
construction of their bias-corrected confidence intervals.
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2.5.3 Placebo Tests
We carry out a series of placebo tests to verify that the observed jump in privatiza-
tion levels is, in fact, driven by the Democrat winning-margin threshold. In Figure
2.7, we plot the discontinuity estimates from a series of regressions, where we fix
the winning margin cutoff to an alternative threshold. For expository purposes, we
show estimation results over the range -0.4 to 0.4. Each dot corresponds to a dis-
continuity estimate in the privatization share around the “false” Democrat winning
margin thresholds. We present results from local polynomial regressions including a
quadratic polynomial in the winning margin. Estimates were noisier for thresholds
below zero due to smaller sample sizes. However, only at the true cutoff of zero is
the discontinuity estimate statistically significant.
Given the significant discontinuity in privatization levels across the winning mar-
gin threshold, and given that other covariates are distributed smoothly across the
threshold, one can interpret any discontinuity in the conditional distribution of unit
labor costs as a causal effect of privatization.
2.6 Empirical Results of the Privatization Effect
In this section, we first report our regression discontinuity estimates of the cost sav-
ings associated with privatization, and provide evidence that our main results are
robust to various specifications of the RD design. We further demonstrate that pri-
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vatization is the main mechanism driving cost savings for transit agencies. In Section
2.6.3, we test whether privatization affects public transit quality and reliability as a
consequence of reducing costs. Our final set of empirical results provides evidence
that privatizing transit agencies are able to reduce costs by limiting instances of
“featherbedding.”
2.6.1 Main Results: The Effect of Privatization on Labor
Cost
We investigate whether privatization reduces transit agency labor costs. Because pic-
tures are illuminating in a regression discontinuity context, we first provide graphical
evidence of the relationship between labor costs and mayoral election outcomes. Each
dot in Figure 2.8 corresponds to the average unit labor cost that follows a mayoral
election t, given the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t among
transit agencies in strong bargaining rights states. The lines in Figures 2.8 represent
the predicted values from a linear, quadratic and cubic polynomial fit of the win-
ning margin, without covariates. Republican victories over Democrat mayors have
the greatest impact on privatization levels in strong, as opposed to weak bargaining
rights states. Consequently, the discontinuity in labor costs near the winning margin
threshold is driven by agencies in strong bargaining rights states (Panel B).37 In such
37Appendix Figure B.5 shows residuals plots from a regression of log unit labor costs on all transit
agency and UZA controls – excluding the privatization share –, as well as state and year fixed effect
along the Democrat winning margin. In strong bargaining rights states, costs are lower after closely
won Republican victories. Graphical evidence of the persistent discontinuity in labor costs, as well
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states, costs are lower after closely won Republican victories.
Table 2.5 reports estimates of the privatization treatment effect, β1 in Eq. 2.9,
under three types of estimators: OLS, fuzzy RD, and the local polynomial estimator.
We show results with and without UZA and agency control variables. All regressions
include year and state dummies, so that the relationships between privatization levels
and labor costs are identified using variation across agencies within the same state.
Standard errors are clustered at the UZA level. OLS estimates in columns (1) and
(2) suggest that a 1% increase in a transit agency’s privatization share reduces their
per-mile labor costs by between 0.16% and 0.3%. For a transit agency with no
privatization, the labor cost-savings from fully privatizing transit operations would
be between 15.0% and 30.9%.38 However, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased
by unobserved factors that are correlated with a transit agency’s level of privatization
that also affect labor costs. Columns (3) – (4) present analogous results under an
FRD approach in which we instrument the privatization share with an indicator
equal to one if a Democrat won a mayoral election. The FRD estimates in columns
(3) and (4) are larger in magnitude relative to the naive specifications in columns
(1) and (2). Thus, omitted variables produce a downward bias on the privatization
effect. This is consistent with our prior finding that large agencies in cities with
strong unions have more to gain from privatization but are less likely to privatize.
The FRD estimates suggest a 1% increase in privatization reduces unit labor costs
as residual labor costs, under varying bin sizes appear in the online appendix.
38Because Eq. 2.9 takes the semi-logarithmic functional form and the privatization rate ranges
from 0 to 1, a consistent estimator for the percentage impact from full privatization (e.g., privati-
zation rate going from 0 to 1) on the labor cost is 100 ∗ [ exp(γˆ − var(γˆ)2 )− 1]
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between 0.4% and 1.9% for those transit agencies near the 50-50 margin of victory.
Columns (5) and (6) employ the flexible version of equation (9) where the Demo-
crat mayor effect is allowed to differ by states with strong collective bargaining rights.
These regressions show that outsourcing public transit to private entities by 1% will
decrease labor costs per mile by between 1.0% and 2.1%. The full effect of privatiza-
tion is a reduction ranging from 46.4% to 68.1% in unit labor cost after controlling
for observables. Inclusion of UZA and transit agency control variables reduces the
magnitude of the FRD estimates substantially. Finally, the local polynomial estimate
in column (7) is of similar magnitude to the FRD estimates.39,40
The magnitude of cost savings from privatizing suggested by the FRD estimates
is considerably larger than the OLS estimates. This difference in effect size indicates
that treatment is endogenous, and the highest-cost agencies are not engaging in pri-
vatization. The difference in estimated effect sizes could also reflect the fact that
FRD estimates are local; the FRD design predicts the average treatment effect for
agencies with close mayoral elections, where the Republican candidate won by a small
margin. These estimates may not generalize to a broader sample of transit agencies.
Further, because the regression discontinuity analysis sample consists only of dom-
39The local polynomial estimate is consistent for various bandwidth sizes, as shown in Appendix
Figure B.6.
40To investigate the potential bias into FRD results due to the relatively weak first stage, we em-
ploy a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator, which has the same asymptotic
distribution as the FRD (i.e., 2SLS) estimator. The LIML estimator is less precise than 2SLS, but
provides finite-sample bias reduction (Angrist and Pischke 2008; Greene 2003). Results of LIML
estimation are shown side-by-side with that of the FRD estimation in Appendix Table 2.3. The
effect of privatization on labor costs are qualitatively and quantitatively similar between LIML and
FRD estimators, further the standard errors from LIML estimation are similar in magnitude to
that of the FRD estimator, suggesting weak correlation is not substantially biasing our results.
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inant transit agencies, the predicted cost savings are likely to be an upper bound
estimate for non-dominant transit agency. We investigate the relationships between
transit agency size and labor costs in Section 2.6.4 and find dominant transit agen-
cies have approximately 20% higher labor costs per mile relative to non-dominant
transit agencies, all else equal.
2.6.2 Specification and Robustness Tests
Contemporaneous Treatment Effects
An assumption underlying our RD strategy is that mayor partisanship affects transit
operating costs only through its effect on the propensity to privatize. That is, transit
agencies operating under Republican mayors experience lower operating costs rela-
tive to their Democrat-electing counterparts because Republican mayors are more
likely to outsource public transit to private entities. We recognize that our approach
would not recover the causal impact of privatization on costs if Republican mayors
engaged in significantly different cost-cutting measures than Democrat mayors that
are either unobserved, or unaccounted for in our specifications. Our tests for co-
variate balance (Figure 2.4, Appendix Table B.1, Appendix Figure B.3) established
that pre-existing differences in city-wide characteristics do not explain our results.
However, there remains a possibility that contemporaneous treatments, such as elim-
ination of unprofitable routes, are driving our results.41
41In Appendix Figure B.7, we also show that incumbency or power transition effects within
our mayoral election sample are not spuriously driving our regression discontinuity results. We
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We test whether election of Republican mayors is systematically correlated with
transit agencies eliminating unprofitable bus routes in an effort to reduce costs. Ap-
pendix Table B.2 shows results of regressing mayoral political affiliation in election
year t on the level of transit service following the election. Among closely won elec-
tions (those with a Democrat winning margin between -60% and 60%), we find no
significant difference whether we measure transit services in terms of annual VMT,
annual PMT, or occupancy rate. Regressions that use the full support of the Demo-
cratic winning margin show that cities with Republican mayors have higher levels
of VMT and PMT, on average, compared to Democrat mayors. This is the op-
posite result we would expect if Republican cities reduced costs by cutting transit
services. Rather, the positive relationship between Republican mayors and transit
service is the general equilibrium result we would expect after the consumer price
of transit falls, and demand for transit increases. Additionally, it is possible that
privatized transit agencies are able to offer service to remote, low-density areas that
were too costly under public transit operations. Later in Section 2.6.4, we explore
the mechanisms for cost savings under privatization.42
test that the closely won elections in our sample capture variation in political affiliation itself (ie
Democrat or Republican party), as opposed to characteristics of mayoral power transitions that are
correlated with political affiliation. For example, it is possible that political administration changes
by newly elected mayors (e.g., non-incumbent mayors) induce privatization of bus transit, and newly
elected mayors are more often Republican than Democrat. Our empirical results show that mayoral
power transition characteristics evolve smoothly through the winning margin cutoff. Closely won
Democrat victories are no more likely than Republican victories to have a non-incumbent winner,
a new political party, or a mayor serving a longer tenure.
42It is unlikely that scale economies harnessed by Republican-won cities explain cost savings from
privatization because our cost outcome variable of interest excludes fixed costs.
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Alternative Identification Strategies
To further test the robustness of results to the identifying assumption, we estimate
the effect of privatization based on two alternative strategies. The first strategy
uses labor contract cycles as an instrument for privatization. The second strat-
egy compares the operating costs per mile between buses and subways - which, by
their nature cannot be privatized - for cities that have both modes of transporta-
tion. Although these strategies are based on different identification assumptions, the
empirical findings from these robustness checks are all consistent with those from
the RD estimates. We present the implementation and results of these alternative
identification strategies in greater detail in Appendix B.3.
Varying the Margin of Victory Window
As a final robustness check, we verify that our chosen window around the winning
margin threshold does not affect the main results. We re-estimated the regression
specifications with full UZA and agency controls in Table 2.5 under several different
ranges of the winning margin. Appendix Table B.3 shows the OLS, FRD, and local
polynomial results under windows ranging from 10% to 70% around the threshold.
These results are similar in sign and magnitude to those discussed in Section 2.6.1:
the OLS estimates suggest a cost savings between 20% and 36% while FRD and local
polynomial estimates imply cost savings between 70% and over 90%. The implied
cost savings are larger for smaller windows; however, these estimates are less precisely
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estimated due to the small sample sizes. Because the estimates remain reasonably
stable across different windows of the winning margin, we conclude that our main
findings are robust to the choice of the winning margin range.
2.6.3 Effects of Privatization on Service Quality and Rider-
ship
Critics of privatization often point to worsening service quality as a drawback of
outsourcing. Hart et al. (1997) theorize that in-house service provision in the context
of prisons is optimal if cost reductions from privatizing have substantial impacts
on non-contractible quality. However, if quality reductions from cost reductions
can be controlled through contracts or competition, then privatization is optimal.
Therefore, the ability to measure and monitor service quality is an important factor
that determines whether a public service can or should be privatized.
We estimate the effects of privatization on several indicators of service quality,
including annual VMT, PMT, ridership, and the number of non-fatal and fatal inci-
dents per year reported by the transit agencies. Non-fatal incidents include collisions,
vehicles leaving the roadway, fires, electric shocks, or security incidents. Fatal inci-
dents include fatal collisions with pedestrians, cyclists, suicides, or operator deaths.
The incidents data were available from NTD from 2002 through 2011. Annual count
of incidents provides a proxy for bus operator negligence. Outcomes of annual VMT,
PMT, and rider occupancy measure whether transit agencies that outsource are
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more likely to reduce transit services or if unobservable factors cause rider demand
to decline when operations are managed by a private entity. Evidence of reduc-
tions in service levels or demand would confound the cost-saving effects identified in
our main analysis. Specifically, privatizing might reduce costs not through efficient
management and labor utilization, but through reducing the services rendered to
the public. Any evidence of reductions in rider occupancy would more importantly
suggest that privatizing has welfare-diminishing effects by pushing people away from
public transit.
We first provide graphical evidence that service quality does not differ across
mayoral political affiliation. Appendix Figure B.8 plots the residuals generated from
regressing each of the service variables VMT, PMT, rider occupancy, and number
of incidents on transit agency observables. We would expect to see a discontinuity
at the winning margin if political affiliation induced significant differences in service
level or quality through privatization. The absence of a discontinuity suggests that
reductions in overall bus service, or reductions in service quality cannot explain the
labor cost savings observed in our main results.
Our regression analyses relating service quality attributes to agency privatization
levels support the graphical results that privatization does not reduce costs through
literal or figurative shortcuts to transit service. Appendix Tables B.3 and B.4 show
estimation results following Eq. 2.9 where incidents, VMT, PMT, and rider occu-
pancy are the outcome variables. Transit agencies with higher levels of privatization
report a lower number of incidents per year under negative binomial, FRD, and lo-
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cal polynomial estimation, although the effect is imprecisely estimated (Appendix
Table B.3).43 Results of Appendix Table B.4 show that privatizing bus transit is
positively correlated with VMT under both OLS and FRD estimation (columns 1-
2), contrary to what we would expect if cost savings resulted from reducing transit
services. Taking all regression results together as a whole, however, suggests that
there is no significant relationship between privatization share and transit service
offerings. Columns (4) and (5) show that privatization does not significantly affect
rider occupancy.
These analyses suggest that private firms provide public bus transit at a lower
cost than public operators, and these cost savings do not come at the expense of
reduced miles of service or reduced quality.44
2.6.4 The Cost-Saving Channels from Privatization
Non-privatized, unionized transit agencies often face a higher labor cost due to re-
strictions on use of part-time employees, and through obligations to larger pensions
and fringe benefits (Giuliano and Lave 1989; Black 1991; DiSalvo 2010; Winston
2010). We test whether publicly operated transit services exhibit under utilization
of employees, or “featherbedding” of employee headcount. Due to the limitations
of NTD data, we observe employee headcount only for the publicly operated tran-
43Because the incidents data (annual number of fatal and non-fatal incidents) are count data
with several zeros, we use a negative binomial estimator, in addition to RD methods.
44In the online appendix, we show graphically that there is little evidence of discontinuities in
number of incidents, VMT, PMT, or rider occupancy at the democrat winning margin cutoff.
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sit services, thus we are not able to compare employee headcount for public and
private operations directly. However, we are able to test the effect of state-level
union strength on full-time employee headcount, holding all other factors constant,
for publicly operated transit services. Table 2.6 shows results of regressing the log
of the number of full time employees per publicly operated VMT on measures of
state-level bargaining rights and a right-to-work state indicator. Stronger state bar-
gaining rights are correlated with higher full-time employee headcount per VMT.
Conversely, transit agencies operating in right-to-work states have a lower full-time
employee headcount per VMT. The negative correlation between right-to-work laws
and employee headcount per VMT persists even for transit agencies operating in
states with strong collective bargaining rights.
In a similar spirit as Thomas (1998), we examine transit agencies in counties
that share a state border, where right-to-work laws differ on either side of the state
border. For instance, Kansas – a right-to-work state, and Missouri – a non-right-
to-work state - share a border. We compare the transit labor costs between transit
agencies in two counties that share the Kansas-Missouri border. These counties are
arguably comparable on unobservables due to their close geographic proximity. After
controlling for city and agency-specific observables like average wage, union strength,
density, and cost of living, any variation in labor costs between these two agencies
is due to their differing right-to-work status. The NTD data consists of 17 such
border-county pairs comprising 21 transit agencies. Table 2.7 shows the results of
fixed effect regressions. Each specification includes the 17 border-pair fixed effects.
The sample size is small, however the right-to-work estimate is precisely estimated,
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and is robust to the inclusion of various fixed effects and UZA and agency controls.
The evidence in Tables 2.6 and 2.7 suggest that right-to-work states have lower labor
costs, all else equal, and leaner use of staff is at least partially responsible for these
lower labor costs.
As a final piece of evidence demonstrating the role that unions play in lobbying
large liberal city transit agencies, in Table 2.8 we report regressions in which the
dependent variable is the log of operating cost per mile and the explanatory variables
are dominant agency indicators and their interactions with right-to-work status and
union strength. These regressions include UZA-by-year fixed effects, which serve to
control for all local trends that can impact operating costs. The remaining variation is
cross-transit agency variation within a UZA. Since major UZAs such as Chicago have
multiple transit agencies, we compare cost per mile for dominant transit agencies and
suburban agencies. In addition, we stratify these estimates by the state’s right-to-
work status. Column (2) shows that in pro-union, non-right-to-work states, operating
costs are 36% higher in the dominant agency relative to the suburban agencies.
However, in right-to-work states such as Texas, operating costs are only 3% higher
in the dominant agency relative to the suburban agencies. If the efficiency wage
theory explained why public transit employees receive higher compensation relative
to private-sector employees, we would not expect to see an operating cost differential
across transit agencies within the same city for the same unit of service. Rather, our
preferred explanation is that unionized labor in liberal areas focus their negotiation
efforts on the dominant transit agencies, generating an operating cost premium for
these larger agencies.
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An important dimension of the privatizing process is that the employees operating
and maintaining buses often include the same people whether the bus is operated
by the private or public entity. The majority of these employees are unionized,
even if they are on payroll of the private entity. Thus, the impact of unions on
transit operating costs is not absent when operations are outsourced to private firms.
Rather, private firms are better equipped to negotiate labor contracts with union
representatives.
Several private operators are large multinational firms that can draw upon best
practices in contract negotiations and employee management. More importantly,
private firms serve to create a disconnect between unionized transit employees and the
transit authority responsible for budgeting and planning. Because of their affiliations
with a political organization, public unions have the power to increase and sustain
levels of public employment as well as impact local finance policy to increase taxes
and salaries (DiSalvo 2010). Severing the tie between the policy-making institution
and the employees is one of the most important mechanisms by which private firms
reduce costs of public services.45
45DiSalvo (2015) discusses important advantages that public sector unions exercise over private
sector unions at the negotiations table including: protection from business cycles due to the ease
with which governments can borrow money, influence on employers through political contributions,
and absence of direct mechanisms to control management because voters are generally uninformed
of local government spending.
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2.7 Welfare Analysis of Privatization
We estimate the welfare loss from overpaying for public bus transit by comparing
the welfare under the current level of privatization as well as under full privatization
with some simplifying assumption. The welfare loss stems from the high cost of
service rendered by public sector provision of transit services relative to private sector
provision identified in Section 2.6. In this section, we demonstrate how the cost
premium from public sector provision results in insufficient transit service levels in
equilibrium. While we found no significant effect of privatization on service levels in
Section 2.6.3, our analysis describes the partial equilibrium. The long run, general
equilibrium result of lower operating costs is an increase in demand and supply of
transit services.
We first estimate the demand curve for bus services in terms of the number of
passenger trips as a function of trip price. Total passenger trips on fixed-route bus
transit as of 2011 were approximately 5.2 billion.46 We obtain the bus ridership
elasticity with respect to fare of -0.4 from prior studies on transportation demand.47
Using the estimates for total operating costs per mile from the RD design described
in Section 2.6.1, we calculate the average predicted bus fare for a transit agency as
of 2011 under current levels of privatization as α1 = $2.98. If all transit agencies
privatized their operations completely, the average predicted bus fare as of 2011
46APTA 2013 Public Transportation Factbook, Table 5.
47Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) estimate an elasticity of bus ridership with respect to fare of
approximately -0.441. Oum et al. (1992) estimate elasticities between -0.3 and -0.7. TCRP (2004)
estimates an elasticity of -0.40.
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would be p1 = $1.87. Using the current bus fare α1, counterfactual bus fare p1,
the elasticity of bus ridership, and the aggregate number of passenger trips, we
calculate the aggregate demand curve for bus passenger trips. Further details on
these calculations are presented in Appendix B.2.
Figure 2.9 shows the predicted change in consumer welfare if all bus services
were privatized and operated by private companies. The shaded area is the change
in consumer surplus associated with privatization. Part of the change in consumer
surplus is the result of a wealth transfer from consumers to public employees of transit
agencies. Specifically, at least part of the differential between α1 and p1 is a wealth
transfer from consumers to the employees of public transit in the form of higher
wages. Area D in Figure 2.9 is pure deadweight loss associated with this transfer.
While there are benefits to society from transit agencies employing individuals who
might otherwise receive lower pay, the transfer is not costless. Since this transfer
makes the public provision of transportation more expensive, demand for passenger
trips is pushed to lower levels than it would be under full privatization, indicated
by the lower dashed line. Under fully privatized operations, the long run, general
equilibrium result of lower operating costs would be an increase in aggregate ridership
would from 5.2 billion to approximately 6.2 billion passenger trips.
The national change in consumer surplus under the average impact of privati-
zation on operating costs amounts to approximately $6.3 billion. Pure deadweight
loss is approximately $524.3 million. This amount neither serves wealth redistribu-
tive purposes, nor is it compensated to transit riders for the inability to use transit
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at an efficient cost. That is, U.S. taxpayers lost $524.3 million in aggregate from
over-paying for bus transit in 2011. Losses of similar magnitude exist for subsequent
years.
The social welfare gains from privatizing public transit are complicated by poten-
tial welfare losses to transit employees. Under privatized management, bus operators
may suffer from a more efficient use of inputs, either through lower pay or longer
work hours. However, the increase in ridership under lower-cost, privatized opera-
tions also serves to increase demand for bus transit labor. In 2011, public bus transit
employed over 130,000 individuals as bus operators. These drivers served 5.2 billion
passenger trips. Holding the ratio of drivers to trips constant, an increase in rid-
ership demand to 6.2 billion trips would translate into over 26,000 additional bus
operator jobs alone (not including new maintenance and managerial jobs that would
also be necessary). To the extent that these workers value their jobs more than their
second best alternative, the $524.3 million deadweight loss in 2011 is a lower bound
because it does not account for the welfare gain from employment and job creation
that would result from increased demand for bus transit.
Table 2.9 shows the estimated deadweight loss in 2011 for three major transit
agencies: Boston’s MBTA, Chicago’s CTA, and San Antonio’s VIA. Boston’s dead-
weight loss from inefficiently high transit costs amounts to approximately $14.8 mil-
lion, while Chicago’s CTA has estimated deadweight losses of approximately $26.3
million. In this same year, Boston and Chicago received $846 million and $705
million, respectively, in public funding for operations. The deadweight loss from
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inefficiently high operating costs accounted for 1.7 and 3.7%, respectively, of local,
state, and federal funding sources for these two agencies in 2011.
Both Chicago and Boston operate in states with collective bargaining rights,
whereas collective bargaining is outlawed in Texas. Notice that deadweight losses
for San Antonio’s VIA are estimated to be substantially lower at approximately
$4.2 million. San Antonio’s fleet is half the size of Boston, however their estimated
deadweight loss is less than one third that of Boston.
2.8 Conclusion
Our analysis of public sector efficiency in the provision of bus services suggests three
important findings. First, the private sector provides a unit of bus transit service
at a substantially lower cost than the public sector. Second, the cost premiums are
higher for larger transit agencies, when state-level collective bargaining rights are
stronger, and when local political leaders are Democrats. Third, privately operated
firms are able to curb labor costs per mile through efficient allocation of labor and
through limiting featherbedding. Strong union bargaining power in non-right-to-
work states appears to increase the number of full time employees on payroll, holding
the service area constant. These effects are most pronounced for a city’s largest
transit agency, which suggests public sector unions shift their bargaining pressure
toward the dominant transit agencies such as Chicago’s CTA, New York’s MTA,
or Boston’s MBTA. The operating cost per bus mile in Chicago’s major transit
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agency in 2012 was $13.18, or 175% that of the operating cost per bus mile in
Houston’s major transit agency. While individual transit agencies absorb these costs,
the workers who receive these higher wages benefit. During a time of great concern
about income inequality, public employment offers stable middle-class jobs for less
educated and disadvantaged workers (Alesina et al. 2000, Boustan and Margo 2009).
Future research could examine the implications of public sector employment and pay
for overall metro area income inequality trends.
Using RD estimation to identify the effect of privatization on total operating costs,
we find that the difference in operating costs per mile between mean privatization
levels as of 2011 and the counterfactual scenario when all bus miles are privatized
is a decrease from $6.63 to $4.16 per mile. Holding total service mileage (2.3 billion
VMT in 2011) constant, this per-unit cost savings translates into an aggregate cost
savings of approximately $5.7 billion, or 30% of aggregate operating expenses.
The documented potential for cost savings from outsourcing bus operations is
likely to be an underestimate of total government cost savings from improving the
efficiency of public sector service provision. Transit unions are crucial political en-
gines in major cities (Koch 2011). Thus, concessions from public employers to the
transit unions are very likely to spread to other unions within a city and positively
impact their negotiation power. Known as the “me-too” bargaining strategy, the
practice of negotiating salaries and benefits based on that of other public employees
has been attributed to state and local government budget deficits, for example in Cal-
ifornia, New York, and Vancouver, BC (Miller 2010). Future research should study
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the timing of public sector union contracts and the sequential game played by a big
city mayor with the public sector unions. Republican mayors may enjoy cost savings
across the board after creating an early reputation for being tough negotiators.
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Figure 2.1: Operating Costs Per Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT) in States
with Strong vs. Weak Bargaining Rights
Note: Operating costs are deflated by CPI. Operating cost transit agency averages are weighted by
transit agency annual VMT. States with strong bargaining rights laws are those where legislative
mandate either implicitly or explicitly dictates public employers and union employees must come
to an agreement on contract negotiations. States with weak bargaining rights laws either prohibit
collective bargaining all together, or do not mandate that the public employer bargain with unions.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Labor Costs per Vehicle Miles Traveled (VMT)
in States with Strong vs. Weak Bargaining Rights
Note: Cost values reported in terms of 2011 dollars. Values are weighted by transit agency annual
VMT. Figure does not show outside values.
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Figure 2.3: Share of Privately Supplied Vehicle Miles (Privatization Share)
in States with Strong vs. Weak Bargaining Rights
Note: This figure shows the privatization share among states with strong and weak bargaining
rights laws. States with strong bargaining rights laws are those where legislative mandate either
implicitly or explicitly dictates public employers and union employees must come to an agree-
ment on contract negotiations. States with weak bargaining rights laws either prohibit collective
bargaining all together, or do not mandate that the public employer bargain with unions. Des-
ignation of “strong” vs “weak” bargaining rights states discussed in more detail in footnote 10.
Privatization shares are calculated as total annual VMT operated by private contractors divided
by the total annual VMT. Privatization shares averages for strong and weak bargaining rights
states are weighted by total annual VMT. The jump from 2002 to 2003 in weak bargaining-state
privatization share is caused by three transit agencies that increased their privatization share by
over 30% between 2002 and 2003. These include agencies in Dallas, TX (DART), College station,
TX (Brazos Transit District), and Phoenix, AZ (Valley Metro).
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Figure 2.4: Selected baseline UZA characteristics at the Democrat winning
margin threshold. Sample includes 1444 agency-year pairs. Bin
size=0.04.
Note: Each dot corresponds to the average noted characteristic of a transit agency’s UZA following
mayoral election t, given the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t. Solid and
dashed lines each represent the predicted values of the noted characteristic from linear, quadratic,
and cubic polynomial control functions of the winning margin.
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Figure 2.5: The Distribution of the Democrat Winning Margin Running
Variable.
Note: Figure plots the raw number of elections (as dots) in 1-percentage point bins of the Demo-
crat winning margin. The curve was estimated using a smoothed local linear density estimator
following McCrary (2008) where the midpoint height of each bin of size 0.02 are the regressors,
and the normalized counts of the number of observations falling into each bin are treated as the
outcome variable. Figure excludes elections with Democrat winning margins of -1 (Republican
won all votes) or 1 (Democrat won all votes).
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Figure 2.6: Privatization Share and Winning Margin. Bin size=0.04.
Note: Each dot corresponds to the average transit agency privatization share following mayoral election t, given
the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t. Solid and dashed lines each represent the predicted
values of privatization share from linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomial control functions of the winning margin
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Figure 2.7: Placebo Estimates of Discontinuity in Bus Transit Privatization
Share
Note: Estimates based on local polynomial regressions of the form dit = P (Mit;κ) + εit with robust
confidence intervals developed by Calonico et al. (2014). Polynomial regressions are of order two (κ = 2)
in winning margin (Mit). Kernel type is triangular. Bandwidth, 0.294, is chosen using CCT mean-
squared error optimal bandwidth selector.
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Figure 2.8: Ln(Labor Costs per VMT) at the Democrat winning margin
threshold. Sample includes 880 agency-year pairs. Bin size=0.04.
Note: Each dot corresponds to the average transit agency labor cost per vehicle miles traveled (in logs) that
follows a mayoral election t, given the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t. Solid and dotted
lines each represent the predicted values from linear, quadratic and cubic polynomial control functions of the
winning margin.
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Figure 2.9: Loss in US Aggregate Consumer Welfare from Inefficient Bus
Transit
The horizontal dotted line is the supply of passenger trips under 2011 levels of privatization,
where g(α1, pˆ, u) = $2.98. At this current level of privatization, total passenger trips in 2011 were
5.2 billion. The horizontal dashed line is the supply of passenger trips under the counterfactual
scenario of complete privatization, where g(p1, pˆ, u) = $1.87. Under the hypothetical scenario,
annual passenger trips total 6.2 billion. The solid black curved line is consumer demand for
passenger trips. The shaded area represents the change in consumer welfare when the price of bus
transit is at its current inefficiently high level of $2.98 per trip. The shaded area corresponds to A
in Eq. B.3 of Appendix B.2. Change in US aggregate consumer surplus amounts to $6.3 billion.
Area D represents the deadweight loss. Aggregate deadweight loss amounts to approximately
$524.3 million.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Top 20 Urbanized Areas (UZA)
Rank City Total Vehicle Miles Cost Per Privatization Avg. Cost Per Avg. Cost Per No. Bus
Traveled (in ’000s) Mile Rate Mile in 1990’s Mile in 2000’s Transit Agencies
1 New York, NY 166,033 $18.67 8% $13.38 $16.17 13
2 Los Angeles, CA 148,022 $9.20 21% $8.89 $8.21 13
3 Chicago, IL 83,713 $11.17 3% $8.93 $10.36 6
4 Houston, TX 38,796 $7.49 22% $6.57 $6.44 2
5 Philadelphia, PA 52,569 $12.35 2% $10.20 $10.89 3
6 Phoenix, AZ 34,945 $6.30 100% $6.58 $6.49 5
7 San Antonio, TX 22,424 $5.91 - $4.33 $5.26 1
8 San Diego, CA 25,415 $7.09 63% $5.53 $6.64 3
9 Dallas-Fort Worth, TX 35,649 $7.72 0% $8.06 $7.50 2
10 San Jose, CA 17,277 $12.63 1% $9.57 $11.73 1
11 Austin, TX 14,323 $7.70 41% $5.34 $6.97 1
12 Jacksonville, FL 9,366 $6.70 15% $5.09 $5.82 1
13 San Francisco, CA 53,308 $13.58 12% $9.29 $11.65 7
14 Indianapolis, IN 7,369 $6.06 5% $4.79 $5.70 1
15 Columbus, OH 11,859 $7.15 - $6.86 $7.61 1
16 Charlotte, NC 12,526 $6.31 - $5.51 $6.07 1
17 Detroit, MI 25,582 $8.82 1% $7.41 $8.33 2
18 El Paso, TX 7,561 $6.12 - $4.60 $5.53 1
19 Seattle, WA 55,728 $10.06 2% $7.06 $8.52 5
20 Denver, CO 40,644 $7.42 45% $6.46 $6.24 1
US Average 28,069 $9.25 16% $7.37 $8.27
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Table 2.2: The Distribution of Hourly Pay for Full-time Bus Operators
Boston1 Chicago2 Houston3 Denver4
Hourly Wage Distribution
25th percentile $37.76 $24.19 $20.12 $16.45
50th percentile $44.29 $32.25 $20.12 $20.00
75th percentile $48.38 $32.25 $22.60 $20.00
Mean $42.89 $29.16 $20.21 $18.56
No. Employees 1325 4074 1343 980
Employees per 1000 VMT 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.02
Transit Agency MBTA CTA MTA RTD
Urbanized Area Statistics
Share of Unionized Workers 8.60% 8.10% 3.20% 5.0%
Right to Work State? No No Yes No
Mean Home Price $459,744 $322,764 $225,332 $340,703
Notes: Hourly Pay imputed from reported base pay, assuming 40 hour work weeks for 50 weeks
per year. Home prices sourced from the ACCRA Cost of Living Index. Share of Unionized
workers sourced from CPS.
1 Data based on 2014 values. Source: http://www.mbta.com/uploadedfiles/Smart_Forms/
News,_Events_and_Press_Releases/Wages2014.pdf
2 Data based on 2014 values. Source: http://www.transitchicago.com/foia/
3 Data based on 2014 values.Source: http://salaries.texastribune.org/
metropolitan-transit-authority/
4 Data based on 2012 values. Source: http://www.nataliementen.com/documents/RTD\
%20Salaries\%202012.pdf
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics for transit agencies with publicly- vs.
privately-run operations
Full Sample RD Sample
Public Private1 Public Private1
A. UZA Characteristics
Avg. weekly (low skill) wage ($) 595.28 597.11 598.3 594.08
Avg. road congestion index2 1.059 1.231 1.084 1.213
Avg. home price ($ ’000) 320.33 381.56 321.44 385.66
Share unionized workers3 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06
Avg. population density (pop/sq. mi) 3218.17 4197.68 3245.24 4138.58
B. Agency Characteristics
Share Independent agency 0.59 0.8 0.57 0.8
Share City agency 0.25 0.15 0.23 0.12
Share State DOT agency4 0.15 0.05 0.2 0.08
Avg. fleet size (no. buses) 941.5 1025.36 1261.52 1233.49
Avg. fleet age (years) 7.47 7.37 7.41 7.63
Share of CNG buses5 0.1 0.2 0.09 0.19
Share of hybrid buses 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
C. Agency Outcomes of Interest
Avg. share privatized VMT 0 0.2 0 0.16
Avg. labor costs per VMT ($) 6.47 6.09 7.01 6.56
No. transit agencies 251 144 105 50
No. observations 2751 955 1100 344
Notes: All values weighted by transit agency annual VMT. The same transit agency may be
included in averages for public and private operations if the transit changed their privatization
level on the extensive margin from one year to the next (ie from 0 to > 0 or vice versa).
1 Includes all transit agencies with at least some VMT operated by a private entity in a given
year (ie privatization share>0)
2 Road congestion index measures density of traffic across urban areas. An index greater than
1 indicates an undesirable level of areawide congestion. (Source: Texas A&M Transportation
Institute)
3 Means are conditional on share of unionized workers in strong bargaining rights states.
4 State DOT category includes subsidiary agencies.
5 CNG is compressed natural gas, a cleaner type of fuel than gasoline, diesel, or propane.
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Table 2.4: Transit Agency Privatization Share Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS LPoly
Democrat (d)1 -0.070** -0.060** -0.01 -0.100**
(0.034) (0.029) (0.039) (0.041)
Democrat * StrongBarg (d)2 -0.074*
(0.043)
Year & State FE
UZA & Agency Controls
Observations 1444 1444 1444 521
Notes: Dependent variable is privatization share. Includes dominant transit agencies. (d) denotes
a binary variable. All regressions include the second-order polynomials of Democrat winning
margin and their interactions with Democratic mayor dummy. UZA & Agency Controls listed
in Table 2.3. “LPoly” employs local polynomial RD estimation with robust confidence intervals
developed by Calonico et al. (2014). LPoly estimate uses a triangular kernel and mean-squared
error optimal CCT bandwidth selector of 0.264. Clustered standard errors at the UZA level are
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1Omitted category is Republican mayoral winner.
2 Omitted category is weak bargaining rights state.
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Table 2.5: Transit Agency Labor Cost Per Mile Estimates: Regression Dis-
continuity Approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS OLS FRD FRD FRD FRD LPoly
Privatization share -0.365*** -0.159** -1.919** -0.447 -2.163** -1.004* -2.265**
(0.095) (0.078) (0.886) (0.593) (0.857) (0.525) (1.121)
Controls
Year & State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
UZA & Agency Controls Y Y Y
Excluded instruments
Democrat (d) Y Y Y Y
Democrat * StrongBarg (d) Y Y
Observations 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 1444 549
Cost reduction from 100% privatization* 30.9% 15.0% 90.1% 46.4% 90.2% 68.1% 94.0%
Note: Dependent variable is log(labor cost per VMT). Sample includes dominant transit agencies only. All regressions
control for quadratic polynomial of winning margin and their interaction with Democrat mayor indicator. (d) denotes a
binary variable. “LPoly” employs local polynomial Fuzzy RD estimation with robust confidence intervals developed by
Calonico et al. (2014). LPoly estimate uses a triangular kernel and mean-squared error optimal CCT bandwidth of 0.294.
UZA & Agency Controls listed in Table 2.3. Standard errors clustered at UZA level. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
*Because Eq. 2.9 takes the semi-logarithmic functional form and the privatization rate ranges from 0 to 1, a consistent
estimator for the percentage impact from full privatization (e.g., privatization going from 0 to 1) on the labor cost is
100 ∗ [ exp(γˆ − var(γˆ)2 ) − 1]. The values in the final row represent the expected cost reduction from an agency going
from 0% privatized operations to 100%.
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Table 2.6: Full Time Employee Headcount and Union Strength
(1) (2) (3)
Right to Work (RtW) State (d)1 -0.073*** -0.069*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.013) (0.019)
Strong Barg. State (d)2 0.006 0.056***
(0.013) (0.017)
RtW State x Strong Barg State (d) -0.108***
(0.025)
Year FE Y Y Y
Observations 3395 3395 3395
R2 0.012 0.012 0.017
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of full time employee headcount per publicly operated
VMT. All regressions are OLS. (d) denotes a binary variable. Sample includes subset of transit
agencies which reported employee work hours and counts. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗p <
0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
1 Omitted category is a non-right-to-work state.
2 Omitted category is a weak bargaining rights state.
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Table 2.7: Effect of Right to Work Laws on Labor Costs using State Borders
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Right to Work State (d)1 -0.536*** -0.397*** -0.680*** -0.298***
(0.052) (0.048) (0.017) (0.054)
County Pair FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
State FE Y Y
UZA & Agency controls Y
Observations 206 206 206 206
R2 0.53 0.709 0.709 0.902
Notes: Notes: The dependent variable is log(labor cost per VMT). All regressions are OLS.
Observations consist of 21 transit agencies in 17 counties that border another state with differing
Right to Work legislation. UZA & Agency Controls listed in Table 2.3. (d) denotes a binary
variable. Standard errors are clustered by transit agency. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 Omitted category is a non-right-to-work state.
Table 2.8: Dominant Transit Agencies Effects on Operating Costs with City-
Year Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dominant TA (“Dom”) (d)1 0.275*** 0.362*** 0.356*** 0.268***
(0.051) (0.053) (0.06) (0.077)
Dom x RtW State (d)2 -0.338*** -0.335*** -0.278***
(0.059) (0.058) (0.055)
Dom (d) x UnionShare 0.052 -0.145
(0.369) (0.367)
Dom x StrongBarg (d)3 0.116**
-0.055
UZA x Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 3706 3706 3706 3706
R2 0.538 0.579 0.579 0.582
Notes: Dependent variable is log(operating costs per VMT). All regressions are OLS. The “Dom-
inant” TA has the highest average annual VMT in a given UZA. (d) denotes a binary variable.
Standard errors clustered at UZA level in parentheses. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1 Omitted category is a non-right-to-work state.
2 Omitted category is a weak bargaining rights state.
3 Omitted category is a weak bargaining rights state.
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Table 2.9: Welfare Loss Estimates for Three US Cities in 2011
City (Agency) Current (Predicted) Privatized (Predicted) Consumer DWL % of Strong Bargaining
Cost / VMT Cost / VMT Surplus ($mm) DWL ($mm) Public Funding* Rights?
Boston (MBTA) $13.59 $8.13 $163.68 $14.77 1.7% Yes
Chicago (CTA) $11.29 $6.64 $297.82 $26.31 3.7% Yes
San Antonio (VIA) $7.18 $4.22 $59.61 $4.19 2.5% No
US Total $6.63 $4.16 $6,319.34 $524.35
Notes: Predicted values for Current Cost/VMT and Privatized Cost/VMT generated using the RD regression specification.
The dependent variable is total operating costs per VMT. Regression controls include all those listed in Table 3 with the
addition of city-average diesel and natural gas prices. Privatized Cost/VMT counterfactual assumes privatization share is
100%. Consumer Surplus and DWL correspond to shaded area and area D in Figure 2.9, respectively.
*Sources: MBTA Fiscal 2012 Audited Financial Statements Pg 5, Net Nonoperating revenue (http://mbta.com/
uploadedfiles/About_the_T/Financials/113990_12_MBTA_FS-FINAL.pdf); CTA President’s 2012 Budget Recommen-
dations, 2011 Forecasted Total Public Funding Pg 22, (http://www.transitchicago.com/assets/1/finance_budget/
2012_Budget_Book_for_Web.pdf); VIA 2012 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report; Sept 30, 2012 Pg. 45, Sales Taxes
+ Grants Reimbursement (http://www.viainfo.net/Organization/Docs/2012CAFR.pdf)140
CHAPTER 3
ROAD RATIONING POLICIES AND HOUSING MARKETS
3.1 Introduction
Several major cities around the world have implemented road rationing policies to
address increasingly harmful levels of air pollution and traffic congestion.1 These
policies generally restrict people’s ability to drive within city limits on particular
days of the week and at peak commute times. Figure 3.1 shows how permanent adop-
tion of alternate-day-based road rationing policies has accelerated since the 2000’s
among some the world’s largest urban centers. Cities are a physical manifestation
of people’s desire to eliminate transportation costs. Thus, driving restrictions will
likely affect not only pollution and congestion, but the ways in which people sort
in space. This paper demonstrates how a shock to transit costs served to alter the
spatial distribution of different income groups in the context of Beijing, China. Our
results are the first to demonstrate, empirically, that policies aimed at mitigating
air pollution through driving restrictions can induce equity concerns of access to
economically important centers within cities.
Rapid urban growth in China since 1990 has increased automobile use within its
largest cities at a staggering rate. Between 2005 and 2015, the rate of car ownership
1Air pollution is a primary concern for many urban areas. Over 80% of the world’s major cities
fail to meet World Health Organization guidelines on air quality (World Health Organization 2019).
Emissions from vehicles is a particular concern in several developing nations, contributing to nearly
50% percent of particulate matter in Beijing (Viard and Fu 2015) and nearly 20% in Delhi (Jain
2018).
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outpaced population growth by 3 to 1 in Beijing. The Chinese government responded
to degrading air quality and road congestion through several transit-oriented poli-
cies, including heavy investment in its subway network and a license plate-based road
rationing policy in July of 2008 (hereinafter, CDR or “car driving restriction”). The
CDR limited car owners from driving their car one day per week according to the last
digit of their license plate. We exploit this shock to commute costs to test predic-
tions of urban land use models developed by Alonso, Muth, and Mills (hereinafter,
“AMM”) (Alonso et al. 1964; Mills 1967; Muth 1967), and extended by LeRoy and
Sonstelie (1983). We show that the CDR increased the premium for both subway
station proximity, and proximity toward Beijing’s central business districts. Both
of these price effects served to decentralize lower income groups away from subway
stations and the central business districts.
Our analysis uses detailed, micro-level data on real estate transactions and buyer
demographics of residents of Beijing. Using changes in housing prices as a reflection
of changes in the demand for location amenities (Rosen 1974), we test how the driving
restriction policy affected demand for both subway proximity and central business
district proximity. We further explore how these housing market effects impacted
the relative likelihood of income groups to sort near subway stations and Beijing’s
central business districts. These data allow us to include a comprehensive set of
controls on housing characteristics in addition to neighborhood-level fixed effects
to account for unobserved differences in neighborhood desirability. Our housing
price estimates effectively compare observationally similar housing units within the
same neighborhood that vary in their relative distance to the nearest subway station
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and the central business district. We exploit the driving restriction as a city-wide
unexpected increase in the cost of driving to test how the premium for subway and
central business district proximity changes over time. Our preferred estimates show
that the driving restriction increased demand for subway proximity by approximately
3.6%, and the demand for central business district proximity by 1.3% per kilometer
relative to pre-policy time periods. Pre-trends shows that the premium for proximity
is stable in the periods prior to the driving restriction, but shift significantly in the
aftermath of the policy. The shift in the demand for proximity does not appear to be
driven by unobserved correlated shocks or broader investment in areas that receive
new subway stations. We additionally utilize novel micro data on household income
and housing locations to explore how the driving restriction impacted the residential
location choices of income groups relative to one another. We find modest, but
significant reductions in the composition of lower income households close to subway
stations as well as Beijing’s central business districts following the driving restriction.
This paper contributes to existing work on the housing market responses to driv-
ing restrictions in two important ways: First, this paper shows that the increase in
housing prices in transit accessible areas found in prior literature impose additional
unintended impacts on the accessibility of public transit for lower income individuals.
Second, this paper exploits a large, highly detailed data set that represents 17% of all
housing transactions in Beijing from 2005-2011. The wide variation available in these
data allow us to focus on effects of the driving restriction within a fine geographic
scale, and thereby remove any fixed differences across city neighborhoods that relate
to the housing market or sorting decisions. With this novel data set, we show that
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prior estimates on housing price responses are attenuated by at least 50% because
they do not account for unobserved differences in amenities that vary with subway
locations. After accounting for such confounds, we find that the bid-rent gradient for
subway proximity is much more responsive to driving restriction policies than prior
literature suggests. This is of first order concern when assessing the cost benefit of
investing in public transit.
While tests of the monocentric city model are not, themselves, a novel line of in-
quiry in the urban economics literature, their application to the setting of a rapidly
developing city such as Beijing is important for the following reasons. First, in the
setting of Beijing, with over 19 million inhabitants, the assumptions of competi-
tive bidding for housing that are required by the monocentric city model are not so
extreme an assumption as in several US housing markets, where the bids for any
particular housing unit may be relatively thin. Consequently, quantitative predic-
tions from the price-distance gradient may be more appropriate to the massive urban
markets of China. Second, transit mode choice is largely stratified by income group
in Beijing, unlike most US or European cities. Personal automobiles are costly in
Beijing, highly taxed, and restricted to only those who can afford to enter a lottery
system for purchase of a license plate. Lower income individuals rely on bus, sub-
way, or cycling. This feature makes Beijing a particularly useful setting for testing
predictions of LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) because low income groups are very likely
to utilize different transit modes from high income groups. The driving restriction
provides variation in the transit mode choice utilized by the high income group. Con-
sequently, we are effectively able to analyze two “natural” experiments—the subway
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expansion, and the car driving restriction—to test how these countervailing effects
impact sorting and housing choice across the income distribution. Lastly, urban driv-
ing restrictions are enforced in more and more cities around the world, particularly
in the developing world where air pollution from automobile exhaust is a particularly
salient issue. The effects of these omni-present transit policies on housing markets
and location choice is not well understood, but highly policy relevant.
Urban driving restrictions have been the focus of a small, but growing body
of literature. Most of these studies have focused on the effectiveness of driving
restriction at meeting their primary goals of reducing congestion and air pollution,
with mixed results. High compliance locations appear to experience improvements
to air quality following a driving restriction (Carrillo et al. 2016; Viard and Fu
2015; Wolff 2014; Chen et al. 2013); whereas locations with low compliance or the
possibility of substituting behaviors experience little change in air pollution (Davis
2008; Zhang et al. 2017; Eskeland and Feyzioglu 1997). The consensus in Beijing is
that the CDR was very effective at reducing air pollution and traffic congestion (Lu
2016; Viard and Fu 2015) due to high compliance and rigorous enforcement.
In contrast to the body of literature above, our paper explores how an urban
driving restriction impacts the demand for housing and the subsequent re-sorting of
high relative to low income groups. Our paper is most similar to Xu et al. (2015)
which finds that demand for housing near subway stations increased in the six months
following Beijing’s driving restriction. However, our estimates suggest the magnitude
of this effect is more than double that found by Xu et al. (2015). We attribute
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this difference to application of a more representative dataset. We exploit detailed
information on over 82,000 transactions—roughly 13 times that of the previous study
—that allows for a robust set of controls and geographic fixed effects.
Lu (2018) also investigates how a second driving-based policy, Beijing’s 2012
license plate lottery, impacts the housing market. The license plate lottery substan-
tially reduced the quota of available license plates, thereby restricting the ability of
people to purchase cars. The author finds that this lottery policy increased housing
prices within Beijing’s fourth ring road, and at locations proximate to public transit
stations. While the housing market impacts of Lu (2018) are similar to those we
find for the CDR, we argue that the CDR provides a context better suited to test
predictions of the AMM model because the CDR altered transit costs for individuals
already driving cars; whereas the license lottery did not. This policy distinction is
important because the marginal individual impacted by the CDR is someone who al-
ready owned a car and will, therefore, have to change their mode of travel ex post. In
contrast, the marginal person impacted by the license plate lottery is one who would
have liked to own a car, but cannot following the policy. Thus, there is no transit
mode switch as a consequence of the lottery. In short, the assumptions required to
apply the AMM to the CDR policy are much weaker. The CDR, thus, provides a
credible setting to predict income-based sorting as consequence of a city-wide driving
restriction.
This paper also relates to prior studies concerned with the positive relationships
between inter-city location choices among the poor as a function of public infrastruc-
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ture access (Glaeser et al. 2008; Brueckner and Rosenthal 2009; Brueckner et al. 1999;
Baum-Snow and Kahn 2000; Waxman 2017). In general, our results underscore the
importance of transportation infrastructure and transit technology as a determinant
of urban spatial structure. Beijing’s investment in public transportation through-
out the city allowed lower income individuals to decentralize, and sort near subway
stations, rather than cluster near the city center where public transit was formerly
concentrated. These data patterns are consistent with findings of Glaeser et al. 2008,
who find public transit investment in US cities attracts lower income residents and is
an important determinant of historic centralization of the urban poor. The Beijing
context provides a novel natural experiment that empirically re-affirms these prior
finding through a new channel. While investment in public transit infrastructure
attracts the poor, we demonstrate that increasing commute costs for the wealthy
can actually disperse the poor as they are outbid by the rich.
3.2 Data & Preliminary Facts
Our empirical analysis requires information on housing prices, residential locations,
and household income. We assembled this information using individual real estate
transactions and mortgage loan applications, sourced from two major Beijing real
estate firms and a government-backed loan system known as the Housing Provident
Fund,2 respectively. The real estate data comprises approximately 17% of all housing
2The Housing Provident Fund (HPF) operates as a government-backed credit market to encour-
age home ownership. In absence of a formal credit market, people can access loans through their
employers (Tang and Coulson 2017). At participating employment firms, each employee and his/her
147
purchases within Beijing from 2006 through 2012. Our sample of mortgage contracts
comprises the majority of the mortgage market in Beijing during the sample period,
though the precise market share is difficult to quantify. While our mortgage data
include all mortgage loan applications administered through the Housing Provident
Fund, mortgage loans made to individuals at non-salaried jobs, individuals working
part-time or unemployed, or the very wealthy will not be represented in our data.
The Beijing government enacted several city-wide policies throughout our sam-
ple period that likely impacted the housing market and demand for automobiles.3
Our main analysis uses the transactions occurring between July of 2007 and July of
2009, one year before and after the CDR policy began, to mitigate spurious correla-
tions with these other policies. Each housing transaction contains the sale or rental
price, as well as descriptive information on the housing unit (including number of
bedrooms, floor level, decoration level, types of appliances, etc.), and information on
the housing complex (including geographic location, total size, parking availability,
green space, proximity to key schools, etc.). Figure 3.2 shows the spatial distribution
employer have to contribute a specific percentage of his/her monthly income from the employer to
the HPF account. The employees can then obtain a mortgage loan with a subsidized interest rate
for home purchase (about 1.5 percentage points, or nearly 30%, lower than the commercial banks’
mortgage rate; this interest rate is determined by the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Devel-
opment and the same fixed rate applies to all borrowers). Virtually all eligible home buyers would
apply for this mortgage first before going to other sources of funding. The data cover the universe of
all home purchases in the city that made use of an HPF mortgage loan (209,861 in total) from 2006
to 2013. Mortgage refinancing is uncommon in China, and in any case, there are no refinancing
observations in the sample. As a result, each mortgage contract refers to a housing transaction.
3For example, in January of 2012 the government implemented a lottery system for purchases
of automobile license plates in order to limit the total vehicle fleet on Beijing’s roadways (see Lu
(2018) for an analysis of the license plate restriction on Beijing’s housing market). In April of 2011,
the government enacted an anti-speculative policy that restricted home purchases for natives, and
prohibited home purchases for non-natives of Beijing (see Sun et al. (2017) for analysis of the home
purchase restriction on Beijing’s housing market).
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of these real estate transactions throughout the city, and relative to the subway net-
work. The mortgage loan data also provide information on housing unit price and
descriptive information on the housing complex building. Importantly, the mortgage
data provide detailed information on the loan applicant’s demographic characteris-
tics, including their income, education levels, and place of employment.4
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics on a subset of the variables available within
each of our data sets. The purchase price varies considerably more in the real estate
data as compared to the mortgage data set. The mortgage data housing units are
also further from the city center and further from subway stations, on average. This
is partially due to the selection of individuals represented by the mortgage data,
which over represents the middle class demographic. Home buyers able to utilize the
HPF loan system are less likely to be entrepreneurs or independently wealthy.
Transit mode choice is stratified by income in Beijing. While we do not observe
transit mode choice among the home buyers in our data, the Beijing Transport
Annual Report provides aggregated statistics on mode choice by income group which
supports our prediction that the CDR binds mainly for the wealthy who can afford
cars. As of 2010, over 40% of earners in the top tenth percentile relied on cars to
commute to work, while approximately 25% of earners in the bottom 90th percentile
relied on cars to commute. For public transit, just 14% of the top earnings decile
relied on subway or bus as of 2010, whereas 20-21% of individuals in the bottom
90th percentile chose to commute by subway or bus. A large portion of individuals
4In a subsequent analysis with Li and Zhang, we exploit these data to understand commute
differences by gender.
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in Beijing (20-40%) who are mostly comprised of lower-income earners walk to work
(Institute 2010). Subway transit is heavily subsidized by the Beijing government
and is quite inexpensive. Prior to 2014, subway fares were fixed at 2 yuan (or about
$0.30) per trip.5
Record high pollution levels and the on-coming 2008 Olympic games spurred
Beijing to introduce a driving restriction on July 20, 2008, which banned personal
use of cars within the 5th Ring Road one weekday per week from 7am until 8pm
on the basis of the last digit of the vehicle’s license plate.6 Viard and Fu (2015)
found that Beijing’s driving restriction reduced particulate matter (PM10) by 21%,
with strong compliance and little evidence of inter-temporal substitution (i.e., driv-
ing more during non-restricted hours) or an increase in total number of vehicles in
circulation, as in Davis (2008). In Beijing, it is difficult to evade detection because
cameras throughout the city (as opposed to police) monitor the plates on vehicles.
If an individual violates the restriction, they are fined roughly $30 per violation.
Further, Beijing restricts people’s ability to purchase a second car, and purchase of
a first car is regulated by a lottery system. The limited scope for noncompliance
or substituting behavior were key to the success of Beijing’s CDR in improving air
5Fares became distance-based after 2014, however trips within the 4th Ring Road (under 22
kilometers) were still relatively cheap, averaging about 5 yuan per trip.
6Terms of the driving restriction changed three times after its introduction in July of 2008.
From July through September of 2008, the policy was more strict, allowing cars to drive only every
other day during the week, following an odd-even policy. These restrictions ended temporarily in
September 20th, but were reinstated on October 11th. The new policy restricted vehicle use one
day per week, extending from 6am through 9pm. On April 11, 2009, the daily restriction period
narrowed to 7am to 8pm. The one-day-per week policy is structured such that two out of ten
possible plate numbers ((0,5 (1,6), (2,7), (3,8), (4,9)) are restricted each weekday. Assignment of
the pairs rotates every thirteen weeks. Viard and Fu (2015) provides a review of this policy and
prior work that have investigated the effects of driving restrictions on air pollution.
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quality. Given the strong compliance, how did this policy impact the distribution of
wealth through Beijing?
We first review patterns of economic activity and location sorting within Beijing.
Figure 3.3 shows the location of Beijing’s major employment centers. Beijing has
at least six major employment centers located at various quadrants of the city. The
city’s geographic center is not a traditional business district, which is generally an
assumption of the monocentric city model, but mainly a cultural and consumer-
oriented district. For this reason, we define the Beijing “central business district”
(CBD) as a relative measure and assign the closest major employment center as a
given housing unit’s CBD. In subsequent robustness checks, we find our results are
generally insensitive to alternative definitions of Beijing’s CBD.
Figure 3.4 shows the relationship between income and distance to the central
business district in Panel A and the nearest subway station in Panel B, respectively.
The decentralization of the lower-income relative to the higher-income is prevalent
in the raw data. Both gradients have become steeper over time, particularly for
subway proximity. In the most recent period, Beijing appears similar to older US
and European cities in its demographic spatial structure as average income declines
with distance. However, these patterns are a marked shift from the pre-driving
restriction period, when the relationship between income and CBD proximity is less
pronounced. Income and subway proximity appear almost uncorrelated in the pre-
period in Panel B. The slight positive relationship is consistent with the theoretic
predictions of Glaeser et al. (2008), whereby lower income individuals tend to sort
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near transit oriented locations.7
3.3 Theoretical Framework
We predict how a city-wide road rationing policy will affect the sorting of low rela-
tive to high income individuals through the stylized AMM monocentric city model
(Alonso et al. 1964; Mills 1967; Muth 1967), and its extension by LeRoy and Sonstelie
(1983).
3.3.1 A model of sorting near the CBD
Consider a monocentric city with a central business district (CBD) where all residents
work, supplying l units of labor, to earn wl income. Residents live outside the CBD
in the residential district of the city. Commute time increases monotonically with
distance from the CBD. Consumers decide where to live, choosing δ so as to maximize
consumption of housing h with price P , the numeraire good z with price one, and
time spent outside of work, s. Households commute distance δ to work and pay t,
the unit time cost of commuting, and τ , the fixed cost of commuting. Our empirical
approach focuses on price and sorting effects over a relatively short time horizon
of two to four years, consequently we assume that the city boundary is fixed at r¯,
housing supply is fixed, and the city is closed, without in or out migration. Prior
7Appendix Figure C.2 plots the income-distance gradient for alternative definitions of Beijing’s
CBD. In each definition, the post-period gradient becomes steeper.
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to any policy intervention on behalf of the government, residents face the following
maximization problem:
max
h,δ
U(h(δ), z(δ), s(δ)) s.t. (3.1)
wl(δ)− τ = P (δ)h(δ) + z(δ) (3.2)
l(δ) + s(δ) + tδ = 1 (3.3)
The first constraint is an individual’s budget constraint, while the second is their
time budget constraint. Let wtδ be the time cost of commuting distance δ, and τ be
the fixed, pecuniary cost. In subsequent analyses, we will be interested in how the
time cost of commuting is affected by a driving restriction, therefore we can denote
t as a function of days in which driving is restricted, t(n). In equilibrium, residents
choose a housing location δ such that:
dP (δ)
dδ = −
wt(n)
h(δ) (3.4)
Thus, individuals trade off consumption of housing at further distances from the CBD
for shorter commutes and more leisure time. The price of housing falls with distance
enough to compensate individuals for their longer commutes. Groups facing different
preferences for housing consumption h and time costs wt will have their own distinct
bid-rent gradient (i.e., Eq. 3.4). LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) develop the case where
a high-income group, possessing greater opportunity cost of time utilizes a more
expensive, but faster transit mode relative to the lower income group. This setting
is quite applicable to Beijing where wealthier people use cars and the lower income
rely on public transit.
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In a simplified version of the Beijing scenario where the poor use public transit
and the rich use cars, the poorer group will have a steeper bid-rent gradient than
the rich and, therefore, live closer to the city center if and only if:
hr(δ)
hp(δ)
>
tcar(n)
tpub(n)
× wr
wp
(3.5)
where subscript p denotes the housing consumption and wage of the poor and r
the same for the rich.8 Beijing’s transit policies during our study period serve to
change the ratio of transit time costs for the car users relative to the public transit
users, tcar(n)
tpub(n) . The driving restriction increases the cost of commuting for the rich
by increasing tcar, whereas the subway expansion reduces the cost of commuting for
the poor by decreasing tpub. Both of these policies make the right-hand side larger,
thus Eq. 3.5 is less likely to hold following Beijing’s driving restriction. This logic
tells us that higher-income individuals will find housing close to the city center more
attractive, and will consequently move closer to the city center following the driving
restriction. Similarly, the subway expansion will reduce the comparative advantage
of central-city housing for the poor, and they will move further from the CBD relative
to the rich.
8We can also interpret Equation 3.5 in terms of elasticities. Let y = wl denote income. Let the
income elasticity of housing demand be h,y = yh
∂h
∂y and let the income elasticity of the time cost of
commuting be tw,y = ytw
∂tw
∂y . If Equation 3.5 holds, then h,y > tw,y. In other words, the change
in one’s demand for housing as wealth increases must be greater than the change in one’s relative
value of time as wealth increases.
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3.3.2 A model of sorting near subway stations
Next, the government implements a driving restriction such that residents must
commute to work via subway at least one day per week. Now, time spent away from
work s(δ) is a function of both leisure time λ(δ) as well as the time it takes to walk
to the nearest subway station. Let n define the number of times that residents would
prefer to drive, but must take the subway. n includes both government restrictions
on driving, as well as heavy traffic days. Let ω be walking speed; and x be the
distance from place of residence to the nearest subway station. Then we can define
time spent away from work as:
s(δ) = λ(δ) + nx
ω
(3.6)
If n = 0, then time spent away from work is exactly equal to leisure time. However, if
n > 0, then s(δ) depends additionally on the walking distance to the nearest subway
stop. Under a driving restriction regime, the resident’s choice is again to maximize
consumption of housing, the numeraire good, and leisure time, subject to income
and time constraints. We assume the amount of housing consumed h does not vary
once the consumer selects δ, their distance from the CBD. However, conditional on
δ, the unit price of housing also depends upon n and x, so that the price of housing
is P (x, n|δ). To simplify notation, we present the consumer utility maximization
decision conditional on the choice of δ as follows:
max u(h, z;λ) s.t. (3.7)
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wl − τ = P (x, n)h+ z (3.8)
l + λ+ nx
ω
+ tδ = 1 (3.9)
By substituting the budget constraints into equation (3.7), the optimization problem
can be written as a choice of only x:
max
x
u(wl − τ − P (x, n)h; 1− (tδ + l)− nx
ω
) (3.10)
Within a small radius of δ, equilibrium is achieved through the spatial variation in
P and consumers substituting consumption x and more leisure time λ through a
shorter walk to the station.
Denote µi as the derivative of Eq. (3.10) with respect to the ith argument, and
denote the value of time as the marginal utility of substitution between leisure and
the numeraire good: VOT= µ2
µ1
. The first order condition of (3.10) can be written
as:
∂p
∂x
= −VOT n
ωh
(3.11)
The poor will live closer to stations if:
VOTp
np
ωhp
> VOTr
nr
ωhr
. (3.12)
We assume the rich and poor have similar walking speeds, but face different effective
driving restriction days. The driving restriction is more likely to bind for the rich
relative to the poor because the rich are more likely to rely on cars to commute as
a group relative to the poor. As nr increases relative to np, the driving restriction
makes Eq. 3.12 less likely to hold. This logic tells us that higher-income individuals
will move closer to subway stations following the city-wide driving restriction.
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An advantage of our setting is that we isolate shifts in the bid-rent gradients,
as opposed to their actual slopes. Several factors can confound empirical estimates
of dP (δ)dδ in Eq. 3.4 or
∂P
∂x
in Eq. 3.11, such as proximity to high quality schools
or proximity to recreational amenities (i.e., parks or restaurants). Omission of such
unobserved factors will bias the price-distance gradients, either downward in the case
of positive correlation of x and desirable amenities; or upward in the case of a posi-
tive correlation of x and disamenities, such as the prevalence of noise and congestion
near the city center or subway stations.9 While use of spatial fixed effects can correct
for some of the omitted variable bias, there is a problematic trade off between em-
ploying fixed effects at a fine-enough scale to remove all spatially-dependent amenity
variation, and identification of the bid-rent gradient.
Beijing’s driving restriction policy exogenously shifted both gradients. Conse-
quently, we can identify changes in demographic composition through estimating the
second derivative of both equations with respect to n as follows:
d2p
dxdn = −
wt′(n)
h(δ) (3.13)
and
∂2p
∂x∂n
= −VOT 1
ωh
(3.14)
Our empirical approach will estimate changes in both bid-rent gradients, and then
test predictions of the model on sorting of lower relative to higher income households
near the CBD and subway stations.
9Beijing’s subway network is entirely underground, thus the infrastructure itself does not alter
the visual appeal of a particular location. However, there may be some dis-amenity from living
directly beside a subway station due to heavier foot traffic or noise.
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3.4 Empirical Approach
Our goal is to estimate how Beijing’s transit policies affect the locations of lower
relative to higher income individuals. Expansion of Beijing’s subway network will
lower the cost of commuting by public transit and the driving restriction will increase
the cost of commuting by car. Both of these effects will serve to de-centralize the
poor relative to the rich.
We first explore how Beijing’s transit policies impact demand for housing near
the city’s business districts and near subway stations. The residential locations of
the rich relative to the poor will be driven by changes in their willingness to pay
for proximity. Figure 3.5 plots the bid rent gradients before and after the driving
restriction. The price premium per square meter for subway access clearly increases
following the driving restriction in Panel B. The premium for access to the central
business district in Panel A is less striking, but still demonstrates a slight tilt from
the pre-CDR period. These price dynamics are intuitive if both the rich and poor are
competing for housing proximate to subway stations, but less so for proximity to the
central business district. The poor are not impacted by the driving restriction, thus
do not compete for housing close to the city center. Both rich and poor, however,
prefer housing closer to subway stations, all else equal.
Our identification strategy exploits variation in the housing price-distance gradi-
ent before and after the CDR policy within a neighborhood (a “jiedao”) of Beijing.
Figure 3.6 demonstrates our within-neighborhood variation. Within our data sample,
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each jiedao contains an average of 45 housing complexes, or about 2,500 transactions
from 2007 through 2009. A jiedao is the smallest administrative unit at which socioe-
conomic data are collected in China, outlined by the thick black lines. The average
size of a jiedao in Beijing is about 43,000 people, spanning three square miles (Ding
et al. 2005). Our sample covers roughly two-thirds of the 300 jiedao within Beijing.
By identifying the gradient change estimates off of time-wise variation within a small
geographic unit, we are able to control for unobserved differences in amenities across
Beijing neighborhoods, such as the existence of high quality shops or restaurants.
Let i index housing units, c index housing complexes, j index jiedao neighbor-
hoods, and t index time. We estimate the effect of the CDR policy on the distance-
to-subway (and distance-to-CBD) price premium through the following specification:
ln(pijt) = β(Kmit ×Rt) + δKmit + ρRt + XijtΘ + γj + τt + εijt (3.15)
where p is the price of housing per square meter, Km measures the distance to
the nearest subway station or business district, and R is a binary variable equal
to one in periods after July 20th, 2008 when the CDR went into effect. X is a
vector of controls for housing unit and building complex attributes and γj and τt
are jiedao and time fixed effects, respectively (we alter the time unit in various
specifications). The parameter β provides the additional price premium demanded
for moving one kilometer closer to either a subway station or the central business
district as a consequence of the driving restriction.10 The identifying assumption
for β to provide a causal effect is that housing prices would have trended similarly
10We choose a log-linear specification for ease of interpretation, however we show in Appendix
Table C.2 that our results are insensitive to a log-log specification used in Xu et al. (2015).
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for close relative to far housing units in absence of the driving restriction. We test
this assumption in the following section by examining trends in the distance-price
premium in periods prior to the driving restriction.
For this approach, we do not need to assume that location characteristics, like
quality of restaurants and shops, are uncorrelated with either distance to the city
center, or the nearest subway. In other words, we do not need to assume that the
subway network or location amenities are randomly assigned across neighborhoods.
The driving restriction policy allows us to credibly identify β, the change in the price
gradient because the driving restriction was unanticipated.
3.5 Results
We now present evidence on the connection between housing demand and transit
policies in Beijing. Expansion of Beijing’s subway network will reduce transit costs
for those relying on public transit, while the driving restriction will increase transit
costs for drivers. The model of LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) predicts that changes
in tpub and tcar should shift the price-distance gradient, as well as the residential
location choices of those relying on public transit relative to those relying on personal
car travel.
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3.5.1 Transit Policies and the Housing Market
First, we test the assumption that housing prices for proximate relative to distant
housing units would exhibit common trends absent the driving restriction. We esti-
mate a dynamic version of Eq. 3.15 where the effect of subway proximity is allowed
to vary in each quarter of our sample, and thereby allows for visual examination of
pre-trends in the data. Let i index housing units, j index jiedao neighborhoods, and
t index one of 28 quarters.
ln(pijt) =
q28∑
t=q1(3q15)
δt(Kmit ×Dt) + αKmit + Xijtθ + γj + τt + εijt. (3.16)
The coefficient δt measures the difference in the housing price-distance gradient in
quarter t relative to the third quarter of 2008 (the 15th quarter in our sample). Figure
3.7 presents evidence that the difference in price per square meter across proximate
relative to distant housing units did not differ significantly from the quarter when
the driving restriction was enacted. However, starting in the first quarter following
the CDR in July of 2008, the premium for subway proximity increased to approxi-
mately 5% per kilometer. Around April of 2011, there is an additional uptick on the
price premium, which corresponds to a substantial restriction in the government’s
circulation of license plates and a lower likelihood of winning the license plate lottery
(Yang et al. 2014).
In Figure 3.8, we show these patterns hold after allowing for a non-parametric
relationship between subway proximity and price. Instead of imposing a linear rela-
tionship between distance and price as in Eq. 3.16, we test for differences between
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housing units within 3 kilometers and those over 3 kilometers of a subway in each
quarter of the study period. Results of the non-parametric specification demon-
strate, again, that the premium for subway proximity increased approximately 2-5%
following the CDR.
Our regression estimates reaffirm that the price-subway proximity gradient be-
came steeper following the road rationing policy. Results are generally robust to
alternative controls, and finer time-location fixed effects. In Table 3.2, subway prox-
imity commands a 1 to 5% price premium per kilometer prior to the CDR policy. This
level estimate may be biased if stations are sited endogenously, however we interpret
the positive sign as consistent with subway access being valuable to city residents.
The interacted term shows that after the driving restriction, housing units one kilo-
meter closer to a subway station sell for approximately 3% more than a comparable
housing unit one kilometer further from a subway station. Comparing column (1)
to column (2), jiedao fixed effects increase the precision of the policy effect substan-
tially and serve to absorb nearly all cross-section variation in subway proximity and
prices. Column 4 uses year-by-month fixed effects, such that variation is driven by
transactions within the month of July 2008. Lastly, Column 5 applies district by
quarter-of-year fixed effects to account for district-level growth trends that may be
spatially correlated with subway proximity. While these additional fixed effects mask
important relevant variation, the point estimates attenuate only slightly.
The city-wide driving restriction policy increases the premium for subway ac-
cess only within walking distance of subway stations. Figure 3.9 displays the non-
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parametric relationship between subway proximity and price following the CDR by
plotting the mean price change for each half-kilometer bin relative to housing units
outside of five kilometers from subway stations. The premium falls to zero after
approximately three kilometers, or about 1.8 miles. Intuitively, subway proximity
has no impact on housing prices outside of a reasonable walking distance from the
station. Figures 3.9 supports our interpretation that demand for the subway net-
work—as opposed to correlated, unobserved amenities—is the mechanism driving
the price premium for proximity following the 2008 driving restriction.
We next consider the effect of the driving restriction on demand for living close
to one of Beijing’s central business districts. Figure 3.10 presents a similar pattern
for distance to the central business district as did Figure 3.7; prior to the driving
restriction, the price premium for CBD proximity is not significantly different from
the driving restriction quarter. However there is a small increase of about 1% in
the premium for proximity to the CBD following the driving restriction. Regression
results in Table 3.3 show that CBD proximity commands approximately 1.5% higher
price per kilometer after the driving restriction. Use of jiedao fixed effects in column
(2) significantly increases the magnitude of the policy effect, implying unobserved
dis-amenities can attenuate estimates of the CBD-proximity gradient. Estimates of
the price gradient change under alternative CBD definitions in Appendix Table C.1
are closer to 1%, but within the range of 1.5%.
Our results show that subway station access came to be in much higher demand
relative to CBD access following the driving restriction. Expansion of the subway
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network makes transit-oriented housing locations more desirable for all marginal
subway riders. However, the driving restriction makes housing closer to the CBD
more desirable only for marginal drivers with a high value of time. Those wealthy
enough to drive their cars are a relatively smaller portion of Beijing’s population
compared to those reliant on public transit, thus it is not surprising that the subway
price effect is much stronger than the CBD price effect. Both results, however, are
consistent with the LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) prediction that changes to transit
costs will alter the distance-price gradient.
3.5.2 Comparing the Subway-Distance Premium with Prior
Work
Our results on the subway-price gradient are significantly larger than those of Xu
et al. (2015), who find that the elasticity of price with respect to subway distance is
-0.02%. We compare results directly in Appendix Table C.2 where we employ the
same 6-month time period, log-log specification, and start date for the CDR (October
11, 2008) as in Xu et al. (2015). As in Xu et al. (2015), we also exclude housing units
located near newly-built subway stations, leaving approximately 19,000 observations.
In the first column, we attempt to replicate their main result by including controls
for location attributes, such as distance to the city center and dummies for whether
the housing complex is located within a “key” school district.11 Our point estimate
11Specifically, we replicate column 8 of Table 2 in Xu et al. (2015)
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is within the range of their main result, but is three times larger in magnitude.
We attribute the difference in our estimates to having substantially more spatial
variation and a more representative data set of the broader Beijing housing market.
After introducing location-specific fixed effects, our estimate becomes larger and
is highly significant. The jiedao fixed effects are an important improvement upon
prior work because they account for unobserved heterogeneity in location amenities.
Noticeably, the addition of detailed controls on the housing attributes reduce the
estimates, but the effect is still more than double that of Xu et al. (2015).
Additionally, Xu et al. (2015) found that the subway distance premium after
the driving restriction ranged between 36-60% of the pre-restriction premium. We
estimate the pre-restriction premium for subway accessibility in columns (4) and
(8) following Xu et al. (2015) where we limit the sample period to 6 months prior
to the driving restriction. Several confounding factors are likely correlated with
subway proximity and housing desirability, thus we interpret columns (4) and (8)
with caution. For comparison purposes, our results suggest that the post-restriction
premium is double the pre-restriction premium, substantially greater than Xu et al.
(2015). This underscores that not only was the gradient shift much larger than prior
estimates suggest; but the magnitude of this gradient shift is of first order economic
significance. This substantial difference in our results implies that subway proximity
may be highly correlated with certain disamenities, like noise or congestion, that put
downward bias on the housing price-subway distance gradient. Failure to control for
these unobserved attributes can significantly underestimate the benefits of transit
infrastructure.
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3.5.3 Transit Policies and the Demographic Sorting
Given that the price-distance gradients for both subway access and CBD access
became steeper following the driving restriction, how did this impact the location
choices of different income groups? From LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983), we can predict
how demographic groups will locate relative to one another by isolating changes in
their commute costs. Inequalities in Eqs. 3.5 and 3.12 provide conditions for lower
income groups to live closer to the city center and near subway stations, respectively.
Eq. 3.5 is more likely to hold if the transit speed of the rich is much faster than that
of the poor (i.e., the time units per mile of tcar is much smaller than that of tpub) or
if the value that the rich and poor place on their time do not differ substantially.
In the early part of our study period, the difference between tcar and tpub is likely
to have been large relative to the post period. The city had no restrictions on auto
use, and Beijing’s subway network was limited to four lines (out of 22 today) leaving
areas outside of the Second Ring Road largely bypassed by the subway network.
Indeed, Figure 3.4 shows that prior to Beijing’s driving restriction, the composition
of wealth by distance (either to the CBD or to subway stations) was more evenly
distributed relative to the post-policy years.
Beijing’s CDR will cause tcar and tpub to converge; the subway expansion will
reduce tpub while the driving restriction will increase tcar. Both mechanisms serve to
reduce the likelihood that Eq. 3.5 holds. In other words, both the subway investment
and the driving restriction should alter the demographic composition such that higher
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income people move toward the city center, and lower income people move away from
the city center. Similarly, the CDR will increase nr relative to np in Eq. 3.12, making
the inequality less likely to hold. The result should be that lower income people move
further away from subway stations relative to higher income people.
We formally test predictions of LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) by using data on
household income and location from the mortgage application data. Our analysis
spans two years before and two years after the driving restriction (July 20, 2006
through July 20, 2010) to gain statistical power and to allow for a time lag in house-
hold’s adjustment to the driving restriction policy. We estimate the following in
order to understand how individuals choose where to live relative to both subway
stations and the central business district:
ln(Kmizt) = α(ln Iizt ×Rt) + δ ln Iizt + ρRt + Xiztθ + ζz + τt + µizt (3.17)
where i indexes households, z indexes zip codes, and t indexes time. α provides the
elasticity of income with respect to distance following the driving restriction policy.
Our results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 are generally consistent with the model’s pre-
diction: wealthier (poorer) households move closer to (further from) both subway
stations and central business districts relative to lower (higher) income households
after the driving restriction. Zip code level fixed effects allow us to examine how
income changes within a neighborhood over time. Variation comes from composi-
tional changes in the type of households selecting to live in a particular neighborhood
over time, as well as from some zip codes being “treated” by the expanding subway
network.
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In columns (4) and (5) of Table 3.4 where we employ the most restrictive controls,
the results show that a 10% reduction in household income corresponds to being
located 0.80% further - or nearly one kilometer - from a subway station relative to
prior to the CDR policy.
Table 3.5 also shows that following the driving restriction, wealthier individuals
are more likely to move proximate to the central business district. Again considering
the most restrictive specifications in columns (4) and (5), the results show that a 10%
reduction in household income corresponds to being located 0.17% further from the
nearest business district following the driving restriction - or approximately one third
a kilometer. Conditioning on variation within a particular subway line in columns
(4) and (5) reduces the estimate magnitude substantially, and the coefficient is no
longer statistically significant. These results are generally consistent with alternate
definitions of the Beijing CBD, as shown in Appendix Table C.3.
While these results on demographic shifts are modest, they suggest that city-
wide policies aimed at reducing traffic and air pollution can be potentially regressive
because they not only increase the premium for center-city locations, but they also
increase competition for housing near public transit, the mode choice disproportion-
ately utilized by lower income groups. In absence of Beijing’s aggressive subway
investments, the housing market and demographic sorting responses would likely be
much stronger.
The potential regressivity of a city-wide driving restriction policy will depend
upon the level of enforcement and the potential for behavioral adjustments. For
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example, if the purchase of new cars in Beijing were unregulated, wealthy car drivers
could have circumvented the license-plate based road rationing by purchasing second
car, as in the case of Mexico City (Davis 2008). Such offsetting behavior would
likely mitigate the driving restriction’s effect on the housing market and demographic
sorting. Beijing’s strong compliance rate means that car owners can only adjust
through a combination of using public transit and relocating within the city to reduce
their total commute time.
3.6 Robustness Checks
The government of Beijing has invested heavily in expanding its subway network
since 2000. As of 2000, Beijing had two subway lines with 31 stations while today the
city has 21 lines with over 370 stations. Appendix Figure C.1 shows how the subway
network has expanded substantially over the last two decades, particularly since 2010.
The placement of new lines and stations is unlikely to be random. To the extent that
increased subway proximity over time is correlated with other location attributes that
affect housing prices, such as expectations on commercial development, our results on
the subway proximity-price premium may be spurious or driven by reverse causality.
To address these concerns, we first exclude housing units that experienced subway
station development nearby. For this sensitivity check, our sample includes only
housing units that maintained the same distance to their nearest subway station
from 2005 through 2016. Approximately 1,200 building complexes in our sample met
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this criteria, leaving about 50% of all transaction observations. Relying purely on
time-wise variation, rather than spatial variation in subway expansion, results of the
bid-rent gradient shift for subway proximity are consistent with our main results. The
bid-rent gradient in Appendix Figure C.3 demonstrates a substantial tilt following
the driving restriction. Table C.4 shows estimates of the subway proximity-price
gradient for this restricted sample. The gradient change is attenuated but within a
standard deviation of our main results in Table 3.2. For housing units with no change
in their proximity to the nearest subway station, the driving restriction increased
the premium for these units by an additional 1.5% per kilometer compared to 3.2%
estimated from our full sample based on column (5) of both tables. We interpret
these results as a lower bound on the increased demand for subway proximity. The
subway stations proximate to this housing subsample are some of the oldest lines and
stations in the system network (Beijing’s oldest lines were built in 1969 and 1971,
without substantial additions until the mid-2000’s) thus proximity to these areas
may be less desirable to the extent that these lines offer less network advantages and
may run less efficiently compared to the newer lines.
As an alternative strategy, we test whether areas that received future subway
development after our study period experienced differential price trends over time.
In Figure 3.11, we estimate the effect of subway proximity among a sample of housing
units that were outside of walking distance from a subway station up through 2013,
but came to be within 3 kilometers after new stations were built after 2013. This
sample is a subset of housing units located in areas that received development in
the future, but should not be affected by the driving restriction during our study
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period because they are not within reasonable walking distance of subway stations.
Any price effects from the driving restriction would raise concern that correlated
shocks stemming from unobserved economic investment or growth caused the subway
proximity-price gradient shift, as opposed to increased demand for the subway itself.
Figure 3.11 is suggestive that the driving restriction did not significantly increase the
price premium for subway proximity among this group of housing units. The point
estimates are imprecisely estimated due to smaller sample sizes in the post-CDR
period. However, the quarterly estimates do not show a clear upward trend, as in
Figure 3.7.
3.7 Conclusion
Road rationing policies are an increasingly common policy instrument used among
major cities to reduce traffic congestion and air pollution. While prior work has
investigated the effectiveness of these policies at improving air quality and congestion,
less is known about the ramifications of these policies on the residential location
decisions of those who drive relative to those that do not.
Urban land use theory provides clear predictions on how such policies will impact
the housing market and the sorting of demographic groups relative to one another.
This paper uses detailed, micro-level data on home purchases and buyer demograph-
ics in combination with a city-wide driving restriction to test these theories in the
context of Beijing, China. Our analysis relies on fine-scale spatial fixed effects to
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control for location-specific correlates of public transit. We find that the driving
restriction increased demand for subway proximity by twice that found by prior lit-
erature. We interpret this difference as evidence of the non-random nature of transit
infrastructure siting decisions. We additionally utilize novel micro data on house-
hold income and housing locations to explore how the driving restriction impacted
the residential location choices of income groups relative to one another. Following
the policy-induced shocks to housing prices, we find the composition of individuals
living proximate to subway stations as well as proximate to Beijing’s CBDs shifted
toward wealthier households. Each of these results is consistent with the AMM model
and its extension by LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983).
These results provide some suggestive evidence that city-wide road rationing poli-
cies can have the unintended consequence of limiting access to public transit for lower
income individuals. Such effects are likely to be stronger in markets where car own-
ership is cost-prohibitive to the poor and when enforcement of the driving restriction
is strict. Future work should explore the welfare implications of such policies by
testing how actual commute times change among the wealthy relative to the poor
following a driving restriction. Exposure to pollution and congestion are additionally
important pieces to consider. Such analysis can inform whether rent stabilization, or
a welfare transfer process may be necessary to offset impacts of driving restrictions
on housing affordability.
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Figure 3.1: Global Growth in Urban Road Rationing Policies
Sources: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-12/16/content_17175846.htm;
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38236926; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Road_space_rationing
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Figure 3.2: Housing Units & Subway Stations in Beijing
Sources: Beijing Real estate data.
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Figure 3.3: Business Districts of Beijing
Sources: Ziye Zhang, HPF Mortgage Data. Figure shows employment concentration by trans-
portation analysis zone. Employment location data sourced from HPF Mortgage Data.
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Figure 3.4: Income Proximity Gradient
Note: Figure plots mean household income for each of 20 distance bins. Each dot represents 850
and 3670 obs per bin in pre and post, respectively. Panel A means are residualized by distance
to the nearest subway. Panel B means are residualized by distance to central business district.
“Central Business District” defined as the closest of 7 main business districts. ρ(pre) and ρ(post)
are regression coefficients. Includes years 2005-2014. Source: Housing Provident Fund mortgage
application dataset. 176
Figure 3.5: Price Proximity Gradient
Note: Figures plot mean house price for each of 20 distance bins. Each dot represents 6,300 and
12,900 obs per bin in pre and post, respectively. Panel A means are residualized by distance to
the nearest subway. Panel B means are residualized by distance to the central business district.
“Central Business District” defined as the closest of 7 main business districts. ρ(pre) and ρ(post)
are regression coefficients. Includes years 2005-2014. Source: Real estate transaction dataset.
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Figure 3.6: Neighborhood Variation
Sources: Beijing Real estate data; Housing Provident Fund data. Figure shows a southwest
section of central Beijing, between the second and third ring roads. CDR effects are identified
based off of variation in distance to subway stations, or distance to the nearest central business
districts across housing units within a jiedao.
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Figure 3.7: Event Study of the Subway-Housing Price Premium
Note: Figure shows the partial effect of subway distance on housing price ln(total price/sqm
in U2007) at each quarter between Jan 2005 and Dec 2011. The omitted quarter is July-
October 2008. Sample includes 256,149 transactions. Controls include district, unit type (resale
or newsale), and jiedao fixed effects; complex controls include age, age2, size, floor-area ratio,
green space, no. total floors. Unit controls include unit size, decoration level, whether at top
floor and facing direction. Standard errors clustered at jiedao level.
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Figure 3.8: Price premium for housing units within vs outside a 3km radius
from subway stations
Note: Figure plots estimates of the average change in price per square meter for housing units
within vs over 3km of a subway station by quarter. The reference quarter is July-October of 2008.
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Controls include district, unit type (resale or
newsale), and jiedao fixed effects; complex controls include age, age2, size, floor-area ratio, green
space, no. total floors. Unit controls include unit size, decoration level, whether at top floor, and
facing direction. Standard errors clustered at jiedao level.
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Figure 3.9: Average Effect of Driving Restriction on Housing Prices by Sub-
way Distance Bin
Note: Figure plots estimates of the average change in housing price per square meter following
the CDR by half-mile distance bins to subway stations. The reference bin includes housing units
over 5 kilometers from subway stations. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Includes
transactions from July 2006 through July 2010. Controls include district, unit type (resale or
newsale), and jiedao fixed effects; complex controls include age, age2, size, floor-area ratio, green
space, no. total floors. Unit controls include unit size, decoration level, whether at top floor, and
facing direction. Standard errors clustered at jiedao level.
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Figure 3.10: Event Study of the CBD-Housing Price Premium
Note: Figure shows the partial effect of distance to central business district on housing price
ln(total price/sqm in U2007) at each quarter between Jan 2005 and Dec 2011. The omitted
quarter is July-October 2008. Sample includes 256,149 transactions. Controls include distance to
nearest subway station, district, unit type (resale or newsale), and jiedao fixed effects; complex
controls include age, age2, size, floor-area ratio, green space, no. total floors. Unit controls include
unit size, decoration level, whether at top floor, and facing direction. Standard errors clustered
at jiedao level. “Central Business District” defined as the closest of 7 main business districts.
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Figure 3.11: Placebo Test of Driving Restriction
Note: Figure shows the partial effect of subway distance on housing price ln(total price/sqm in
U2007) at each quarter between Jan 2006 and Dec 2011. The omitted quarter is July-October
2008. Sample includes housing units located in building complexes that are over 3km from
the nearest subway station through the event period; but are under 3km from a station after the
event period ends (beginning in 2013). The sample includes 65,758 transactions. Controls include
district, unit type (resale or newsale), and jiedao fixed effects; complex controls include age, age2,
size, floor-area ratio, green space, no. total floors. Unit controls include unit size, decoration
level, whether at top floor, and facing direction. Standard errors clustered at jiedao level.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Real Estate Transactions Mortgage Data
Mean (St. Dev) Mean (St. Dev)
Total purchase price (’07 Yuan) 1,195,255.8 866,141.1 543,993.8 269,514.8
Price per sq.m (’07 Yuan) 10,586.6 4,182.1 5,447.2 2,467.3
Unitsize (sq.m.) 109.3 46.4 103.0 32.1
Km to subway 3.2 2.6 12.9 13.5
Km to nearest CBD 5.7 3.5 18.0 13.7
Km to City Center 9.3 3.4 24.2 15.9
Building Age 10.7 6.8 5.7 7.0
Building Floor-to-Area Ratio 2.9 1.2 2.2 1.0
Building Green space ratio 0.3 0.1 33.4 6.8
Household Monthly Income (’07 Yuan) 7,193 5,002
Age of household head 35.8 7.3
Years of work experience of household head 6.7 8.7
Education level of household head (mode) Bachlor’s
No. Complexes 4,114 3,971
No. Neighborhoods 185 183
Observations 237,140 46,471
Observations by Year
2005 1,928 4,858
2006 62,497 5,273
2007 48,637 4,410
2008 25,003 4,225
2009 66,783 12,513
2010 34,927 8,321
2011 16,374 6,871
Note: The unit of observation for the Real Estate Transaction data is a housing purchase transaction.
The unit of observation for the Mortgage Data is a mortgage loan application, or a household,
equivalently. The means are calculated using pre-policy years 2005 through July 2008.
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Table 3.2: Effects of CDR policy on Subway-Price gradient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subway Proximity (km) x CDR 0.040∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Subway Proximimty (km) 0.049∗∗∗ 0.005 0.017∗ 0.015∗ 0.015
(0.015) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Avg Price Premium / Km $405.34 $403.95 $364.65 $348.76 $328.23
Jiedao FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Year-Month FE Y
DistrictxYear-Quarter FE Y
Observations 82002 82002 82002 82002 82002
Adjusted R2 0.125 0.495 0.611 0.621 0.623
Note: Dependent variable is ln(total price per square meter in 2007 real Yuan). Standard errors
clustered at jiedao level. Sample spans 12 mos. before and after CDR. Average price premium
evaluated at the mean unit size (100 sqm for owner-occupied) within 1 and 1.5 km of a subway
station. Controls include year, month, and district fixed effects; controls for complex age, age2, size,
floor-area ratio, green space, no. total floors; controls for housing unit size, decoration level, floor
level, facing direction, and no. bedrooms. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
185
Table 3.3: Effects of CDR policy on Central Business District-Price gradient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CBD Proximity (km) x CDR 0.006 0.016∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.016∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
CBD Proximity (km) 0.035∗∗∗ 0.003 -0.010 -0.008 -0.011
(0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Avg Price Premium / Km $55.74 $163.82 $126.64 $119.76 $157.00
Jiedao FE Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y
Year-Month FE Y
DistrictxYear-Quarter FE Y
Observations 82002 82002 82002 82002 82002
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.488 0.611 0.621 0.624
Note: Dependent variable is ln(total price per square meter in 2007 real Yuan). Standard errors
clustered at jiedao level. Sample spans 12 mos. before and after CDR. Average price premium
evaluated at the mean unit size (100 sqm for owner-occupied) within 4 and 6 km of a the nearest
central business district. Controls include distance to nearest subway station, year, month, and
district fixed effects; controls for complex age, age2, size, floor-area ratio, green space, no. total
floors; controls for housing unit size, decoration level, floor level, facing direction, and no. bedrooms.
“Central Business District” defined as the closest of 7 main business districts. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.4: CDR Policy and Income sorting near Subways
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Household Income)× CDR -0.046 -0.040 -0.015 -0.080∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.057) (0.050) (0.024) (0.025)
Ln(Household Income) -0.139∗ -0.017 -0.002 0.051∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.073) (0.046) (0.036) (0.023) (0.022)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y
Zip FE Y Y Y
Subway Line FE Y Y
Controls Y
Observations 18135 18135 18135 18135 18135
Adjusted R2 0.636 0.811 0.911 0.922 0.923
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Distance to Subway (km)). Income is household monthly income
(’000 yuan). CDR equals 1 after July 20 2008. Standard errors clustered by zip code. Sample spans
July 20, 2006-July 20, 2010. Controls for distance to nearest CBD. Demographic controls include
husband and wife age, employment rank, education, employer type, and tenure.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.5: CDR Policy and Income sorting near the Central Business District
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Household Income)× CDR -0.031 -0.053∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.017 -0.017
(0.081) (0.030) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Ln(Household Income) -0.752∗∗∗ -0.041 0.008 -0.012 -0.008
(0.107) (0.026) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y
Zip FE Y Y Y
Subway Line FE Y Y
Controls Y
Observations 18135 18135 18135 18135 18135
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.841 0.944 0.956 0.956
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Distance to CBD (km). Income is household monthly income (’000
yuan). CDR equals 1 after July 20 2008. Standard errors clustered by zip code. Sample spans July
20, 2006-July 20, 2010. Controls for distance to subway. Demographic controls include husband and
wife age, employment rank, education, employer type, and tenure.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Figures & Tables
Figure A.1: Population Distribution of Local Government Sample
Source: US Census of Governments. This plot shows the cumulative distribution function of the
sample local government population size, and the corresponding share of the US population as
of 1970 and 2012. Includes 3,334 governments categorized as “municipalities” and “townships”
by the Census of Governments, which operate a wastewater treatment plant. See Section 1.4 for
further details on sample selection.
189
Figure A.2: Wastewater Expenditures per capita by Size of Downstream
Population Using State Compliant Plant Share Variation
Source: USGS, Census of Governments, author’s calculations. Figure plots δt×50 + δt and δt from
equation: yit =
∑
t δt×50(I50 × Ss ×Dt) +
∑
t δt(Ss ×Dt) + (Di ×Dt) + γt + νi + εit where the
dependent variable is wastewater expenditures per capita for city i in year t; I50 is an indicator for
a city having downstream population in the bottom 50th percentile, Ss is state share of compliant
plants as of 1972, Dt is an indicator for year t, and Di is downstream population. Bands show 95%
confidence intervals. The reference year is t=1972 and the reference city is one in a low compliant
state. Black triangles show the estimated difference in expenditures in year t relative to 1972,
relative to high downstream-high compliant state cities, and all low compliant state cities, for
cities with downstream population size in the bottom 50th percentile. Gray estimates show the
difference in expenditures in year t relative to 1972 for cities with downstream population size
in the top 50th percentile, relative to low downstream-high compliant state cities, and all low
compliant state cities. Robust standard errors are clustered at the city level. The gray bars show
that cities in the top 50th percentile of downstream population within high compliant states have
significantly less wastewater expenditures after 1972 relative to all other cities. This is due to
the fact that downstream population is less predictive of ex ante compliance in low compliant
states. In other words, all cities in low compliant states, regardless of their downstream population
size, were more likely to be noncompliant. Consequently, their expenditures are not significantly
different from low downstream population cities in high compliant states.
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Figure A.3: Plant Service Population vs Local Government Population
Source: US Census of Governments; EPA CWNS. Plot shows relationship between local gov-
ernment population as reported by Census of Governments, and service population of its corre-
sponding plant as reported by EPA. Includes 3,226 governments with population less than 30,000.
Regression coefficient (r) estimated from Census population =r Plant population + e. Each dot
represents approximately 60 cities.
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Table A.1: Specification Sensitivity of CWA NonCompliance and Wastewa-
ter Expenditures per capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Difference-in-Differences
Primary’72xPost 12.713∗∗ 64.239∗∗∗ 65.585∗∗∗ 64.948∗∗∗ 64.053∗∗∗ 59.114∗∗∗ 58.715∗∗∗
(6.329) (10.010) (9.730) (9.808) (9.917) (9.406) (9.417)
Instrumented Difference-in-Differences
Primary’72xPost 47.825∗∗ 101.599∗∗∗ 140.820∗∗∗ 143.433∗∗∗ 129.552∗∗ 155.228∗∗∗ 151.768∗∗∗
(23.241) (35.054) (52.438) (49.797) (50.268) (50.067) (50.576)
YearFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
CityFE Y Y Y Y Y Y
RegionTrend Y Y Y Y Y
RiverPopulation x YearFE Y Y Y Y
Industry Composition x YearFE Y Y Y
City Controls x YearFE Y Y
County Income Trend Y
Observations 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866
Note: Dependent variable is wastewater expenditures per capita in 2012 dollars. Difference-in-differences reports estimates of β from
Equation 1.2. IV reports estimates of βIV from Eq. 1.3. Industry composition includes mean from 1967 to 1972 of county share of
employment in manufacturing and water-polluting manufacturing. City controls include means from 1967 to 1972 of intergovernmental
grants and distance from coastline. Region trend includes 8 US census regions, based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Specification Sensitivity of CWA NonCompliance and Local Gov-
ernment Growth
Difference-in-Differences
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Primary’72xPost -0.077 -0.030 0.039 -0.264∗∗∗ -0.024∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.022∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.058) (0.050) (0.047) (0.067) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
Instrumented Difference-in-Differences
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Primary’72xPost -0.918∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗ -1.682∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.121∗ -0.294∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ 0.013 0.034 0.051∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.330) (0.286) (0.327) (0.395) (0.070) (0.071) (0.101) (0.057) (0.054) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 14177 14177 14177 8264 8264 8264 8264 8264 8264 6366 6366 6366
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
All Controls Y Y Y Y
Note: Difference-in-differences reports estimates of β from Eq. 1.2. IV reports estimates of βIV from Eq. 1.3. Includes decade interval years only
(1972, 1982, 1992). High Skill Share is the share of city population with 4 or more years of college (1972) or bachelor’s degree or higher (1982-1992);
and includes only balanced panel of cities with annual observations for educational attainment. Standard errors clustered by city. Controls includes
all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Capitalization of CWA Infrastructure Mandate
Wastewater User Fee
Per Capita Annual Fee Increase, τ $62
Interest Rate, (r) 10% 16%
Net present value over 18 years of τ , NPV(r,18) $1,014 $641
Mean increase in housing value, H: $1,069 $1,069
Value of Mandate, (1 +H/NPV ) 2.05 2.67
Note: Value of Mandate provides the implied value of the CWA mandated infrastructure,
interpreted as a multiplier on the NPV of user fees. Estimates of per capita annual fee
increase (δPOST ) sourced from Panel B of Table 1.4. 10% and 16% rate of return based on
average return from 1975-1992 on 10-year treasury bond and S&P 500, respectively. Net
present value calculation is: NPV(r,18) =
∑18
t=0Rt/(1 + r)t where Rt is total user fee per
household, calculated as 2.5 people per household × the per capita tax increase. 18 years
covers 1975 (the first year of significant plant infrastructure construction, as well as EPA
grant distribution (Copeland 2015)) through 1992. Mean loss in housing value calculated
as the average city median housing value as of 1970 × the housing price effect in Panel B
of Table 1.5.
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Table A.4: Effect of CWA Compliance on Local Government Budgets Using
Count of Big Cities Downstream as IV
PANEL A: Expenditures Per Capita
Total Wastewater Other
Total Capital Operating Total PublicSafety PublicWorks GenAdmin Welfare Rec
Primary’72 x Post 486.405 208.348∗∗∗ 154.527∗∗∗ 48.357∗∗∗ 146.727 79.770∗∗ 29.046 6.915 15.468 15.528
(347.818) (61.432) (57.122) (16.102) (317.553) (34.074) (311.407) (20.883) (23.263) (15.160)
Baseline mean 1032.09 66.67 38.65 27.69 650.54 132.39 384.35 61.36 29.43 43.02
PANEL B: Revenues Per Capita
TotalRevenues UserFees Taxes Debt
Total InterGovt Own Total Wastewater Total Property Sales&License LongTerm ShortTerm
Primary’72 x Post 758.405∗∗∗ 480.875∗∗∗ 277.303∗ 58.865 61.988∗∗∗ -3.027 13.417 -16.536 -103.882 205.286∗∗∗
(186.078) (93.602) (150.281) (65.654) (20.851) (55.876) (46.782) (29.244) (760.276) (76.353)
Baseline mean 1019.02 170.60 848.45 111.91 31.41 389.85 300.87 88.99 1394.71 87.83
First Stage F-statistic 19.49 19.49 19.49 19.49 19.49 19.49 19.49 19.49 19.49 19.49
Clusters 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975
Observations 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866
Note: Dependent variables are in 2012 dollars per capita. Table reports estimates of β from Eq. 1.2: yit = β(Pi×POSTt)+Xiθt+(R×t)+γt+νi+εit,
where the instrument for (Pi×POSTt) is Eq. 1.4 and Di is count of cities downstream with population greater than 30,000. Standard errors clustered
by city. X includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Effect of CWA Noncompliance on Water Quality and Municipal
Growth Using Count of Big Cities Downstream as IV
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary’72 x Post 1.622∗∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.073 0.028∗∗
(0.344) (0.071) (0.057) (0.014)
Observations 14177 8264 8264 6366
First Stage F-statistic 18.92 19.36 19.36 14.00
Baseline mean 8.11 36710 95461 0.11
Marginal effect (%) 20% 14.11% 7.43% 26%
Note: Excluded instrument is count of cities downstream with 1970 population greater than 30,000. Includes decade
interval years only (1972, 1982, 1992). “High Skill Share” is the share of city population with 4 or more years of
college (1972) or a bachelor’s degree or higher (1982-1992); and includes only balanced panel of cities with annual
observations for educational attainment (e.g., cities with a population over 2,500 as of 1970). Table reports estimates
of β from Eq. 1.3: yist = βIV (Pi × POSTt) ̂(Pi × POSTt) + Xiθt + Diσt + (R × t) + τt + κi + ist Standard errors
clustered by city. Includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Effect of CWA Noncompliance on Local Government Budgets,
Excluding Coastal Cities
PANEL A: Expenditures Per Capita
Total Wastewater Other
Total Capital Operating Total PublicSafety PublicWorks GenAdmin Welfare Rec
Primary’72xPost 307.685 98.679∗∗ 54.010 43.229∗∗∗ 150.128 36.733∗∗ 57.346 9.098 30.364 16.588
(282.468) (47.450) (44.502) (15.408) (246.815) (16.202) (240.076) (19.243) (24.552) (14.539)
Baseline mean 964.84 66.44 38.36 27.82 630.86 122.92 389.20 57.26 22.80 38.67
PANEL B: Revenues Per Capita
TotalRevenues UserFees Taxes Debt
Total InterGovt Own Total Wastewater Total Property Sales&License LongTerm ShortTerm
Primary’72xPost 509.782∗∗∗ 285.569∗∗∗ 223.963 28.472 49.381∗∗∗ 73.299 7.867 65.290∗∗ -403.944 29.705
(173.024) (72.001) (149.417) (66.914) (18.602) (47.849) (38.332) (26.720) (844.964) (67.254)
Baseline mean 955.27 152.90 802.42 114.26 31.87 329.56 247.72 81.85 1351.27 76.53
First Stage F-statistic 18.74 18.74 18.74 18.74 18.74 18.74 18.74 18.74 18.74 18.74
Clusters 2553 2553 2553 2553 2553 2553 2553 2553 2553 2553
Observations 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564 12564
Note: Excludes cities within 50 kilometers of an ocean coastline. Dependent variables are in 2012 dollars per capita. Table reports estimates of β
from Eq. 1.3. Standard errors clustered by city. Includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Effect of CWA Noncompliance on Water Quality and Municipal
Growth, Excluding Coastal Cities
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary’72xPost 1.227∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗ -0.012 0.027∗∗
(0.321) (0.074) (0.056) (0.012)
First Stage F-statistic 18.08 18.14 18.14 14.41
Baseline mean 8.18(mg/l) 24,703 $91,492 11%
Marginal effect (%) 15% 15.61% -1.35% 24%
Clusters 2515 2543 2543 1951
Observations 11979 7043 7043 5276
Note: Excludes cities within 50km of an ocean coastline. Includes decade interval years only (1972, 1982, 1992).
“High Skill Share” is the share of city population with 4 or more years of college (1972) or a bachelor’s degree or
higher (1982-1992); and includes only balanced panel of cities with annual observations for educational attainment
(e.g., cities with a population over 2,500 as of 1970). Standard errors clustered by city. Includes all controls listed in
Table 1.2, column(4). ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.8: Effect of CWA Noncompliance on Local Government Budgets,
Excluding Hydrologic Regions with Largest Downstream Popu-
lation
PANEL A: Expenditures Per Capita
Total Wastewater Other
Total Capital Operating Total PublicSafety PublicWorks GenAdmin Welfare Rec
Primary’72 x Post 462.934 255.223∗∗∗ 184.799∗∗ 68.690∗∗∗ 201.458 109.054∗∗∗ -37.104 24.321 38.879 66.307∗∗
(433.562) (85.569) (75.785) (25.637) (361.814) (38.851) (347.725) (39.213) (30.447) (26.854)
Baseline mean 1073.49 67.03 40.59 26.17 669.88 138.12 387.12 65.16 33.13 46.34
PANEL B: Revenues Per Capita
TotalRevenues UserFees Taxes Debt
Total InterGovt Own Total Wastewater Total Property Sales&License LongTerm ShortTerm
Primary’72 x Post 904.032∗∗ 530.981∗∗∗ 372.943 36.135 98.215∗∗∗ 286.303 138.638 148.220∗∗∗ -684.323 -86.256
(359.807) (144.491) (306.569) (94.560) (31.533) (185.367) (173.392) (49.224) (1589.046) (124.778)
Baseline mean 1066.22 181.68 884.59 107.23 29.36 425.96 335.41 90.57 1428.26 97.71
First Stage F-statistic 9.53 9.53 9.53 9.53 9.53 9.53 9.53 9.53 9.53 9.53
Clusters 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183 2183
Observations 11084 11084 11084 11084 11084 11084 11084 11084 11084 11084
Note: Excludes cities within the upper Mississippi and Ohio river hydrologic regions. Dependent variables are in 2012 dollars per capita. Table reports
estimates of β from Equation 1.2: yit = β(Pi × POSTt) + Xiθt + Rτ + νi + τt + εit. The instrument for (Pi × POSTt) is Equation 1.4. Standard
errors clustered by city. X includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.9: Effect of CWA NonCompliance on Water Quality and Munici-
pal Growth, Excluding Hydrological Regions with Largest Down-
stream Population
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary’72 x Post 1.244∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗ -0.097 0.027
(0.442) (0.119) (0.083) (0.021)
First Stage F-statistic 9.49 9.71 9.71 8.10
Baseline mean 8.07 mg/l 42,119 $96,036 11%
Marginal effect (%) 15% 31.67% -9.60% 25%
Clusters 2152 2179 2179 1741
Observations 10545 6120 6120 4815
Note: Include decade interval years only (1972, 1982, 1992). “High Skill Share” is the share of city population with 4
or more years of college (1972) or a bachelor’s degree or higher (1982-1992); and includes only balanced panel of cities
with annual observations for educational attainment (e.g., cities with a population over 2,500 as of 1970). Standard
errors clustered by city. Includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.10: CWA Noncompliance and Local Government Budgets using Full
Sample
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences
Expenditures Revenues
Total Wastewater Other Total InterGovt UserFees WWUserFees Taxes LongTermDebt ShortTermDebt
Primary’72xPost -32.969 33.285∗∗∗ -45.425∗ -24.609 20.279∗∗ 0.160 -3.923∗ -6.555 -155.893 16.527∗
(34.508) (6.813) (27.105) (26.316) (8.474) (8.590) (2.219) (8.944) (102.693) (8.929)
Marginal effect (%) -3% 58% -8% -3% 13% 0% -17% -2% -11% 24%
Panel B: Instrumented Difference-in-Differences
Expenditures Revenues
Total Wastewater Other Total InterGovt UserFees WWUserFees Taxes LongTermDebt ShortTermDebt
Primary’72xPost 969.663∗∗∗ 239.874∗∗∗ 757.749∗∗∗ 1282.497∗∗∗ 744.439∗∗∗ 67.010 69.263∗∗∗ 53.144 -525.122 146.464∗∗
(276.258) (66.598) (201.701) (297.309) (104.000) (124.439) (17.544) (161.111) (990.956) (61.659)
Marginal effect (%) 103% 419% 130% 140% 465% 84% 307% 15% -38% 217%
First Stage F-statistic 33.11 33.11 33.11 33.11 33.11 33.11 33.11 33.11 33.11 33.11
Baseline mean 944.49 57.20 580.90 915.86 159.94 80.13 22.54 350.15 1383.99 67.57
Clusters 10820 10820 10820 10820 10820 10820 10820 10820 10820 10820
Observations 48348 48348 48348 48348 48348 48348 48348 48348 48348 48348
Note: Includes full sample of wastewater treatment plants, including those that were built after 1972. Dependent variables are in 2012 dollars per capita. Standard
errors clustered by city. Table reports estimates of β from Eq. 1.2: yit = β(Pi × POSTt) +Xiθt + (R× t) + γt + νi + εit. The instrument for (Pi × POSTt) in Panel
B is Eq. 1.4. Standard errors clustered by city. X includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.11: Effect of CWA Noncompliance on Local Government Growth
using Full Sample
Panel A: Difference-in-Differences
DO2 Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary’72xPost 0.035 -0.026∗∗∗ -0.012∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.009) (0.006) (0.002)
Marginal effect (%) 0% -2.58% -1.15% -5.17%
Panel B: Two Stage Least Squares
Primary’72xPost 2.517∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ -0.118∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.366) (0.086) (0.057) (0.015)
Marginal effect (%) 14 % 22.72 % -3.37 % 76 %
First Stage F-statistic 30.98 30.44 30.44 17.76
Baseline mean 8.15 mg/l 19,716 $87,447 10%
Clusters 10487 10807 10807 8458
Observations 45456 28270 28270 21227
Note: Includes full sample of wastewater treatment plants, including those that were built after
1972. Includes decade interval years only (1972, 1982, 1992). “High Skill Share” is the share of
city population with 4 or more years of college (1972) or a bachelor’s degree or higher (1982-1992);
and includes only balanced panel of cities with annual observations for educational attainment
(e.g., cities with a population over 2,500 as of 1970). Table reports estimates of β from Eq. 1.2:
yit = β(Pi × POSTt) +Xiθt + (R× t) + γt + νi + εit. The instrument for (Pi × POSTt) in Panel B
is Eq. 1.4. Standard errors clustered by city. X includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4).
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A.12: Ex Ante Noncompliance & Downstream Population Using Full
Sample
Cross Section (1972) Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Downstream Population -0.028∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007)
Downstream PopulationxStateShare’72xPost 0.033 0.000
(0.185) (0.190)
Downstream PopulationxPost -0.019∗ -0.019∗
(0.010) (0.011)
StateShare’72xPost -1.671∗∗∗ -1.761∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.211)
Observations 6155 6124 48248 48242
F Statistic 20.998 7.454 33.532 33.109
River FE Y Y
GeographyControls Y
CityControls Y
City,YearFE Y
RiverPopxYearFE Y Y
CityControlsxYearFE Y
Note: Includes full sample of wastewater treatment plants, including those that were built after
1972. The dependent variable in (1) and (2) is an indicator for primary treatment as of 1972. In (3)
and (4), this is interacted with a post CWA indicator. Standard errors clustered by city. Geography
controls include distance to river edge and distance to river mouth. CityControls include pre-CWA
averages from 1967-1972 of: share of county-level employment in manufacturing and water-polluting
industries; and annual federal, state, and local intergovernmental grants. Specifications (3) and (4)
interact these baseline controls with year fixed effects. Downstream population is normalized by its
standard deviation.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.13: Effect of CWA Compliance on Local Government Budgets Con-
trolling for Time-Varying Effects of State “League of Conserva-
tion Vote” Score
PANEL A: Expenditures Per Capita
Total Wastewater Other
Total Capital Operating Total PublicSafety PublicWorks GenAdmin Welfare Rec
Primary’72xPost 530.013∗ 191.267∗∗∗ 132.704∗∗ 54.239∗∗∗ 160.475 79.671∗∗∗ 63.927 -17.322 29.630 4.570
(291.471) (60.049) (54.243) (17.957) (240.720) (27.203) (227.514) (28.482) (30.320) (17.804)
Baseline mean 1032.09 66.67 38.65 27.69 650.54 132.39 384.35 61.36 29.43 43.02
PANEL B: Revenues Per Capita
TotalRevenues UserFees Taxes Debt
Total InterGovt Own Total Wastewater Total Property Sales&License LongTerm ShortTerm
Primary’72xPost 718.755∗∗∗ 540.827∗∗∗ 177.776 41.854 76.931∗∗∗ -108.775 -77.303 -31.501 641.202 136.233
(219.460) (107.964) (180.545) (72.573) (23.476) (78.935) (69.412) (32.924) (925.774) (88.805)
Baseline mean 1019.02 170.60 848.45 111.91 31.41 389.85 300.87 88.99 1394.71 87.83
First Stage F-statistic 14.36 14.36 14.36 14.36 14.36 14.36 14.36 14.36 14.36 14.36
Clusters 2975 2975 2975 2975 297577 2975 2975 2975 2975 2975
Observations 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866
Note: Dependent variables are in 2012 dollars per capita. Table reports estimates of β from Eq. 1.3: yist = βIV
∧
(Pi × POSTt) +Xiθt +Diσt + (R×
t) + τt + κi + ist, where the instrument for (Pi × POSTt) is Eq. 1.4. X includes LCV score interacted with year fixed effects, as well as all controls
listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.14: Effect of CWA compliance on Water Quality & Municipal
Growth, Controlling for Effects of State “League of Conservation
Vote” Score
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary’72xPost 1.543∗∗∗ 0.149∗ 0.106 0.030∗∗
(0.327) (0.080) (0.065) (0.014)
First Stage F-statistic 19.56 15.14 15.14 11.39
Baseline mean 8.11 36710 95461 0.11
Marginal effect (%) 19% 15.71% 10.97% 27%
Observations 14177 8264 8264 6366
Note: Population, housing price, and high skill regressions include decade interval years only (1972, 1982, 1992).
Dollars in USD 2012 values. “High Skill Share” is the share of city population with 4 or more years of college (1972)
or a bachelor’s degree or higher (1982-1992); and includes only balanced panel of cities with annual observations for
educational attainment (e.g., cities with a population over 2,500 as of 1970). Table reports estimates of β from Eq.
1.2: yit = β(Pi × POSTt) +Xiθt +Rτ + γt + νi + εit. The instrument for (Pi × POSTt) is Equation 1.4. Standard
errors clustered by city. Includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). Marginal effect for ln(population) and
ln(median house price) calculated as (exp(β − var(β)/2)− 1)× 100. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.15: CWA Noncompliance and Local Government Budgets by Man-
ufacturing Concentration
Expenditures Revenues
Total Wastewater Other Total InterGovt UserFees WWUserFees Taxes LongTermDebt ShortTermDebt
Primary ’72 x Post 455.598 126.603∗∗ 287.612 744.135∗∗∗ 383.492∗∗∗ 13.220 52.456∗∗∗ 26.975 -433.957 101.135
(288.266) (50.421) (257.522) (178.520) (80.307) (57.451) (19.158) (56.173) (909.631) (64.894)
Primary ’72 x Post x 46.408 38.580 -86.285 -81.365 59.987 -18.173 4.610 -42.874 201.536 -49.466
AboveMedianManuf (154.054) (27.799) (123.680) (132.747) (48.719) (49.014) (10.861) (42.918) (656.818) (48.229)
First Stage F-statistic 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28 7.28
Baseline mean 944.49 57.20 580.90 915.86 159.94 80.13 22.54 350.15 1383.99 67.57
Clusters 2965 2965 2965 2965 2965 2965 2965 2965 2965 2965
Observations 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866 14866
Note: Above Median Manu equals 1 for cities with county-level employment shares in manufacturing above the population median as of 1974. Dependent variables are
in 2012 dollars per capita. Standard errors clustered by city. Table reports estimates of δPOST and δPOST×ω where ω equals 1 if a city has above median employment
share in manufacturing: yit = δPOST (Pi × POSTt) + δPOST×ω(Pi × POSTt × ωi) + Xiθτ + Diσt + (R × t) + γt + νi + varepsilonit. Equation 1.4 instruments for
(Pi × POSTt). Standard errors clustered by city. X includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.16: Effect of CWA compliance on Water Quality & Municipal
Growth by Manufacturing Concentration
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary ’72 x Post 1.777∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.067 0.031∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.064) (0.052) (0.011)
Primary ’72 x Post x AboveMedianManuf -0.404∗ -0.077 -0.088∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.223) (0.049) (0.033) (0.008)
Observations 14177 8264 8264 7618
First Stage F-statistic 10.51 10.78 10.78 8.56
Note: Population, housing price, and high skill share regressions include decade interval years only (1972, 1982, 1992). Dollars in
USD 2012 values. “High Skill Share” is the share of city population with 4 or more years of college (1972) or a bachelor’s degree or
higher (1982-1992); and includes only balanced panel of cities with annual observations for educational attainment (e.g., cities with
a population over 2,500 as of 1970). Table reports estimates of δPOST and δPOST×ω where ω equals 1 if a city has above median
employment share in manufacturing: yit = δPOST (Pi × POSTt) + δPOST×ω(Pi × POSTt × ωi) +Xiθτ +Diσt + (R × t) + γt + νi +
varepsilonit. Equation 1.4 instruments for (Pi × POSTt). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.17: Heterogeneity in CWA Noncompliance in Growth Outcomes
Ln(Population) Ln(House price) High Skill Share
Primary’72 x Post -0.483∗∗∗ -0.106 0.136∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.133) (0.027)
Primary’72xPostxJulyTemp 0.019∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.003∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001)
Primary’72 x Post 0.113 -0.002 0.025∗∗
(0.069) (0.053) (0.011)
Primary’72xPostxDisttoWater -0.035 -0.040∗∗ -0.004∗
(0.027) (0.016) (0.002)
Primary’72 x Post 0.155∗∗ 0.065 0.011
(0.069) (0.057) (0.013)
Primary’72xPostxDisttoMouth -0.002∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 8261 8261 7615
First Stage F-statistic 10.49 10.49 8.86
Note: Table reports estimates of δPOST and δPOST×ω from Eq. 1.7: yit = δPOST (Pi ×
POSTt) + δPOST×ω(Pi × POSTt × ωi) +Xiθτ + (N i × γt) +Diσt + (R× t) + γt + νi + εit,
where ω is one of three variables: (i) “July Temp” is average maximum July temperature
from 1970-2000; (ii) “Distance to Water” is kilometers to nearest large water body, where
“large” is a water feature with a stream order of 6 or larger as defined on a scale of 1-13 by
USGS; and (iii) “Distance to Mouth” is distance to river mouth in percentiles. Equation
1.4 instruments for (Pi×POSTt). Standard errors clustered by city. X includes all controls
listed in Table 1.2, column(4).
A.2 Data Sampling Restrictions
First, I restrict my analysis to the roughly 8,318 facilities (out of 20,361 total munic-
ipal plants) that were listed as operational wastewater treatment plants as of 1972.
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Thus, my analysis does not include cities that built a wastewater treatment plant
after the CWA came into effect. This restriction increases the likelihood that compli-
ant and noncompliant cities shared important ex ante unobservable characteristics
that determine economic growth such as willingness of their taxpayer base to invest
in long-lasting infrastructure projects. I further exclude plants that ceased operation
over time by including only facilities that appear in each decade and in at least half
of the 13 surveys between 1972 and 2003. This restriction further drops 22% of the
facilities that appeared in the 1972 survey, leaving 6,440 plants. To reduce poten-
tial instances of measurement error or misreporting, I exclude wastewater treatment
plants that did not meet all of the following criteria: maintains facility type “wastew-
ater treatment plant” as opposed to sewer system, septic, or other (excludes 12.6%
of facilities); reports having wastewater treatment plant technology and is recorded
as a wastewater treatment facility (excludes 2.3% of facilities); does not cease having
a plant if had a plant in the prior year (excludes 3.7% of facilities), and does not
downgrade technology type from secondary to primary (excludes 19% of facilities).
These additional sample restrictions eliminate approximately 2,462 plants.
These sample restrictions serve to reduce measurement error of treatment plant
technology and help to ensure that variation across my treatment and control cities
is driven primarily by differences in the CWA technology standard, as opposed to
cyclical infrastructure degradation, or structural municipal decline. Appendix Table
A.18 shows descriptive statistics comparing my restricted sample to the full popula-
tion of municipal treatment plants. By utilizing only continuously operating plants,
the population size of cities in my analysis is larger, on average, than the mean plant-
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operating municipality. As a robustness check in Section 1.6.3, I re-estimate my main
empirical specifications without imposing either the 1972 criteria or the misreporting
exclusions and find qualitatively similar results to those of my restricted sample.
Table A.18: Characteristics of Sample vs Population of Cities with a Munic-
ipal Plant
Sample Population P-val for
difference in means
Population 35,075 10,074 0.000
Median House Price ($ ) 97,469 91,212 0.000
Share of population with a college degree 0.111 0.101 0.000
County income per capita 23,345 22,869 0.000
County employment share in manufacturing 0.368 0.356 0.001
County employment share in water-polluting manufacturing 0.148 0.136 0.000
Total revenues pc ($) 1,046 881 0.000
Intergovernment revenues pc ($) 180 157 0.000
Revenues from own sources pc ($) 865 724 0.000
Total taxes pc ($) 417 335 0.000
Total user fees pc ($) 108 68 0.000
Wastewater user fees pc ($) 31 19 0.000
Long-term debt outstanding pc ($) 1,387 1,372 0.924
Short-term debt outstanding pc ($) 94 58 0.000
Total expenditures pc ($) 1,069 916 0.000
Wastewater expenditures pc ($) 78 56 0.000
Total other expenditures pc ($) 654 560 0.000
Number of Cities 2,964 7,895
Panel Frequency 5.2 4.5
Observations 14,860 33,624
Note: All variables measured as means in 1967 and 1972. P-value denotes significance of difference
in means. See Section 1.4 for details on data sources.
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A.3 Dissolved Oxygen & Water Quality
I focus on dissolved oxygen as my preferred measure of water quality for two main
reasons. First, dissolved oxygen plays a crucial role in water ecosystems: insufficient
levels of dissolved oxygen can cause fish, amphibians, and plant life to die off. Because
the primary goal of the CWA was to restore and maintain the biological integrity of
US surface waters and to make all water “fishable and swimmable,” dissolved oxygen
provides an holistic measure of the effectiveness of the CWA technology mandate in
meeting the CWA goals. Second, dissolved oxygen is directly impacted by municipal
sewerage. Secondary treatment can increase dissolved oxygen levels by removing
harmful bacteria from the wastewater eﬄuent, including fecal coliforms, and nutrients
such as nitrogen and phosphorous (Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 2009). These
pollutants are potentially hazardous to human health and can induce eutrophication,
thereby reducing the clarity and aesthetic value of surface waters.
In summary, high levels of dissolved oxygen correlate with water quality attributes
that are likely to be valued by individuals, such as visual aesthetics and the oppor-
tunities for fishing and swimming recreation. However, dissolved oxygen may not
provide the most salient metric for water quality. Visual clarity of water, for exam-
ple, can be high even if the water quality is inhospitable to aquatic life and dissolved
oxygen levels are low. In absence of large fish kills or algal blooms, variation in
dissolved oxygen, nitrogen or phosphorous may be unobservable to the eye (Leggett
and Bockstael 2000). Turbidity provides a closer measure of water clarity, however
turbidity is not closely related to overall ecosystem health. To the extent that the
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dissolved oxygen improvements from secondary treatment are largely undetected by
local residents, my estimates on the local value of water quality from wastewater
treatment infrastructure will be attenuated toward a null effect.
A.4 Comparison of Water Quality Results
Keiser and Shapiro (2018) focus on municipal wastewater treatment plants as the
relevant treatment unit and employ a triple difference estimation strategy to show
that water quality downstream of grant-receiving plants improved significantly more
than that of plants that did not receive federal grants. Their study isolates changes
to water quality within 25 miles downstream of a wastewater treatment plant after
the plant receives an infrastructure grant. In contrast, my paper considers changes
to average surface water quality within 25 miles of the city center for cities under
pressure to comply with the CWA mandate. Both ex ante compliant and noncompli-
ant cities could receive EPA infrastructure grants. A second major difference is that
Keiser and Shapiro (2018) focus on dissolved oxygen deficit (among others) as their
measure of water quality, whereas I focus on dissolved oxygen in its compound form.
Because healthy levels of dissolved oxygen can differ across water bodies depend-
ing on the ambient temperature, salinity, and depth, researchers sometimes consider
dissolved oxygen saturation (or dissolved oxygen deficit) as a standardized measure.
I focus on the compound form to reduce potential mis-measurement from convert-
ing dissolved oxygen to dissolved oxygen saturation, and then aggregating up water
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quality readings to a city-level average. Because my empirical approach relies on
within-city variation, any cross sectional differences across geographic locations with
respect to their water chemistry is unlikely to bias my results.
A.5 Heterogeneity in Growth Responses by City Size
Despite having significantly lower costs of compliance, larger noncompliant cities
experienced more adverse growth outcomes relative to smaller noncompliant cities.
Appendix Table A.19 shows estimates of Eq. 1.7. Population of large cities grew
approximately 10% slower, on average, between 1972 and 2002 relative to smaller
cities; however, the total effect for both is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Median housing prices among larger noncompliant cities declined approximately 9%
more on average over the 30–year study period relative to noncompliant smaller cities.
Both classes of city size show evidence of high–skill sorting following the CWA.
A.5.1 Mechanisms for Heterogeneous Responses
Despite having lower compliance costs, larger cities appear to have substantially lower
overall benefits from the infrastructure mandate relative to smaller cities. I explore
two potential explanations for this surprising result. The first relates to housing
supply elasticity. If larger cities generally have less elastic housing supply, then cost
of living increases in larger cities will more readily manifest in price declines relative to
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smaller cities. I test for differences in housing supply response across larger relative
to smaller cities in Appendix Table A.20. While all results are noisily estimated,
point estimates for the larger cities suggest very limited response in housing quantity
following the CWA infrastructure mandate, consistent with inelastic housing supply.
In contrast, smaller cities have 2-10 times larger housing supply responses, indicating
more elastic supply. Noticeably, housing supply in smaller cities responds positively
to the CWA mandates. In the following section, I present a potential explanation
for this positive response.
The second potential mechanism driving more adverse growth responses in larger
cities relates to heterogeneity in water quality improvements from the CWA. I test
this mechanism by exploiting the local average treatment effect of my instruments,
which predicts ex ante noncompliance driven by low downstream population. A city
may have low downstream population either because it is situated near the mouth of
a river, or if it is situated at any point on a sparsely-populated river. Considering the
former case, large and small cities located near the end of a populous river are likely
to have different improvements to water quality following the CWA. Larger cities are
more likely to have been able to pressure upstream neighbors to adopt secondary
treatment prior to the CWA. Consequently, the CWA is less likely to improve water
quality generated from upstream polluters for larger cities near the end of a river.
Smaller cities, in contrast, may have greater benefits from mandated wastewater
treatment owing both to their own investments as well as those of upstream neigh-
bors. I explore this potential source of heterogeneity by categorizing cities according
to their population size relative to the total population of their river network. Ap-
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pendix Table A.21 presents estimates of Eq. 1.7 where ω equals 1 for cities whose
own population relative to the total river population are in the top 50th percentile of
their river network’s population share distribution.1 Because the complier group of
my instrument is likely to be cities located near the end of a river mouth, differences
in relative population size among this group can inform how much differences in
upstream treatment adoption may drive heterogeneous local growth responses to the
CWA. Results of Appendix Table A.21 are suggestive that cities occupying a larger
share of their river population have lower increases in water quality, housing supply,
housing prices, and share of high skill residents relative to cities occupying a smaller
share of their river population. Growth differences across city size are most pro-
nounced in the shorter time period presented in the top panel. Consequently, larger
cities may have faced worse growth responses to the uniform CWA mandate because
they were less likely to benefit from mandated upstream pollution abatement.
1The US Hydrography dataset organizes the US river system into 409 distinct river networks,
defined by a common terminating location (i.e. river mouth). I define a river system by the
“terminal path” identifier.
215
Table A.19: Effect of CWA Compliance on Local Government Growth by
City Size
Dissolved Oxygen Ln(Population) Ln(Median house price) High Skill Share
Primary’72xPost 1.455∗∗∗ 0.130∗ -0.007 0.013
(0.320) (0.067) (0.056) (0.014)
Primary’72xPostxAboveMedian 0.045 -0.086∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.088) (0.019) (0.013) (0.004)
Total Above Median Effect 1.500∗∗∗ 0.044 -0.097∗ 0.02
(0.313) (0.067) (0.055) (0.013)
Baseline mean 8.108 mg/l $36,710 95,461 11.02%
First Stage F-statistic 10.981 10.770 15.501 12.210
Observations 14177 8264 8264 6366
Note: Includes decade years only (1972, 1982, 1992). “High Skill Share” is the share of city population with 4 or more years of
college (1972) or a bachelor’s degree or higher (1982-2002); and includes only balanced panel of cities with annual observations for
educational attainment (e.g., cities with a population over 2,500 as of 1970). Table reports estimates of δPOST and δPOST×ω from
Eq. 1.7: yit = δPOST (Pi×POSTt) + δPOST×ω(Pi×POSTt×ωi) +Xiθτ + (N i×γt) +Diσt(R× t) +γt+ νi+ εit, where Equation 1.4
instruments for (Pi×POSTt). Standard errors clustered by city. Includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). Marginal effect for
ln(population) and ln(median house price) calculated as (exp(β−var(β)/2)−1)×100, where var(β) = (se(β1)2+se(β2)2+2cov(β1, β2).
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.20: Housing Supply Response by City Size
Ln(Housing Units)
(1) (2) (3)
Primary’72xPost (Below Med) 0.137 0.119 -0.056
(0.087) (0.085) (0.086)
Primary’72xPost (Above Med) 0.000 -0.011 -0.033
(0.083) (0.081) (0.082)
First Stage F-statistic 13.231 13.627 12.97
Controls Y Y Y
PopxYearFE Y Y
Incl. 1972-1982 Y
Baseline mean 16816 16816 16815
Observations 10489 10489 8610
Note: Includes decade years only (1972, 1982, 1992, 2002). Column
(3) includes only the first decade following the CWA. Number of
housing units per municipality sourced from IPUMS NGHIS. Table
reports estimates of δPOST and δPOST×ω from Equation 1.7: yit =
δPOST (Pi×POSTt) + δPOST×ω(Pi×POSTt×ωi) +Xiθτ + (N i×
γt) +Diσt+ (R× t) +γt+νi+ εit, where Equation 1.4 instruments
for (Pi × POSTt). Standard errors clustered by city. “Controls”
include all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.21: CWA Noncompliance Effect by City Size as Share of River Pop-
ulation
DO2 Ln(Housing Units) Ln(House Price) Ln(Population) Share College
Includes 1972-1992
Primary’72xPost 1.390∗∗∗ 0.053 0.358∗∗∗ 0.086 0.039∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.083) (0.075) (0.077) (0.014)
Primary’72xPostxAboveMedian -0.057 -0.031 -0.096∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.007
(0.113) (0.035) (0.024) (0.025) (0.005)
Observations 14177 7618 8264 8264 7618
Includes 1972-2002
Primary’72xPost 0.979∗∗∗ 0.046 0.020 0.035 0.043∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.095) (0.057) (0.082) (0.015)
Primary’72xPostxAboveMedian 0.026 -0.024 -0.094∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.011∗
(0.105) (0.040) (0.019) (0.030) (0.006)
Observations 18998 10489 11127 11127 10489
Note: Table reports estimates o δPOST and δPOST×ω from Eq. 1.7: yit = δPOST (Pi × POSTt) + δPOST×ω(Pi ×
POSTt × ωi) + Xiθτ + (N i × γt) + Diσt + (R × t) + γt + νi + εit, where Eq. 1.4 instruments for (Pi × POSTt).
Standard errors clustered by city. Xi includes all controls listed in Table 1.2, column(4). Above Median equals 1 if
a city’s population share of its river network is in the top 50th percentile among cities on its river network. There
are 409 river networks. Aggregate median river population share is 0.003%. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.22: Federal Grant Receipt and City Population Size
Population Size
Above Median Below Median Obs. Baseline Mean
Panel A: Annual Wastewater Expenditures
Total per capita 136.17∗∗∗ 166.81∗∗∗ 11,924 $66.7
(51.75) (53.34)
Capital per capita 106.02∗∗ 121.61∗∗ 11,924 $38.68
(48.71) (50.58)
Panel B: Annual Federal grant receipts
Grant flow per capita 152.36∗∗∗ 144.72∗∗∗ 11,924 $14.63
(37.65) (39.60)
Note: Table reports estimates of β from Eq. 1.2: yit = β(Pi×POSTt)+Xiθt+(R×
t) +γt+νi+ εit where (Pi×POSTt) is using Eq. 1.4. The first stage F-statistic for
Panels A and B is 14.64. Includes years 1967-1987. Standard errors clustered by city.
Includes all controls listed in Table 1.2 column 4. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Panel B uses grant data defined as ”Federal intergovernmental other” by the Census
of Governments, which included municipal receipt of federal CWA infrastructure
grants from 1967 through 1992. In addition to grants for sewerage, the “other”
federal grants category includes grants for generally infrequent cost needs, such as
disaster assistance and homeland security. Note, the post-CWA increase in federal
aid more than covers total wastewater expenditures for larger cities, but falls short
by more than $20 per capita for smaller cities.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 Labor & Energy Cost Calculations
We calculated fuel costs using reported fuel-use data from NTD and estimates of
retail fuel prices for each of the reported fuel inputs. Fuel prices were sourced from
the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Fuel price data vary by state and
year. NTD does not report labor costs separately from total operations costs. Thus,
we infer labor costs as the residual operating costs net of our calculated energy
costs. The following figure shows the breakdown of line items included in operating
expenses as reported by transit agencies to NTD. Vehicle operating costs include:
labor costs (including salaries, wages, benefits, and pensions), costs of fuel, materials
and supplies, utility costs, taxes, and liability costs. With the exception of fuel
inputs, we cannot separately identify these costs from total operating costs. Thus,
our estimate of labor costs is an upward bound, and includes expenses for materials
and miscellaneous expenses.
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Figure B.1: Operating Costs Line Items as Reported to NTD
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B.2 Details on the Welfare Analysis Calculation
The procedure we use to estimate welfare loss from high public transit cost is as
follows: We begin by specifying the consumer compensating variation obtained from
reducing bus transit operating costs by privatizing.
Consider the consumer’s minimum cost of achieving a utility level, u, given prices
p:
g(p, u) = min
x
{p ∗ x|u(x) ≥ u} (B.1)
The compensated demand function for good xi ∈ x is given by:1
xi =
∂g(p, u)
∂pi
= g(p, u) (B.2)
Glaister (1974). Let α1 and p1 be the price of bus fare under current privatization
levels (where majority of bus transit is publicly operated), and under the counter-
factual scenario of complete privatization, respectively. Let all other prices faced by
the consumer, pˆ, be held constant. The loss to the consumer from purchasing bus
fare, x1, at α1 instead of the lower efficient price p1 can be expressed by:2
A =
∫ α1
p1
g1(z, pˆ, u)dz = g(α1, pˆ, u)− g(p1, pˆ, u) (B.3)
The area A is the change in consumer surplus due to the change in transit operating
costs.
1The difference between the compensated and Marshallian demand function is the income effect.
Deaton (1974) shows that if the utility function is additively separable, and the expenditure on the
good is a small fraction of income, then the compensated and uncompensated elasticities will be
close. For purposes of this exercise, we posit that bus transit is additively separable to all other
consumption goods and services.
2Small and Rosen (1981) provide a detailed outline for the theoretical justification for measuring
price-induced utility changes as areas to the left of the relevant compensated demand curves.
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To apply this theoretical framework to our empirical analysis, we specify g(.) as
the transit agency supply curve. We have posited a production function whereby
transit agencies employ inputs in fixed proportions to produce a bus mile. Thus,
marginal costs are equal to unit operating costs, C
VMT
. Let the transit agency supply
curve equal their marginal costs, thus g(.) = C
VMT
. The consumer’s expenditure for
bus transit is proportional to the transit agency’s marginal costs of providing bus
service.
In addition to a supply curve, the other inputs necessary to calculate welfare
loss include a demand curve for bus transit, a base unit cost of transit, and the
counterfactual unit cost of transit under complete privatization. Our base unit cost
of transit is the operating costs per VMT, C
VMT
, predicted by our model under
privatization levels observed as of 2011. We predict C
VMT
under current privatization
using the RD specification presented in Section 2.6.1. To generate the estimates, we
regress the log of total operating costs per VMT on predicted privatization share (city
mayoral party affiliation instruments for privatization share in the fuzzy RD design),
following the right-hand-side of Eq. 2.9. Since we are interested in predicting total
operating costs, rather than labor operating costs, we control for energy input prices
in addition to each of the covariates impacting labor unit costs presented in Table
2.3. Under 2011 observed privatization levels, the predicted average C
VMT
is $6.63.
The counterfactual C
VMT
predicted by our model if all transit agency operations are
completely privatized is approximately $4.16.3
3As our dependent variable is in log form, we calculate the predicted unit cost values using a
smearing adjustment following Greene (2003): yˆ = exp (X ′βˆ + σ/2)
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We calculate a demand curve for bus transit using an elasticity measure of bus
ridership, or passenger trips, with respect to bus fare. According to Gagnepain
and Ivaldi (2002),Oum et al. (1992), and TCRP (2004), this elasticity measure is
approximately -0.4. Specifically, R = −0.4 = (%∆Ridership)/(%∆Fare). Given the
aggregate ridership of bus transit in 2011 was approximately 5.2 billion, we can solve
for the change in ridership given an incremental change in bus transit fare. This
requires that we specify a transformation from our predicted unit operating costs to
bus passenger fare.4
To perform this transformation, we multiply the predicted C
VMT
= $6.63 by the
average VMT per passenger trip observed in 2011, 0.45, to calculate predicted unit
cost per passenger trip, C
Trip
. By employing a constant term, C
Trip
, for the transfor-
mation of predicted unit costs, we assume the number of passenger trips per VMT is
unaffected by privatization levels. This static simplification is consistent with Gag-
nepain and Ivaldi (2002) who modeled the relationship between VMT and passenger
trips as a reduced form function of population characteristics, density, and road con-
gestion in a particular year. Since our welfare analysis is particular to the year 2011,
our methodology is consistent with Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) in assuming that
4We have characterized transit agency supply in terms of VMT, while consumer demand is in
terms of passenger trips. Transit agency costs and revenues are driven by two different output
variables that are closely related. Outputs from the perspective of the transit agency are VMT,
whereas the passenger uses VMT as inputs in the “production” of their final consumption good,
which is passenger miles or passenger-trips. (“This characterization of transit output is quite useful
if we construct a general equilibrium model of transit, in which transit firms supply intermediate-
type outputs while passengers, who demand them, generate final-type outputs.” (Berechman 2013).
Prior literature has frequently employed similar transformations as those discussed here, recognizing
the difference between VMT as intermediate output and passenger trips as final output in transit
systems (Gagnepain and Ivaldi 2002).
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the relationship between capacity and demand is static in a particular year. Our pre-
vious empirical findings on the impacts of privatization on transit agency VMT and
rider occupancy further support this simplification. Appendix Table B.4 shows that
privatization does not have a deterministically significant impact on either VMT,
PMT, or rider occupancy rate.
Our transformation further assumes transit agencies price at marginal cost. In
this way we can interpret unit cost per passenger trip as an approximation to the
predicted bus fare per passenger trip. We acknowledge that marginal cost pricing
is not representative of public transit pricing schemes. Public transit pricing is, in
general, heavily subsidized to make up for the large fixed costs of infrastructure.
Mohring (1972) gives a detailed discussion of dynamic optimal pricing schemes. We
abstract away from identifying the pricing scheme of transit agencies in order to
highlight general welfare effects from inefficient public transit. In summary:
g(α1, pˆ, u) = $6.63 ∗ 0.45 = $2.98per trip
g(p1, pˆ, u) = $4.16 ∗ 0.45 = $1.87per trip
%∆Ridership = %∆Cost per Trip ∗ R
where %∆Cost per Trip are based on incremental value changes between $1.87 and
$2.98. We calculate the area A in Eq. B.3 using the trapezoidal method. A in Eq.
B.3 corresponds to the shaded area in Figure 2.9.
The procedure for calculating welfare loss specific to Boston, Chicago, and San
Antonio mimic the above discussion with the following exceptions. First, rather than
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using an aggregate ridership value of 5.2 billion, the base ridership value is based
on city-specific estimates. Second, the transformation calculations employ the city-
specific average VMT per passenger trip observed in 2011. These values and their
sources are shown in the following table:
City Transit Agency Values as of 2011
Total Annual Total Annual VMT per
City (Agency) Passenger Trips (mn.) VMT (mn.) Passenger Trip
Boston (MBTA) 109.9 27.2 0.25
Chicago (CTA) 310.4 58 0.19
San Antonio (VIA) 44.2 22.4 0.51
Source: NTD.gov Data Tables, Table 19: Transit Operating Statistics for 2011
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B.3 Alternative Empirical Strategies as Robustness Checks
In this section, we present two alternative empirical strategies based on different
identifying assumptions from that of the RD analysis.
B.3.1 Union Contract Cycle as Instrument
We carry out estimation of Eq. 2.9 and instrument for the privatization share using
union contract cycle schedules for 10 transit agencies. When a union’s labor contract
is over and up for negotiation, the transit agency manager may find it easier to
privatize a portion of their operations to private contractors. However, the status of
the labor contract (whether it is active or not) should not be correlated with a transit
agency’s unit labor costs. Appendix Table B.5 shows the first stage results. The end
of a labor contract cycle is positively correlated with privatization share, as we would
expect. Appendix Table B.6 shows the impact of privatization on labor costs under
OLS and GMM employing the contract cycle instrument. The cost saving estimates
are very similar in magnitude to the RD estimates discussed in Section 2.6.1; a 1%
increase in the share of bus miles that are privatized reduces labor costs per mile by
between 0.6% and 0.9%.
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B.3.2 Using Subway Cities as Controls
Due to limited within-city variation in the NTD data, we are unable to employ city-
level fixed effects in our main specifications discussed in Section 2.6.1. Thus, our
identification comes from variation in transit agencies within the same state with
differing levels of privatized bus miles. The analyses in Section 2.6.1 include various
controls for transit agency characteristics, such as fleet size, type, and the share
of buses that use alternative fuel. However, it is possible that certain unobservable
city-specific factors affect both privatization decisions and unit labor costs, and these
unobservables generate the differences we observe across agencies within the same
state.
To address this endogeneity concern, we look at the subset of agencies in our
NTD data whose UZA also has a subway system. Subway systems, by their nature
as massive public works projects, are public entities and cannot be privatized. Com-
paring the operating costs of bus transit to the operating costs of subway transit in
the same city will fully control for any city-wide unobserved effects that impact tran-
sit costs, which may confound our main cross-city identification. We carry out two
specifications: in column (1) of Appendix Table B.7 the dependent variable is the log
of bus operating costs per VMT, and the regression controls for subway operating
costs per VMT. In column (2), the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of bus to
subway operating costs. Under both specifications, a 1% increase in privatized bus
miles is associated with a 1% decrease in operating costs per VMT. These results are
again, consistent with those found in Section 2.6.1 under the RD method.
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B.4 Figures & Tables
Figure B.2: Privatization share among non-dominant agencies. Bin
size=0.04. Sample includes 662 agency-year pairs.
Source: “Non-dominant” agencies include those that do not have the largest average annual
vehicle miles traveled from 1998-2011 in a UZA. Each dot corresponds to the average transit
agency privatization share following mayoral election t, given the margin of victory obtained by
Democrats in election t. The solid and dashed lines represent the predicted values of privatization
share from linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomial control functions of the winning margin.
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Figure B.3: Predicted Log(Labor Costs) Given Pre-Existing Agency Char-
acteristics at the Democrat Winning Margin Threshold. Bin
size=0.04. Sample includes 1,299 agency-year pairs
Source: Each dot corresponds to the average predicted log(labor costs) per VMT following may-
oral election t, given the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t. The solid and
dashed lines represent the linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomial control functions of best fit.
Predicted values of log(labor costs) per VMT are obtained from a regression model relating ob-
served log (labor costs) per VMT to each of the 11 predetermined covariates, x, listed in Appendix
Table B.1 as follows: yit = xκ + εit. The vector of coefficients, κ, is estimated from a random
subsample of 150 observations. Next, we generate out-of-sample predictions of log(labor costs)
per VMT: yˆit = xκ. The resulting covariate index function can be interpreted as the best linear
prediction of mean log labor costs given the vector of predetermined variables (Card et al. 2015).
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Figure B.4: Privatization Share at the Democrat winning margin threshold.
Bin size=0.04
Source: Each dot corresponds to the average transit agency privatization share following mayoral election t, given
the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t. The solid and dashed lines represent the predicted
values of privatization share from linear, quadratic, and cubic polynomial control functions of the winning margin.
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Figure B.5: Residual Ln(Labor Costs per VMT) at the Democrat winning
margin threshold among agencies in strong bargaining rights
states. Sample includes 880 agency-year pairs. Bin size=0.04
Source: Each dot corresponds to the average residual log unit labor cost following mayoral election
t, given the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t. The solid and dashed lines
represent the predicted values of residual log unit labor cost from linear, quadratic, and cubic
polynomial control functions. Figures plot residuals generated from OLS regressions of log unit
labor cost on all controls listed in Table 2.3, and year and state fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at the UZA level.
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Figure B.6: Local Polynomial Regressions with Varying Bandwidth: Effect
of Privatization on Log(Labor Cost per VMT)
Source: This figure re-estimates the local polynomial specification in column (7) of Table 2.5
under varying bandwidths. The estimated treatment effect from (7) in Table 2.5 is represented
by the shaded red line, which has an optimal CCT bandwidth of 0.294. All treatment effects
estimated using local polynomial Fuzzy RD estimation with robust CCT confidence intervals,
triangular kernel, and the denoted bandwidth, and are of order two in winning margin.
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Figure B.7: Mayoral Regime Characteristics at the Democrat Winning Mar-
gin Threshold. Sample includes 1,444 agency-year pairs. Bin
size=0.04.
Source: Each dot corresponds to the average noted UZA mayoral regime characteristic following
mayoral election t, given the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t. The solid
and dashed lines represent the predicted values of the noted characteristic from linear, quadratic,
and cubic polynomial control functions without covariates.
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Figure B.8: Residual service attributes at the Democrat winning margin
threshold. Bin size=0.04. Sample includes 1430 agency-year
pairs.
Source: Each dot corresponds to the average noted residual service attribute following mayoral
election t, given the margin of victory obtained by Democrats in election t. The solid and dashed
lines represent the predicted values of residual service attribute from linear, quadratic, and cubic
polynomial control functions. Figures plot residuals generated from OLS regressions of each
service attribute. All regressions include all controls listed in Table 2.3, as well as log(fleet size)
and log(average fleet age) as of 1997 to control for initial service demand conditions, and year
and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the UZA level.
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Table B.1: Test for Discontinuity in Covariate Means Near Winning Margin
Threshold
Covariate Mean P-Value
[-0.6,-0.3) [-0.3, 0) [0, 0.3) [0.3, 0.6]
A. UZA Characteristics
Weekly (low skill) wage ($) 577.47 589.8 609.17 605.99 0.983
Road congestion index1 0.891 0.916 0.927 0.94 0.181
Home price ($ ’000) 316.843 283.183 259.375 255.399 0.403
Share unionized workers2 0.057 0.064 0.064 0.059 0.41
Population Density (pop/sq. mi) 2836.4 2399.6 2397.6 2395.5 0.716
B. Agency Characteristics
Share independent agency 0.552 0.574 0.661 0.446 0.175
Share city agency 0.385 0.367 0.239 0.384 0.082
Fleet size (no. buses) 216.1 162.3 206.6 391.2 0.449
Fleet age (years) 7.2 7.6 7.6 7.6 0.738
Share of CNG buses3 0.108 0.076 0.059 0.069 0.644
Share of hybrid buses 0.012 0.011 0.01 0.007 0.074
Observations 96 324 230 112
Notes: Columns 1-4 report the variable mean for UZA’s within the noted Democrat winning
margin window. P-values are based on discontinuity estimates, λ, from second-order polynomial
regressions in Democrat winning margin: yit = σD(S)it+λ1Mit+λ2M2it+λ3DitMit+λ4DitM2it+
νit or (|M |≤ 0.6) where y is a covariate, M is the winning margin, and D = 1 if the winning
mayor is a Democrat. Standard errors were clustered at the UZA level.
1 Road congestion index measures density of traffic across urban areas. An index greater than
1 indicates an undesirable level of area-wide congestion. (Source: Texas A&M Transportation
Institute)
2 Means are conditional on share of unionized workers in strong bargaining rights states.
3 CNG is compressed natural gas, a cleaner type of fuel than gasoline, diesel, or propane.
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Table B.2: The Effect of Mayoral Party Affiliation and Transit Agency Ser-
vice Offering
Annual Vehicle Annual Passenger Occupancy
Miles (th.) Miles (th.) Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MV Window [-1, 1] [-0.6,0.6] [-1, 1] [-0.6,0.6] [-1, 1] [-0.6,0.6]
Mayor Effect -6.372*** -2.442 -8.942*** -4.465 0.142 0.202
(2.081) (2.44) (3.312) (4.138) (0.35) (0.476)
Observations 1444 762 1444 762 1444 762
Adjusted R2 0.769 0.752 0.659 0.647 0.66 0.627
Notes: Dependent variable is denoted at top of each column. Occupancy Rate is PMT/ VMT.
Mayor effect is the total effect of Democrat mayor (λ1) and Democrat mayor interacted with
strong bargaining rights state indicator (λ2) from the following specification: yit = σD(S)it +
λ1Mit+λ2M2it+λ3DitMit+λ4DitM2it+νit or (|M |≤ 0.6) where y is a covariate, M is the winning
margin, and D = 1 if the winning mayor is a Democrat. All regressions are OLS. Sample includes
dominant transit agencies only. zit is the vector of covariates listed in Table 2.3 as well as year
and state fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at UZA level. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.3: Effect of Privatization on Frequency of Fatal and Non-Fatal Inci-
dents
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimator NB NB FRD CCT
Dependent Var No. of Yearly Incidents No. of Yearly Incidents/VMT
Privatization share -0.329** -0.507 -0.027 5.299
(0.167) (0.379) (0.027) (8.579)
Year & State FE Y Y Y
UZA & Agency Controls Y Y Y
Sample Full RD RD RD
Observations 2597 1030 1030 661
AIC 13954.9 6799.6 — —
Notes:The dependent variable for (1-2) is the number of annual non-fatal and fatal incidents
reported by the transit agency. Regressions (1-2) are negative binomial, and control for log
of annual VMT. The dependent variable for (3-4) is the number of annual non-fatal and fatal
incidents per VMT. (3) includes controls for quadratic polynomial of winning margin and their
interaction with Democrat mayor indicator. The first stage for (3) is reported in Table 2.4, column
(3). Excluded instruments in (3) are Democrat (d); and Democrat x StrongBarg. (4) employs
local polynomial RD estimation with robust confidence intervals developed by Calonico et al.
(2014); (4) is estimated using a triangular kernel and mean-squared error optimal CCT bandwidth
selector of 0.240. Agency and UZA controls listed in Table 2.3. AIC measures goodness of fit for
nonlinear models; smaller AIC is a better fit. AIC calculated as -2(log likelihood) + 2(dof +1).
Standard errors clustered at the UZA level in parentheses.∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table B.4: Effect of Privatization on Total VMT, PMT and Rider Occupancy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator OLS FRD OLS FRD OLS FRD
Dependent Var Log (Vehicle Miles Traveled) Log (Passenger Miles Traveled) Log (Occupancy)
Privatization share 0.144*** 0.28 0.014 -0.826 -0.13 -1.233
(0.035) (0.42) (0.089) (0.777) (0.084) (0.81)
Year & State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
UZA & Agency Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations* 3672 1430 3672 1430 3672 1430
F-Stat for Excl. IV – 3.1 – 3.74 – 3.1
Notes: Dependent variable is log annual VMT in (1) and (2), log annual PMT in (3) and (4), and annual occupancy
rate in (5) and (6). Occupancy is annual passenger miles divided by annual VMT. All regressions include controls
for log(fleet size) and log(average fleet age) as of 1997 to control for initial service demand conditions. The fuzzy
RD specifications further control for quadratic polynomials of Democrat winning margin and their interactions
with the Democratic mayor dummy, and use both the Democratic mayor assignment variable as well as its
interaction with strong state bargaining rights indicator in the first stage. The fuzzy RD estimates are based on
dominant agencies only. UZA & Agency Controls listed in Table 2.3. Standard errors are clustered at the UZA
level. ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01. *Sample sizes are based on transit agencies that report passenger miles
traveled. Of our full sample of 3,706 agency-year observations, 34 observations do not report passenger miles
traveled, 14 of which have mayoral election data.
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Table B.5: First Stage Regressions Using Contract Cycle as IV
(1) (2)
OLS OLS
Labor contract cycle 0.016*** 0.042***
(0.005) (0.005)
Hourly wage (low skill) -0.009 -0.067
(0.032) (0.084)
Road congestion index 0.014 0.103
(0.111) (0.134)
Avg. home price -0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.006)
Union share*StrongBarg (d)1 -0.1 0.217
(0.178) (0.357)
Ln(population density) 1.051*** 1.225***
(0.401) (0.163)
Ln(number of buses) 0.173*** 0.277***
(0.062) (0.04)
Ln(average bus age) -0.036** -0.085***
(0.014) (0.0)2
Share of CNG buses -0.011 0.049
(0.043) (0.05)
Share of hybrid buses -0.255*** -0.237
(0.082) (0.333)
Year FE Y Y
Agency FE Y
Observations 130 140
Adjusted R2 0.623 0.726
Notes: The dependent variable is privatization share. The data include 10 transit agencies for
which we have union contract cycle data. Column (1) is estimated after first-differencing (FD)
while column (2) uses transit agency fixed effects (FE). Contract cycle variable is defined as the
number of labor contract cycles since 1998. (d) denotes a binary variable. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
1 Omitted category is weak bargaining rights state.
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Table B.6: Labor Cost Regression Using Contract Cycles as IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS w/ FD OLS w/ FE GMM w/ FD GMM w/ FE
Privatization share -0.646*** -0.762*** -0.389 -0.869***
(0.129) (0.072) (0.598) (0.141)
Hourly wage (low skill) -0.103 0.02 -0.099 0.008
(0.093) (0.116) (0.098) (0.115)
Road congestion index 0.449* 0.429*** 0.458* 0.418***
(0.267) (0.139) (0.273) (0.136)
House Price 0.014** 0.003 0.014** 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Union share*StrongBarg (d)1 0.065 -0.158 0.092 -0.12
(0.292) (0.434) (0.296) (0.428)
Ln(population density) 0.228 0.587*** -0.033 0.641***
(0.296) (0.145) (0.698) (0.151)
Ln(population) 0.190*** 0.160** 0.143 0.203**
(0.057) (0.068) (0.099) (0.081)
Ln(number of buses) 0.021 0.050*** 0.03 0.045**
(0.031) (0.019) (0.041) (0.019)
Ln(average bus age) 0.009 0.059 0.014 0.056
(0.084) (0.052) (0.085) (0.052)
Share of CNG buses -0.893*** -0.645*** -0.840*** -0.733***
(0.305) (0.207) (0.302) (0.216)
Share of hybrid buses -0.646*** -0.762*** -0.389 -0.869***
(0.129) (0.072) (0.598) (0.141)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Agency FE Y Y
F-Stat for Excl. IV – – 7.22 59.79
Observations 130 140 130 140
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.933 0.137 0.932
Notes: The dependent variable is log(labor cost per VMT). The data include 10 transit agencies
for which we have union contract cycle data. Columns (1) and (3) are estimated after first-
differencing (FD) and columns (2) and (4) include transit agency fixed effects (FE). The IV for
privatization is the number of labor contract cycles since 1998. (d) denotes a binary variable.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
1 Omitted category is weak bargaining rights state.
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Table B.7: Effect of Privatization on Bus Costs per Mile Using Subway as
Control
(1) (2)
Dependent Var log(Bus cost per VMT) log(Bus cost/Subway cost)
Privatization share -1.008*** -1.002***
(0.115) (0.226)
Log(total cost per mile for subway) 0.248***
(0.044)
Hourly wage (low skill) 0.183 0.117
(0.185) (0.236)
Ln(Nat. Gas price) 0.017 -0.016
(0.014) (0.027)
Ln(Diesel price) -0.326 -1.529**
(0.282) (0.558)
Road congestion index 0.093 0.049
(0.202) (0.296)
House Price 0.012 0.052
(0.015) (0.030)
Union share*StrongBarg (d)1 -0.118 0.925
(0.579) (0.900)
Ln(population density) 0.244 -0.462
(0.302) (0.365)
Independent agency (d)2 -0.223 -0.803***
(0.218) (0.179)
City agency (d)2 -0.753*** -0.745**
(0.136) (0.238)
Ln(number of buses) 0.024 0.087
(0.048) (0.073)
Log(average bus age) 0.001 -0.176
(0.065) (0.099)
Share of CNG buses -0.254*** -0.236*
(0.070) (0.122)
Share of hybrid buses -0.191 -0.55
(0.179) (0.395)
Year & State FE Y Y
Observations 140 140
Adjusted R2 0.977 0.953
Notes: The dependent variable in (1) is log(total bus operating cost per VMT). The dependent
variable in (2) is log(total bus operating cost per VMT / total subway operating cost per subway
mile traveled). All regressions are OLS. Total operating costs include labor and material costs,
fuel costs, administration, and maintenance. (d) denotes a binary variable. The data include 10
transit agencies that run both a bus system and a subway system. Standard errors are clustered
at the transit agency level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
1 Omitted category is weak bargaining rights state.
2 Omitted agency-type category is “Other”, which includes state DOT or subsidiary agencies.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
C.1 Figures & Tables
Figure C.1: Beijing Subway System Expansion
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Figure C.2: Income-Distance Gradient with various definitions of CBD
Note: Figure plots mean household income by binned distance to city center. Includes 50 bins each with 330 and
1400 obs per bin in pre and post periods, respectively. Means residualized by distance to the nearest subway.
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Table C.1: Effects of CDR policy on City Center-Price gradient - Varying
Definition of City Center
Geographic Technology Software Financial Beijing Embassy Business Shopping
Center District District District “CBD” District Park District
CBD Proximity (km) x CDR 0.006 0.007∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.003 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
CBD Proximity (km) -0.020 -0.015 -0.013 -0.025 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.018
(0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.017)
Avg Price Premium / Km $60.85 $71.82 $89.07 $34.04 $96.67 $58.32 $95.73 $99.45
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Jiedao FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 83711 83711 83711 83711 83711 83711 83711 83711
Adjusted R2 0.611 0.612 0.613 0.612 0.614 0.611 0.615 0.612
Note: Dependent variable is ln(total price per square meter in 2007 real Yuan). Standard errors clustered at building complex level. Sample spans 12
mos. before and after CDR. Average price premium evaluated at the mean unit size (100 sqm for owner-occupied) within 4 and 6 km of the nearest
business district. Controls include distance to nearest subway station, year, month, and district fixed effects; controls for complex age, age2, size,
floor-area ratio, green space, no. total floors; controls for housing unit size, decoration level, floor level, facing direction, and no. bedrooms.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.2: Comparison of CDR Effects with Xu et al. (2015)
CDR is October 11 CDR is July 20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ln(Distance to Subway) -0.081∗∗ 0.071 -0.022 -0.085∗∗ -0.096∗∗ 0.010 -0.057∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗
(0.038) (0.049) (0.023) (0.039) (0.038) (0.057) (0.019) (0.050)
Ln(Distance to Subway) x CDR -0.069 -0.107∗∗∗ -0.068∗∗∗ -0.085 -0.077∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.030) (0.023) (0.055) (0.031) (0.013)
Location Controls Y Y Y Y
Full Controls Y Y
Jiedao FE Y Y Y Y
6 mos. pre CDR Y Y
Observations 18989 18981 18981 5917 14061 14051 14051 6016
Adjusted R2 0.223 0.630 0.720 0.166 0.189 0.654 0.731 0.101
Note: Dependent variable is ln(total price per square meter in 2007 real Yuan). Standard errors clustered at building complex level.
Excludes housing units near newly built subway stations. Location Controls include distance to city center, and an indicator for
locating within a key school district. Controls include year, month, and district fixed effects; and controls for complex age, age2,
size, floor-area ratio, green space, no. total floors; controls for housing unit size, decoration level, floor level, facing direction, and no.
bedrooms. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table C.3: CDR Policy and Income sorting near the Central Business Dis-
trict - Varying Definition of City Center
Geographic Technology Software Financial Beijing Embassy Business Shopping
Center District District District “CBD” District Park District
Ln(Household Income)× CDR -0.010∗∗ 0.002 -0.009∗∗ 0.003 -0.020∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Ln(Household Income) -0.001 -0.011∗∗ -0.002 -0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.002 0.008∗ 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Zip FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Subway Line FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 18135 18135 18135 18135 18135 18135 18135 18135
Adjusted R2 0.979 0.957 0.959 0.980 0.967 0.972 0.963 0.978
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Distance to CBD (km)). Income is household monthly income (’000 yuan). CDR equals 1 after July 20 2008. Standard
errors clustered by household. Sample spans July 20, 2006-July 20, 2010. Demographic controls include husband and wife age, employment rank,
education, employer type, and tenure. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.3: Price Proximity Gradient, excluding areas near newly-built sta-
tions
Note: Figure plots mean house price for each of 20 distance bins. Each dot represents 12,100
and 76,500 obs per bin in pre and post, respectively. Means are residualized by distance to the
central business district. ρ(pre) and ρ(post) are regression coefficients. Includes years 2005-2016.
Source: Real estate transaction dataset.
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Table C.4: Effects of CDR policy on Subway-Price gradient, excluding areas
near newly-built stations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Subway Proximity (km) x CDR 0.037 0.012 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Subway Proximity (km) 0.097∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011)
Avg Price Premium / Km $373.45 $117.89 $127.32 $136.63 $150.62
Controls Y Y Y Y
Jiedao FE Y Y Y
Year-Month FE Y
DistrictxYear-Quarter FE Y
Observations 12486 12486 12479 12479 12479
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.617 0.727 0.738 0.746
Note: Dependent variable is ln(total price per square meter in 2007 real Yuan). Sample includes
housing units in building complexes that do not change in their proximity to subway stations from
2005 through 2016. Standard errors clustered at jiedao level. Sample spans 12 mos. before and after
CDR. Average price premium evaluated at the mean unit size (100 sqm for owner-occupied) within
1 and 1.5 km of a subway station. Controls include year, month, and district fixed effects; controls
for complex age, age2, size, floor-area ratio, green space, no. total floors; controls for housing unit
size, decoration level, floor level, facing direction, and no. bedrooms. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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